



THE BENDIGO FIRE

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
The City of Greater Bendigo is about 150 kilometres north-west of Melbourne. The city itself, centrally located in the municipality, is one of Victoria’s main regional centres.

The Bendigo fire started shortly after 16:00 on 7 February 2009 in Maiden Gully, 8 kilometres north-west of the central business district. It burned through gently rolling country bordering the city’s western suburbs, where there are numerous former gold diggings that are now public open space interspersed between suburban blocks. The fire burned for six hours in the late afternoon and evening, running for about 5.5 kilometres to the south-east before the wind changed at about 18:45 and pushed the flames to the north-east, further into suburban Bendigo. About half of the area burnt was public land. One fatality occurred, a number of people were injured, and 58 houses were destroyed. Figure 13.1 shows the extent of the fire.

OVERVIEW

Maximum temperature	The maximum temperature recorded was 45.4°C at Bendigo automatic weather station. ¹
Minimum relative humidity	The minimum relative humidity recorded was 6 per cent at Bendigo AWS at 13:16. ²
Wind	The maximum winds recorded before the wind change were north-westerly at 41 kilometres an hour at 17:01. ³ The wind change was recorded by the Bendigo AWS at 18:45 at 35 kilometres an hour. ⁴ The maximum winds recorded after the wind change were south-westerly at 35 kilometres an hour at 18:45. ⁵
Fire danger index	The maximum Grassland Fire Danger Index was 129 at Bendigo AWS at 13:31. ⁶
Cause	Suspicious. ⁷
Fatalities	One fatality. ⁸
Casualties	Forty-one casualties. ⁹
Houses destroyed	Fifty-eight houses. ¹⁰
Overall area burnt	341 hectares. ¹¹
Firefighting resources	On 7 February, 152 CFA and 111 NEO personnel attended the fire. They were supported by 30 CFA appliances, 31 NEO appliances and 3 aircraft. ¹²


Figure 13.1 The Bendigo fire




Source: Exhibit 994 – Maiden Gully Fire – Fire Spread Map.¹³

Bendigo 7 February – 9 February

The following time line summarises events associated with the Bendigo fire. For the most part, the times given are approximate. Further details about the events are provided in the accompanying narrative.





13.1 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

13.1.1 PREPARATION

Bendigo is in the same CFA region as Redesdale, so preparations for Bendigo were the same as those for Redesdale (see Chapter 11). On 6 February Mr John Deering, Operations Manager of CFA Region 14, and Department of Sustainability and Environment acting Area Land and Fire Manager, Mr Andrew Matthews, set up a joint level 3 incident management team at the Epsom Incident Control Centre, for a 'hot start' the following day. Many of the IMT members selected for the hot start were at the ICC on 6 February and used that day to test and confirm ground observer arrangements and begin fire behaviour prediction work. Those present also participated in a practice scenario involving a multi-agency response to a level 3 fire.¹⁴

A fully staffed IMT was at the Epsom ICC on the morning of 7 February. Mr Deering was there from 08:30 and shared the leadership role with Mr James Dalton, DSE Assistant Manager, Fire and Emergency Management. Both men were accredited level 3 Incident Controllers.¹⁵

What was not contemplated in the detailed preparations at the Epsom ICC was the possibility that a second level 3 fire would demand further incident management resources. The possibility became reality, and the Epsom IMT felt unable to manage two complex fires that were about 40 kilometres apart.¹⁶

The Municipal Emergency Resource Officer had confirmed on 6 February the availability of council staff for emergency response and recovery and placed the council's seven water tankers and six graders on standby.¹⁷

Table 13.1 summarises the state of preparedness for the Bendigo fire.

Table 13.1 The Bendigo fire – IMT preparedness

Pre-designated level 3 ICC	No ¹⁸
Pre-formed IMT at ICC	No ¹⁹
Pre-identified level 3 IC	No ²⁰
Pre-identified IMT members	No ²¹
Time fire started	Approximately 16:20 ²²
Full IMT in place by	Approximately 21:30 ²³
Safety adviser appointed	No ²⁴

13.1.2 7 FEBRUARY

Origin and cause

Ms Kirsty Tinker-Casson of Bracewell Street, Maiden Gully, was home alone on the afternoon of 7 February when at about 16:20 she noticed flames coming from the edge of the creek near her home. She tried to ring 000, without success at first; by the time she did get through, the fire was racing alongside the creek.²⁵

Police investigations determined the cause of the Bendigo fire to be suspicious. In order not to prejudice criminal investigations and proceedings, limited evidence was presented to the Commission concerning the cause of the fire.²⁶

Fire run, response and management

Mr Eric Smith, captain of the Eaglehawk CFA brigade, was at the Eaglehawk fire station on 7 February when, at about 16:30, two private cars arrived and the drivers told him there was a fire in Bracewell Street that was 'going pretty well'. The Eaglehawk pumper turned out immediately, and Mr Smith notified VicFire of the fire. As the Eaglehawk pumper travelled towards the fire Mr Smith could see the growing smoke column and made a series of requests for tankers to be dispatched.²⁷

The fire initially travelled south-east and quickly built into a ferocious fire, crowning in trees less than 20 metres from the area of its origin.²⁸

Mr Smith and the Eaglehawk pumper arrived on the scene at about 16:40 and were soon joined by the Bendigo tanker. Together they were able to extinguish the edge of the fire near the point of origin, protecting nearby houses. As other tankers arrived Mr Smith directed them to work along both flanks of the fire, concentrating on the eastern edge.²⁹

At about 16:45 the Adam Street ICC was assigned to manage the Bendigo fire. This facility was a level 2 CFA incident control centre; it had been staffed in preparation for the day as a group coordination centre. It became the ICC for the Bendigo fire because by this time the Epsom ICC was already fully engaged responding to the Redesdale fire (see Chapter 11), which had begun more than an hour before the Bendigo fire. The Redesdale Incident Controller did not think his team had the capacity to manage a second complex fire at the same time.³⁰

CFA Group Officer Mr Peter Rogasch had been at Adam Street since morning and assumed the role of Incident Controller. Although he was an experienced firefighter, at the time he had no qualifications or experience as a level 3 Incident Controller.³¹

From the beginning, the Adam Street ICC was hampered in its efforts by poor radio and telephone communications. Repeated attempts to use the telephones, both landline and mobile, met with little success. In addition, the ICC had no access to the CFA's Incident Management System from either of its two computers.³²

The first alert for the Bendigo fire, in the form of an unofficial verbal awareness message, was broadcast on ABC Bendigo at 16:52; this was done from the information unit at the Epsom ICC because there was no information officer at the Adam Street ICC during the initial stages of the fire. The first official fire information release was broadcast on ABC Bendigo at 17:10, informing listeners of a fire near Bracewell Street, Eaglehawk. An urgent threat message, also prepared by the Epsom ICC, was posted to the CFA website.³³

At about 17:00 Senior Sergeant Grant Morris, the Municipal Emergency Response Coordinator, asked Mr Alexandra Malone, the Municipal Emergency Resource Officer for Greater Bendigo Council, to open an emergency relief centre for residents evacuating from Bracewell Street: the Eaglehawk Leisure Centre was opened.³⁴

As first officer on the scene, Mr Smith had assumed the role of Incident Controller and had established a control point at Bracewell Street. He was unaware of the Adam Street ICC until much later in the day. At about 17:14 he made contact with Mr Greg Stead on Bendigo Pumper 1, and together they divided the fire ground into two sectors. Mr Smith continued as sector commander of the north and Mr Stead became sector commander of the south.³⁵

Within 35 to 40 minutes of being reported the fire was approaching Maiden Gully Road, near Bonazza Road. Despite appliances having responded to the southern end of the fire, it crossed Maiden Gully Road near Albert Street at about 17:30 and was so intense it melted the asphalt. By this time there were already three spot fires about 2 kilometres to the south-east of the main fire.³⁶

Mr Peter Beaton, a communications officer employed by DSE at its Epsom office, was rostered to work as an information officer at the Epsom ICC from 17:00 on 7 February. Not long after 17:30 he was directed to go to the Adam Street ICC to fill the position of information officer.³⁷

The fire continued with high intensity, crowning in small patches of forest on both sides of Albert Street. The fire's initial south-eastern run was halted at an area of forested Crown land known as the Dai Gum San diggings, where a fuel-reduction burn had been conducted the previous spring. This restricted the width of the firefront moving into suburban Bendigo by about 40 per cent and, the Commission was advised, limited the fire's impact at that time.³⁸

DSE slip-on units arrived near Victoria Hill diggings, where they directly attacked the fire. A DSE crew arrived with a bobcat, and staff were directed to cut firebreaks in grassland at the intersection of Marong Road (the Calder Highway) and Eaglehawk Road. The strategy was to contain the fire at Upper California Gully Road and to extinguish any spot fires that started to the east of that line. Consistent with this, resources were directed to work in the Upper California Gully Road – Eaglehawk Road – Victoria Street area, extinguishing any spot fires and cutting breaks along the northern flank of the fire.³⁹

The fire continued to crown, causing spotting that carried it over some areas of low fuel and into grasslands and backyards in the areas of Daniel Street, Walker Street and Cunneen Street. At about 17:30 a resident lost his life after being overcome by flames outside his home in Daniel Street.⁴⁰ The circumstances surrounding his death are considered in Chapter 19.

Crowning continued to carry the fire into the Watkins Street and Happy Valley Road areas, and spot fires were occurring several kilometres downwind. Among the spot fires was one near the intersection of Lily Street and Chum Street, which threatened Fortuna Villa (a heritage-listed 19th century villa estate) and St John of God Hospital. This fire was brought under control within about 15 minutes.⁴¹

As the fire progressed further south-east it burned through an area that had been subject to fuel-reduction burning in 2006. The Commission was advised that the reduced fuel load again diminished the intensity of the fire, even as it travelled uphill.⁴²

Mr Mike Wassing, an endorsed level 3 Incident Controller, was at home on 7 February and, after learning of the Redesdale fire, went to the Bendigo Regional Emergency Coordination Centre to offer his assistance. He arrived at 17:40 and quickly realised that the Adam Street ICC needed more resources. At about 18:00 he telephoned Mr Pat O'Brien, CFA General Manager for the North West Area, and informed him of the Bendigo fire and discussed resources. Mr O'Brien asked Mr Wassing to go to the Adam Street ICC to help Mr Rogasch. Mr Wassing did so, arriving at 18:30.⁴³

Box 13.1 Evacuation and roadblocks

Sergeant Craig Gaffee became aware of the fire in the Maiden Gully area at 16:44 and assumed the role of Forward Commander for the fire. From the time he was able to assess the fire as it approached Maiden Gully and Bonazza Roads, one of his priorities was to warn people of the danger and to tell them to either leave or put their fire plan into operation.⁴⁴

Initially Sergeant Gaffee had three police units available; more units arrived during the afternoon. Traffic management was also a priority, but Sergeant Gaffee tried to keep himself and two other units free of roadblocks so they could warn people being threatened by fire to evacuate if that was their plan. He found that an effective way of gaining attention was to drive along a street using the police vehicle's siren and public address system to alert residents to the fact that the fire was approaching. Where possible, he and other police also went door to door.⁴⁵

Evacuation of residents in areas under threat was carried out at Sergeant Gaffee's initiative in the face of a crisis, not at the request or direction of the CFA as control agency for the fire. During the early hours of the fire he had limited information about the fire's movement and extent. The knowledge he did have was gained by his own direct observations and those of other police, as relayed through the police communications network, D24.⁴⁶

With the resources that were available initially, police were able to warn only a limited number of residents.⁴⁷ It would, however, have been impossible in conditions as extreme as those experienced on 7 February to ensure that all individuals were warned by police.

Sergeant Gaffee's other priority in responding to the Bendigo fire was traffic management. Starting at 16:50, when he arrived at Bonazza Road, he directed the available police units to establish roadblocks at strategic points in order to restrict traffic from entering the fire area. During the next three hours he monitored the movement of the fire as best he could and deployed units as they became available to crucial intersections, keeping ahead of the fire. He observed that, because of limited resources and poor communication, it was initially difficult to establish enough roadblocks. Additionally, the Bendigo fire was burning in a built-up area, so people were able to avoid roadblocks by taking back roads.⁴⁸ The Commission commends the efforts of Victoria Police to warn residents and ensure their safety on the roads.

At 17:55 Senior Sergeant Morris telephoned Mr Malone to ask him to activate the Municipal Emergency Coordination Centre. Mr Malone called the relevant council staff, two of whom were not able to respond because they were directly involved with the fire themselves. Mr Malone and the council's Chief Executive Officer, Craig Neiman, opened the MECC at Bendigo Town Hall. It was fully operational by about 18:30.⁴⁹

In the meantime, Senior Sergeant Morris had been alerted to the fact that the expected wind change would push the fire towards Eaglehawk, placing the emergency relief centre at risk. He asked Mr Malone to relocate the relief centre. Accordingly, the emergency relief centre was moved to the Kangaroo Flat Senior Citizens Centre. People who had gone to the Eaglehawk Leisure Centre were transferred to Kangaroo Flat.⁵⁰

At about 18:00 residents were extinguishing embers in Breen Street, several kilometres south of the main fire. Another spot fire, in Lilac Street, was discovered by residents and put out at about this time. By 18:30 the fire was 5.5 kilometres long and had almost reached the Calder Highway, between Happy Valley Road and Dare Street. The head of the fire was only 2 kilometres from Bendigo's central business district, and there was a spot fire three blocks from the Bendigo police station.⁵¹

Image 13.1



Source: Courtesy of the *Herald & Weekly Times*.

Mr Beaton, the information officer from the Epsom ICC, arrived at Adam Street at 18:04. He immediately set about gathering information about the fire, with the intention of issuing an urgent threat message as soon as possible. When he did try to issue the message, however, he encountered a series of technical problems that resulted in many emails not reaching the intended recipients. The problems Mr Beaton experienced with the official channels for issuing warnings might explain why no urgent threat messages for the Bendigo fire appeared on the CFA website between 17:17 and 21:37 and no further urgent threat messages were broadcast on 774 ABC radio until 22:52.⁵²

When Mr Beaton discovered that the urgent threat messages were not being distributed he contacted local radio stations directly, asking them to send out the messages. This was effective: ABC Bendigo broadcast updated fire information at 18:42, 18:58 and 19:17.⁵³

No-one from the Adam Street ICC was able to make contact with Mr Smith on the fire ground until some time between 18:10 and 18:30. Until then, he acted as the Incident Controller with no knowledge that the Adam Street IMT had been established.⁵⁴

Mr Jeff Wilkie, Assistant Fire Management Officer with DSE, was on standby for air operations at Bendigo airport. The operations officer at the Epsom ICC asked him to help coordinate the DSE resources responding to the Bendigo fire. Mr Wilkie was similarly unaware of the existence of the Adam Street IMT and until 20:20 provided situation reports only to the Epsom ICC.⁵⁵

The wind, which had been tending from north-west to west, swung to the south-west at about 18:30. After this the fire was pushed initially to the east and then to the north-east. It made major runs into the back areas of homes along Eaglehawk Road and threatened others along Upper California Gully Road. Spot fires occurred on the eastern side of these roads and north of the Eaglehawk rubbish tip. When the fire entered the tip its impact was considerably diminished, although, because of the fire's intensity, it did spot over the tip.⁵⁶

After discussion with Mr Deering at about 18:30, Mr Mark Gilmore, an operations manager with the CFA, agreed to leave the Epsom ICC and help the field commanders at the Bendigo fire. He arrived at the head of the fire, near the Calder Highway, as the wind was changing and assumed the role of divisional commander.⁵⁷

Having spoken with Mr Wassing, Mr O'Brien alerted Mr Russell Manning, DSE District Manager for the Mallee, to the need to send additional resources to the Adam Street ICC to assist with management of the Bendigo fire. After discussion with Mr Deering and other DSE managers, it was decided that Mr Manning would take a number of people with him from the Epsom ICC to help out at Adam Street. They arrived at 19:00, at which point Mr Manning was assigned the role of Deputy Incident Controller.⁵⁸

Mr Gilmore also had problems with radio communication and was unable to make radio contact with the field commanders. At 18:30, Mr Gilmore left the Adam Street ICC to help field commanders at the fire. Just prior to 19:00, he drove to Bracewell Street in an attempt to locate the control point. At 19:10 he found Mr Smith in Upper California Gully Road, and together they went to the intersection of Eaglehawk Road and Upper California Gully Road, where they established an operations point. At about 19:15 Mr Gilmore held a briefing at the operations point, using the bonnet of his vehicle on which to formulate a strategy for containing and re-sectorising the fire.⁵⁹

The first official advice to the public about the location of an emergency relief centre came in an urgent threat message issued at 19:00; it identified the Eaglehawk Leisure Centre. Even though that centre had been closed, this advice was repeated until 21:30, when the Kangaroo Flat Senior Citizens Centre was named the emergency relief centre.⁶⁰

By 19:22 the winds had subsided somewhat and it was possible to use air support. A helicopter was directed to provide fire-bombing support on the running edge of the fire, where there were no tankers. Once ground crews arrived, the fire-bomber moved to the western side of the fire to protect some of the more remote dwellings.⁶¹

Back at the Adam Street ICC Mr Wassing's skill and experience as a level 3 Incident Controller quickly became apparent. At about 19:30 he and Mr Rogasch agreed that Mr Wassing should take over as Incident Controller, although he did not formally assume the role until 21:30. Mr Wassing's presence, together with the arrival of

a number of personnel from the Epsom ICC, and improved information flows from the fire ground, meant the Adam Street IMT became more functional. By the time of the briefing for the night-shift IMT at about 21:30, Mr Wassing was able to concentrate on pressing matters such as liaison with the Municipal Emergency Coordination Centre, traffic management, and safety concerns arising from gas leaks and fallen power lines. The Bendigo fire was by this time largely under control, having been contained in the area of Happy Valley Road and Marong Road (the Calder Highway) by 19:47.⁶²

At about 19:45 Mr Gilmore eventually made contact with the Adam Street ICC when Mr Rogasch telephoned him, telling him that the ICC was operating, that he was the Incident Controller, and that Mr Gilmore should work through him. Mr Rogasch asked Mr Gilmore to come to the ICC to provide a briefing on the status of the fire. Mr Gilmore arrived at the ICC at about 21:00 and shortly afterwards gave a full briefing to the IMT.⁶³

At 20:00 the southerly wind had dropped further, and the fire behaviour moderated. The fire was contained at 21:52 on 7 February and was declared safe at 03:00 on Monday 9 February.⁶⁴

The fire caused one death, 41 casualties and destroyed 58 houses as it burned along the fringe of Bendigo, covering 341 hectares. A total of 47 tankers responded during the course of the fire.⁶⁵

The Municipal Emergency Coordination Centre remained operational and staffed until 17:45 on Sunday 8 February. It closed that night but was then open during business hours from Monday 9 February until Monday 16 February. The emergency relief centre at Kangaroo Flat was closed on 9 February, when the Eaglehawk Senior Citizens Centre was opened as a recovery centre. The Red Cross registered 345 people at the Kangaroo Flat emergency relief centre on 7 and 8 February, about 100 of them staying on the Saturday night.⁶⁶

13.2 CONCLUSIONS

Although planning and pre-positioning of staff at the Epsom ICC were effective, management in CFA Region 2 did not plan adequately for the possibility of more than one major fire in the region. When the second fire did break out on the outskirts of Bendigo, facilities and the personnel available to manage the incident were inadequate. Qualified staff were concentrated at the Epsom ICC and the Adam Street ICC facilities were unsatisfactory. The latter ICC was largely disconnected from the Bendigo fire response, particularly in the crucial hours before and immediately after the wind change.

Despite this, credit is due to the firefighters who responded to the Bendigo fire: they were able to respond operationally to fighting the fire, establish a working incident management structure, and deploy resources effectively. They did this in circumstances in which radio communications were poor, which could explain why many people at the fire ground were unaware of the Adam Street ICC until so late in the day.

The almost total breakdown in radio communication between the fire ground and the Adam Street ICC was an important feature of the Bendigo fire. Mr Gilmore gave evidence of repeated unsuccessful attempts to contact the CFA field commanders using the CFA radio. By all accounts, his radio appeared to be functioning since he was able to talk with other people and could hear radio traffic. Mr Wilkie of DSE experienced similar radio communication problems from the fire ground, which suggests that it was not only the CFA's radio system that was struggling. Witnesses attributed these problems to a number of causes, among them heat and smoke and the inadequate facilities at the Adam Street ICC.⁶⁷ Communication issues are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3 of Volume II.

Additionally, the lack of a pre-positioned information officer and basic computer facilities at the Adam Street ICC impeded the provision of prompt warnings and advice to the public.

There was confusion about the location of the emergency relief centre, and the public received poor advice about suitable venues for people who were evacuating. This confusion might have been avoided had there been better communication between the Adam Street ICC and the Municipal Emergency Coordination Centre—in particular, with earlier attendance by a CFA liaison officer.⁶⁸

An inter-agency initiative that did work well, though, was the allocation of a police member to each of the sector commanders for the Bendigo fire. This was arranged through the MECC during the evening of 7 February. The arrangement proved mutually beneficial: the police were able to help the sector commanders deal with small concerns before they became big problems, and their presence in the sector commanders' vehicles meant they had access to good information about the fire situation.⁶⁹

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- 1 Exhibit 22 – Statement of Williams, Annexure 1 (WIT.013.001.0012) at 0101
 - 2 Exhibit 22 – Statement of Williams, Annexure 1 (WIT.013.001.0012) at 0089
 - 3 Exhibit 557 – Meteorological Aspects of the Maiden Gully Fire (BOM.901.0096) at 0109
 - 4 Exhibit 557 – Meteorological Aspects of the Maiden Gully Fire (BOM.901.0096) at 0109
 - 5 Exhibit 557 – Meteorological Aspects of the Maiden Gully Fire (BOM.901.0096) at 0109
 - 6 Exhibit 22 – Statement of Williams, Annexure 1 (WIT.013.001.0012) at 0089
 - 7 Exhibit 214 – Statement of Hollowood (WIT.3010.001.0338) [64]
 - 8 Exhibit 215 – Supplementary statement of Hollowood (WIT.3010.003.0287_R) [19]
 - 9 Exhibit 215 – Supplementary Statement of Hollowood (WIT.3010.003.0287_R) [19]; Exhibit 457 – Statement of Rogasch (WIT.3004.019.0362) [42]
 - 10 Exhibit 980 – Correspondence – Houses Destroyed – Breakdown by Fire (CORR.1003.0048_R) at 0048_R
 - 11 Exhibit 786 – Statement of Clow (WIT.3004.034.0004) [19.9]
 - 12 Exhibit 939 – Details Regarding Emergency Response (CFA.600.005.0195) at 0195, 0198; Exhibit 939 – Day by Day Breakdown – Bendigo (DSE.HDD.0048.0545_17); Exhibit 939 – Aircraft Data 0809 (DSE.HDD.0048.0544_20) at 0544_20
 - 13 Exhibit 994 – Maiden Gully Fire – Fire Spread Map (CFA.600.006.0010)
 - 14 Exhibit 452 – Statement of Deering (WIT.3004.019.0192) [25], [29], Annexure 6 (WIT.3004.019.0272) at 0272; Exhibit 460 – Statement of Cutting (WIT.3004.020.0001) [21]; Exhibit 466 – Statement of Vearing (WIT.3024.004.0215) [15]; Exhibit 458 – Statement of Gilmore (WIT.3004.019.0001) [12]
 - 15 Exhibit 452 – Statement of Deering (WIT.3004.019.0192) [5], [32]; Exhibit 466 – Statement of Vearing, Annexure 4 (DSE.HDD.0052.0651) at 0687, 0707
 - 16 Deering T10162:30–T10163:8; Cutting T10323:14–T10323:29
 - 17 Exhibit 465 – Statement of Malone (WIT.4010.001.0001) [52]–[53]
 - 18 Exhibit 457 – Statement of Rogasch (WIT.3004.019.0362) [12]–[13], [17]; Exhibit 460 – Statement of Cutting (WIT.3004.020.0001) [56]; Cutting T10323:30–T10324:12; Rogasch T10245:8–T10245:29, T10247:17–T10247:26
 - 19 Exhibit 457 – Statement of Rogasch (WIT.3004.019.0362) [18]
 - 20 Exhibit 457 – Statement of Rogasch (WIT.3004.019.0362) [13], [18]
 - 21 Exhibit 457 – Statement of Rogasch (WIT.3004.019.0362) [12]–[13], [17]; Exhibit 460 – Statement of Cutting (WIT.3004.020.0001) [56]; Cutting T10323:30–T10324:12; Rogasch T10245:8–T10245:29, T10247:17–T10247:26
 - 22 Gilmore T10130:7–T10130:12
 - 23 Exhibit 470 – Statement of Manning (WIT.3024.004.0233) [44]; Exhibit 457 – Statement of Rogasch (WIT.3004.019.0362) [26]; Exhibit 458 – Statement of Gilmore (WIT.3004.019.0001) [74]; Rogasch T10255:4–T10255:22; Gilmore T10307:28–T10308:7
 - 24 Exhibit 548 – Correspondence – Safety Advisors (CORR.0911.0107_R)
 - 25 Exhibit 462 – Statement of Tinker-Casson (SUMM.044.002.3976_R) at 3976_R–3977_R
 - 26 Exhibit 214 – Statement of Hollowood (WIT.3010.001.0338) [64]
 - 27 Exhibit 456 – Statement of Smith (WIT.3004.020.0219) [16]–[18]; Smith T10229:19–T10229:29, T10230:31–T10231:9
 - 28 Gilmore T10130:27–T10131:4
 - 29 Exhibit 456 – Statement of Smith (WIT.3004.020.0219) [19]–[21]; Smith T10232:2–T10232:21
 - 30 Exhibit 460 – Statement of Cutting (WIT.3004.020.0001) [56]; Exhibit 457 – Statement of Rogasch (WIT.3004.019.0362) [12]–[13], [17]; Deering T10162:30–T10163:8; Cutting T10323:14–T10323:29
 - 31 Exhibit 460 – Statement of Cutting (WIT.3004.020.0001) [56]; Exhibit 457 – Statement of Rogasch (WIT.3004.019.0362) [2]–[3], [12]–[13], [17], Annexure 1 (WIT.3004.019.0372), Annexure 2 (WIT.3004.019.0375); Rogasch T10244:7–T10244:20, T10245:8–T10245:29, T10247:17–T10247:26; Cutting T10323:30–T10324:12
 - 32 Exhibit 460 – Statement of Cutting (WIT.3004.020.0001) [57]; Rogasch T10248:15–T10248:24, T10249:5–T10249:20
 - 33 Exhibit 469 – Statement of Downes (WIT.3004.020.0314) [28]–[29]; Exhibit 144 – ABC Local Radio – Disc 1 (TEN.052.001.0001); Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees, Annexure 31 (WIT.004.001.0509) at 0565
 - 34 Exhibit 465 – Statement of Malone (WIT.4010.001.0001) [2], [60]–[62]; Exhibit 464 – Statement of Morris (WIT.3010.007.0298) [2]
 - 35 Exhibit 456 – Statement of Smith (WIT.3004.020.0219) [19], [22]–[23], [27]; Rogasch T10249:28–T10249:30; Exhibit 457 – Statement of Rogasch (WIT.3004.019.0362) [19]–[20]; Smith T10231:16–T10231:17, T10232:31–T10233:16
 - 36 Exhibit 458 – Statement of Gilmore, Annexure 8 (WIT.3004.019.0147) at 0157–0161; Gilmore T10131:29–T10132:12

- 37 Exhibit 471 – Statement of Beaton (WIT.3024.004.0190) [14], [20]–[21]
- 38 Exhibit 458 – Statement of Gilmore, Annexure 8 (WIT.3004.019.0147) at 0163–0166; Gilmore T10132:13–T10133:15
- 39 Exhibit 458 – Statement of Gilmore (WIT.3004.019.0001) [70]–[71], [73]; Gilmore T10306:21–T10307:27; Exhibit 462 – Statement of Wilkie (SUMM.044.002.3887) at 3889–3890, 3892
- 40 Exhibit 34 – Statement of Kane (WIT.017.001.0001_R); Kane T1040:6–T1057:10; Gilmore T10133:31–T10134:5
- 41 Exhibit 458 – Statement of Gilmore, Annexure 8 (WIT.3004.019.0147) at 0162; Gilmore T10134:6–T10134:9, T10134:17–T10135:7
- 42 Gilmore T10135:17–T10136:10
- 43 Exhibit 472 – Statement of Wassing (WIT.3004.020.0150) [1]–[6], [9]–[14]
- 44 Exhibit 461 – Statement of Gaffee (WIT.3010.006.0199) [19]–[21]; Gaffee T10337:17–T10338:10
- 45 Exhibit 461 – Statement of Gaffee (WIT.3010.006.0199) [28], [32], [38], [48], [65]; Gaffee T10336:9–T10336:17, T10338:20–T10338:27, T10340:18–T10340:29, T10346:29–T10347:7
- 46 Gaffee T10345:27–T10346:3
- 47 Exhibit 461 – Statement of Gaffee (WIT.3010.006.0199) [65]; Gaffee T10346:17–T10347:28
- 48 Exhibit 461 – Statement of Gaffee (WIT.3010.006.0199) [11], [13], [19]–[21], [65]; Exhibit 456 – Statement of Smith (WIT.3004.020.0219) [38]; Smith T10238:30–T10239:16; Gaffee T10337:17–T10338:10, T10345:27–T10346:3, T10348:31–T10349:20
- 49 Exhibit 464 – Statement of Morris (WIT.3010.007.0298) [27]; Exhibit 465 – Statement of Malone (WIT.4010.001.0001) [63]
- 50 Exhibit 464 – Statement of Morris (WIT.3010.007.0298) [28]–[29]; Exhibit 465 – Statement of Malone (WIT.4010.001.0001) [64]; Exhibit 461 – Statement of Gaffee (WIT.3010.006.0199) [56]
- 51 Gilmore T10136:11–T10136:13, T10137:12–T10137:20, T10140:1–T10140:12
- 52 Exhibit 471 – Statement of Beaton (WIT.3024.004.0190) [22]–[28], [31]–[34], Annexure 2 (DSE.HDD.0012.1659); Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees, Annexure 31 (WIT.004.001.0509) at 0565–0629; Exhibit 7 – Transcript – 774 ABC Radio (SUMM.001.002.0001) at 0535
- 53 Exhibit 471 – Statement of Beaton (WIT.3024.004.0190) [31], [33], [36]–[37]; Exhibit 144 – ABC Local Radio – Disc 1 (TEN.052.001.0001)
- 54 Exhibit 457 – Statement of Rogasch (WIT.3004.019.0362) [19]–[20]; Exhibit 456 – Statement of Smith (WIT.3004.020.0219) [23], [27]; Smith T10233:11–T10233:16; Rogasch T10249:5–T10249:30
- 55 Exhibit 462 – Statement of Wilkie (SUMM.044.002.3887) at 3887, 3892
- 56 Gilmore T10140:1–T10140:12, T10140:20–T10141:15, T10141:25–T10141:31
- 57 Exhibit 458 – Statement of Gilmore (WIT.3004.019.0001) [5], [6], [13], [60]–[64]; Gilmore T10278:6–T10280:1, T10280:29–T10283:4, T10284:3–T10284:17
- 58 Exhibit 471 – Statement of Beaton (WIT.3024.004.0190) [21]–[22]; Exhibit 470 – Statement of Manning (WIT.3024.004.0233) [23], [41]–[44]; Exhibit 472 – Statement of Wassing (WIT.3004.020.0150) [13]
- 59 Exhibit 458 – Statement of Gilmore (WIT.3004.019.0001) [60]–[68], [70]–[71], [82]–[83], Annexure 3 (WIT.3004.019.0043); Gilmore T10301:17–T10306:20
- 60 Exhibit 471 – Statement of Beaton, Annexure 3 (DSE.HDD.0012.1660), Annexure 4 (DSE.HDD.0012.1661), Annexure 5 (DSE.HDD.0012.1662), Annexure 6 (DSE.HDD.0012.1663)
- 61 Exhibit 463 – Statement of Jarvis (VPO.001.012.0032) at 0034
- 62 Exhibit 472 – Statement of Wassing (WIT.3004.020.0150) [17]–[33]; Exhibit 458 – Statement of Gilmore (WIT.3004.019.0001) [79], [93]–[95]
- 63 Exhibit 458 – Statement of Gilmore (WIT.3004.019.0001) [74]; Exhibit 457 – Statement of Rogasch (WIT.3004.019.0362) [26]; Rogasch T10255:4–T10255:22; Gilmore T10307:28–T10308:7
- 64 Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [122]; Gilmore T10143:4–T10143:9
- 65 Exhibit 456 – Statement of Smith (WIT.3004.020.0219) [18]; Exhibit 34 – Statement of Kane (WIT.017.001.0001_R) [1]; Exhibit 215 – Supplementary Statement of Hollowood (WIT.3010.003.0287_R) [19]; Exhibit 457 – Statement of Rogasch (WIT.3004.019.0362) [42]; Exhibit 786 – Statement of Clow (WIT.3004.034.0004) [19.9]; Exhibit 980 – Correspondence – Houses Destroyed – Breakdown by Fire (CORR.1003.0048_R) at 0048_R at 0048; Smith T10231:10–T10231:13; Gilmore T10143:4–T10143:9, T10143:21–T10143:24
- 66 Exhibit 465 – Statement of Malone (WIT.4010.001.0001) [65], [75]–[77]
- 67 Exhibit 458 – Statement of Gilmore (WIT.3004.019.0001) [65]; Exhibit 462 – Statement of Wilkie (SUMM.044.002.3887) at 3888; Gilmore T10273:12–T10274:11; Rogasch T10260:6–T10260:18
- 68 Exhibit 465 – Statement of Malone (WIT.4010.001.0001) [67]; Exhibit 464 – Statement of Morris (WIT.3010.007.0298) [30]
- 69 Exhibit 465 – Statement of Malone, Attachment 6 (WIT.4010.001.0206) at 0263; Exhibit 461 – Statement of Gaffee (WIT.3010.006.0199) [62]; Gaffee T10346:4–T10346:16; Smith T10239:17–T10240:2

