



THE DELBURN FIRES

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The Delburn fires—which consisted of three separate fires that started on 28 and 29 January 2009 and ultimately joined up—occurred about 150 kilometres south-east of Melbourne, in an area that forms part of the Strzelecki Ranges and has extensive blue-gum and pine plantations. Among the towns in the vicinity are Mirboo North, Boolarra, Yinnar and Churchill. There are important infrastructure assets in the area, including the Morwell open-cut mine and power station and the main high-tension power line servicing Melbourne.


The fires burned mainly between 28 January and 3 February, being at their most destructive on 30 January in and around Boolarra. On 7 February there was an increase in fire activity, but this was managed and there were no major outbreaks.

Forty-four houses were destroyed, most of them on the western and southern outskirts of Boolarra. Figure 3.1 shows the extent of the fires.

OVERVIEW

Maximum temperature	The maximum temperatures recorded were 44.5°C on 29 January and 45.1°C on 30 January at Latrobe Valley automatic weather station. ¹
Fire danger index	The maximum Forest Fire Danger Index was 52 on 30 January. ²
Cause	Suspicious. ³
Fatalities	No fatalities. ⁴
Casualties	None reported.
Houses destroyed	Forty-four houses. ⁵
Overall area burnt	6,534 hectares. ⁶
Firefighting resources	On 30 January, 597 CFA and 699 NEO personnel attended the fire. They were supported by 112 CFA appliances, 103 NEO appliances and 14 aircraft. ⁷


Figure 3.1 The Delburn fires



Source: Exhibit 994 – Delburn Fire – Fire Spread Map.⁸

Delburn 28 January – 3 February

The following time line summarises events associated with the Delburn fire. For the most part, the times given are approximate. Further details about the events are provided in the accompanying narrative.





3.1 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

3.1.1 28 TO 30 JANUARY

Origin and cause

'The Delburn fires' refers to three separate fires that ultimately joined up. They began in the area surrounding Delburn on 28 and 29 January and came together on 29 and 30 January, developing into a major fire.⁹

A number of other fires also began in the Delburn area between 29 January and 2 February, although these did not pose a serious threat. Among the fires extinguished by local Country Fire Authority and Hancock Victorian Plantations forest industry brigades soon after ignition and those that burned themselves out were the following:

- a fire at the Delburn–Yinnar refuse transfer station, which ignited at about 13:18 on 29 January but was extinguished almost immediately
- a fire at Ten Mile Creek Road in an HVP plantation about 1 kilometre south-west of Delburn, which ignited at about 07:00 on 30 January and was contained by HVP crews almost immediately
- a fire discovered at 08:30 on 2 February at Brewsters Road, Yinnar, which had already burned itself out without intervention.¹⁰

The following were the three main fires that ultimately joined and became known as the Delburn fires:

- the Ashfords Road fire, which was discovered 2.5 kilometres north-north-west of Boolarra at about 16:00 on 28 January
- the Creamery Road fire, which was discovered 2.5 kilometres east of Delburn at about 13:00 on 29 January
- the Lyrebird Walk – Darlimurla fire, which was discovered 4 kilometres north of Mirboo North, near Darlimurla, at about 15:30 on 29 January.¹¹

Victoria Police and fire agency investigators determined the cause of the Creamery Road and Lyrebird Walk – Darlimurla fires to be suspicious. In order that criminal investigations and proceedings not be prejudiced, limited evidence relating to the cause of these two fires was presented to the Commission. The probable cause of the Ashfords Road fire was insufficient blacking out of a fire that had started earlier in the day.¹²

Fire run, response and management

As noted, the Ashfords Road fire was detected at about 16:00. The initial response came from local CFA and HVP brigades. CFA Group Officer Lou Sigmund was the operations officer and officer in charge of the initial response. Crews had already responded to a fire in the same location that morning; it had been extinguished, and it was left to HVP crews to black out the area. Mr Sigmund described the scene when he arrived in the afternoon as a 'wall of flame'. Crews called for extra resources and worked throughout the night to manage the fire.¹³

The initial incident control centre for the fires was established by 17:13 at the HVP office in Churchill because HVP assets had become involved in the fire. Mr Kevin Pettit, a CFA operations officer, assumed the role of Incident Controller on the afternoon of 28 January. He was qualified to be a level 3 Incident Controller if he had a mentor. At this stage, however, the incident was only a level 2 incident. The first awareness message was issued at about 18:00, warning road users of smoke in the Delburn area.¹⁴

At 23:30 the incident control centre was closed temporarily, pending a review the following morning of the Ashfords Road fire. When re-assessed on the morning of 29 January, the fire was found to be very small and manageable from the operations point located in Boolarra, near the fire ground, without an ICC. The Incident Controller then operated from a communications vehicle.¹⁵

At about 13:00 on 29 January the Creamery Road fire was detected. Because of the location of this second fire, there was considerable potential for it to burn in native forest and eucalyptus plantation areas. Mr Pettit released resources from the Ashfords Road fire to assist at Creamery Road.¹⁶

Shortly afterwards, at about 13:30, the Ashfords Road fire intensified and crossed containment lines at its north-east corner, spotting into grassland.¹⁷

As a result of the increased fire activity and a concern that the Ashfords Road and Creamery Road fires could join, it was decided by CFA and Department of Sustainability and Environment management to establish a joint CFA and DSE level 3 incident control centre at the DSE offices in Traralgon, about 33 kilometres to the north-east. Although Mr Pettit was endorsed to be a level 3 Incident Controller only with a mentor and no mentor was present, he continued as Incident Controller.¹⁸

At about 15:30 the Lyrebird Walk – Darlimurla fire was detected. It had significant potential to threaten nearby houses.¹⁹ At 15:45 on 29 January the first urgent threat message was issued, warning that Darlimurla and surrounding areas might be affected by fire and advising residents of roadblocks that had been set up.²⁰

Communications in the Boolarra area were problematic because of black spots. Crews were, however, assisted by the mobile communications vehicle; in addition, firefighters resorted to using their mobile phones, although with limited success.²¹

While the fires were being fought during the afternoon of 29 January, the mobile communications vehicle ran out of fuel twice, even though ground crews had sent requests for fuel to the ICC 'on three separate occasions'. The vehicle had to be towed out of danger by a tanker.²²

On the afternoon of 29 January a divisional emergency coordination centre and divisional operations centre were established at Morwell police station and staffed with police and support staff. The Latrobe Municipal Emergency Coordination Centre was also activated on 29 January. By 17:00 all three fires were burning towards the south-east. The weather was very hot and the wind was mild. The fires were burning freely and intensely, and the total area of all three fires was about 200 hectares. An incident report entered at 17:17 noted that crews had constructed containment lines for about 30 per cent of the Creamery Road fire and were continuing to focus on extending containment lines and blacking out.²³

At 19:48 the area estimated to have been burnt by all three fires was about 760 hectares. By 19:57 the Creamery Road and Ashfords Road fires had joined up and the wind had changed to a south-south-easterly. The joined fires had broken containment lines at Ten Mile Creek Road and both the joined fires and the Lyrebird Walk – Darlimurla fire were threatening to cross the Strzelecki Highway.²⁴

At last light, when aircraft could not continue to fly, the incident management team knew it would not be possible to put the fires out that day. As a result, the team started to implement longer term strategies.²⁵

The wind changed to the south at 21:00. The fires continued to spread to the east and north during the night, and by 04:43 on 30 January they had burnt 2,150 hectares. The Incident Controller decided it was necessary to increase media and community engagement in order to alert residents in the path of the fire to the danger. Preparations were made for community meetings to be held on the morning of 30 January.²⁶

Mr Michael Owen, a CFA operations officer and endorsed level 3 Incident Controller, became the day-shift Incident Controller for the Delburn fires on 30 January. He arrived at the Traralgon ICC at about 06:45, in anticipation of a 07:00 start. Mr Pettit briefed Mr Owen and gave him an incident action plan for the day shift. The plan noted that the weather forecast was for a maximum temperature of 42 degrees, with low humidity and moderate winds.²⁷

About 1,000 people attended the community meetings held by the CFA in Boolarra, Mirboo North, Yinnar and Churchill on the morning of 30 January.²⁸

The Commission received a DVD recording of the Boolarra meeting and heard evidence about the meeting from Mr Sigmund, who attended in his capacity as a community member. Residents were told that, given the conditions, early departures were critical and it was likely that they would not see fire appliances and might not even receive a warning of fire entering the township. The DVD shows that both the CFA and DSE warned people about the fire threat they were facing and provided information designed to enable them to make an informed decision about whether to stay or go.²⁹

After being invited to do so by the CFA and DSE, Mr Sigmund addressed the meeting: 'I said that the town was in imminent danger of being overrun by the fire if the wind changed to the southwest and that the town would burn if this were to occur'. He also told the meeting the local CFA brigade would sound the siren at the Boolarra fire station when ember attack began, in order to let people know when they should evacuate.³⁰

As a result of a further wind change the fires breached the control lines on the eastern flank at about 13:00 on 30 January, spreading quickly to the east towards the outskirts of Boolarra and Yinnar. Spot fires were reported nearby. The wind change led to more erratic and severe fire behaviour. Also at about this time, as the fires closed in on Yinnar and Boolarra, urgent threat messages were issued, warning residents that spot fires were burning close by and that residents might be directly affected by fire.³¹

Mr Sigmund gave the order for the siren to be sounded in Boolarra at about 13:30. He told the Commission that after the sounding of the siren a large number of people evacuated the township. He was later told by a CFA operations officer that 'use of the siren ... was inappropriate'.³² The Commission disagrees. The role of local warning measures is discussed in Chapter 1 of Volume II.

Between 13:46 and 14:13 the fires spread rapidly. Thirty to 40 spot fires were reported by aircraft near Boolarra, and during the afternoon the Incident Controller asked for more resources. Additional strike teams were provided and directed towards Boolarra and Yinnar.³³

At 15:00, following a further deterioration in conditions, the crew of Traralgon East Tanker 1 became trapped by a fallen tree and power lines as they tried to leave a property on the Boolarra – Mirboo North road, close to Boolarra township. Members of the crew were forced to shelter in the tanker as the fire burned over them. No-one received injuries or burns, and the tanker sustained only minor heat damage.³⁴

By 17:00 fires had broken away on the eastern flank and were again running freely. Fires were reported to the north, south and east of Boolarra. Spot fires were burning in the area of Yinnar. Boolarra was subjected to heavy ember attack, and four strike teams (20 tankers) worked to protect assets in the town.³⁵

By 17:31 the incident control centre had received reports of houses being destroyed in the areas of McIntosh Road, Boolarra; Creamery Road near Yinnar; and Samson Road in Mirboo North.³⁶

It was between 20:00 and 21:00 on 30 January that the fires merged. By 21:42 the eastern flank of the fire was within half a kilometre of Boolarra, and a large spot fire was burning to the south of the township. By this time the fire covered 5,750 hectares.³⁷

Firefighting continued throughout the remainder of 30 January. After nightfall, fire activity began to subside, and during the evening and overnight firefighting efforts were directed towards asset protection, blacking out and establishing new control lines to limit the fire's run.³⁸

The CFA and DSE released a large number of warnings during the Delburn fires. In the afternoon of 29 January and throughout 30 January urgent threat messages were issued for the communities of Darlimurla, Mirboo North, Boolarra and Yinnar, telling people of the progress of the fires in their areas. These messages provided details of fires' distance from townships.³⁹

3.1.2 31 JANUARY TO 3 FEBRUARY

At 00:50 on 31 January firefighters assessed the vegetation under the high-voltage power lines to the north of the fires, and SP AusNet was informed it should clear vegetation under the lines that day.⁴⁰

The fire continued to burn slowly, largely within control lines, during the ensuing days. Crews were mopping up, monitoring and maintaining containment lines around the fire's edge. There were a number of flare-ups and spot fires, but all were controlled by ground and air crews.⁴¹

Image 3.1



Source: Courtesy of Herald & Weekly Times.

For much of 30 and 31 January there was no safety adviser in the incident management team structure. Despite numerous requests made through the Resources Unit, no safety adviser was provided. Eventually the Deputy Incident Controller was nominated safety adviser, although this was contrary to CFA procedures, which require that the safety adviser not be simultaneously performing any other IMT function. Despite the lack of a safety adviser, Mr Owen, the Incident Controller, told the Commission that he monitored trends in firefighter injuries and incidents to ensure that safety messages were conveyed to crews.⁴²

By 12:06 on 31 January the total fire area was 6,370 hectares. From the evening of 1 February onwards, as the fire became controlled, resources and operations were progressively withdrawn. The Divisional Emergency Coordination Centre at Morwell police station was closed on 2 February.⁴³

On 3 February Mr Peter Lockwood assumed the role of day-shift Incident Controller. The fires were declared contained at 15:00 that day. Between 3 and 7 February planning was done with the predicted extreme weather conditions in mind, and work on establishing and maintaining control lines continued. Low winds between 2 and 6 February helped the firefighters.⁴⁴

The Latrobe Municipal Emergency Coordination Centre operated until 3 February and was then reactivated on 7 February in response to the Churchill fire. Relief centres were established at Boolarra and Churchill. When the MECC was operational for the Delburn fires there was a video link between the MECC and the ICC. Ms Sheryl English, Latrobe Valley Municipal Emergency Resource Officer, considered this a valuable facility. Senior Sergeant Brendan Scully described communications between the MECC and the ICC as 'very effective'.⁴⁵

Table 3.1 summarises the state of preparedness for the Delburn fires.

Table 3.1 The Delburn fires – IMT preparedness

Pre-designated level 3 ICC	Traralgon ICC was used when the incident reached level 3 status on 29 January 2009 ⁴⁶
Pre-formed IMT at ICC	Already in place on 7 February 2009 ⁴⁷
Pre-identified level 3 IC	Already in place on 7 February 2009 ⁴⁸
Pre-identified IMT members	Already in place on 7 February 2009 ⁴⁹
Time fire started	16:00 on 28 January 2009 ⁵⁰
Time full IMT in place	Already in place on 7 February 2009 ⁵¹

3.1.3 7 FEBRUARY

Although crews' activities had been scaled down, the incident control centre remained active 24 hours a day in the lead-up to 7 February in order to maintain a state of preparedness for the predicted conditions. Efforts focused on patrolling and the detection of hot spots. Contingency plans were put in place for a major flare-up of the fire on 7 February, including the identification of a full IMT for that day.⁵²

The CFA and DSE resources allocated to the Delburn fires for 7 February amounted to two task forces and a number of slip-on units. Three strike teams were on call. Hancock Victorian Plantations also provided 16 personnel, as well as 14 firefighters in two tankers and four slip-on units.⁵³

The morning of 7 February was reasonably quiet. As the day warmed and the wind picked up, however, there was an increase in fire activity. The fire did not break the containment lines despite the extreme weather experienced on the day. Fire activity was managed by the crews and resources on the ground, and later in the day a number of crews were released to attend outbreaks at Churchill, Kilmore East and Murrindindi.⁵⁴

On 7 February the Traralgon ICC also became responsible for the Churchill fire. The following day the Delburn element of the Traralgon IMT was demobilised; only the section responsible for Churchill remained operational.⁵⁵

The final fire area for the Delburn fires was about 6,534 hectares, with a perimeter of more than 70 kilometres.⁵⁶

In contrast with the fires that ravaged Victoria on 7 February, the Delburn fires were fought with a great deal of aerial support. Mr Owen told the Commission he 'pretty well had his own air force'. On both 30 and 31 January a large number of the state's firefighting aircraft were working on the Delburn fires—an opportunity that was not available to firefighters on 7 February because of the many concurrent fires and the severe weather, which restricted flying operations. In addition to plentiful aerial support, there was an abundance of water from the nearby power stations and a good air base at Traralgon. Mr Owen agreed that the plentiful supply of air resources greatly assisted in combating the fire.⁵⁷

Although no-one died or was seriously injured as a result of the Delburn fires, there was much damage, particularly in Boolarra. Forty-four houses were destroyed, most of them on the western and southern outskirts of the township. In addition, about 60 per cent of the area burnt consisted of commercial tree plantations, resulting in significant loss for Hancock Victorian Plantations.⁵⁸

3.2 CONCLUSIONS

The apparent re-ignition of the Ashfords Road fire highlights the importance of blacking out thoroughly after a fire. The value of this often tedious and time-consuming activity cannot be underestimated during periods of high fire danger.

Problems with communications between crews on the fire ground and in the various incident control centres hampered coordination of the firefighting effort. Communications are discussed in Chapter 3 of Volume II.

The lack of response to requests for fuel for the mobile communications van suggests that insufficient attention was given to logistical support for those on the fire ground. Supporting people on the fire ground must remain a focus of incident management teams.

The community meetings held on 30 January helped residents of the affected towns understand the threat the fires posed and make good decisions in the face of danger. They also demonstrate the need for plain speaking and clarity of meaning, to ensure that messages are clearly and concisely conveyed to the public. The Commission supports the use of agreed and well-understood local warning measures, such as sirens, to alert communities to imminent danger.

The Commission was impressed by the training of the Traralgon East Tanker 1 crew, who successfully sheltered during a burnover. Their survival is indicative of effective crew training in personal protection procedures and good tanker design. Both of these elements highlight the progress made since the Linton tragedy in 1998. The Commission notes, however, that there were problems with incident communications and that the crew had a poor understanding of rapidly changing fire behaviour, both of which contributed to the crew being exposed.⁵⁹

Mr Owen explained that his overall objective as Incident Controller on 30 January was to create strong control lines around the fire, to ensure that it would not break out when the forecast bad fire weather arrived the following week. Similarly, in anticipation of the forecast weather for 7 February, Mr Lockwood had as his objective 'to secure [the fire's] perimeter ... and black out as much of the fire as possible'.⁶⁰ These objectives were largely achieved.

Although the Commission notes the Incident Controller's attention to safety, it considers this to be part of his overall responsibility for the safety of the firefighters who were under his control. Such attention cannot be a substitute for the appointment of a dedicated safety adviser whose sole duty is monitoring and advising on safety-related matters. The Commission notes that Mr Owen's requests for a safety adviser were not met. Firefighter safety is discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of Volume II.

All firefighters, including the incident management team, involved in suppression of the Delburn fires between 28 January and 3 February are to be commended on the outcome they achieved on 7 February: the fires were kept within control lines despite the extreme weather.

The Commission notes the effective relief arrangements that were instituted and the effective communications, including a video link, between the municipal emergency coordination centre and the incident control centre. This is in contrast to some other fires.

- 1 Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 16 (WIT.005.001.1601) at 1618
- 2 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [117]
- 3 Owen T13150:17–T13150:21
- 4 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [27]
- 5 Exhibit 980 – Correspondence – Houses Destroyed – Breakdown by Fire (CORR.1003.0048_R) at 0048_R
- 6 Exhibit 786 – Statement of Clow (WIT.3004.034.0004) [19.3]
- 7 Exhibit 939 – Details Regarding Emergency Response (CFA.600.005.0195) at 0196, 0198; Exhibit 939 – Day by Day Breakdown – Delburn (DSE.HDD.0048.0545_24); Exhibit 939 – Aircraft Data 0809 (DSE.HDD.0048.0544_20) at 0544_21–0544_22
- 8 Exhibit 994 – Delburn Fire – Fire Spread Map (CFA.600.006.0009)
- 9 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [21]
- 10 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [63]–[64]; Owen T13146:8–T13146:26
- 11 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [41], [56], [67], Annexure 26 (WIT.3004.032.0131) at 0132; Owen T13146:28–T13147:11
- 12 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [42], Annexure 15 (WIT.3004.031.0462) at 0467; Owen T13150:17–T13150:21
- 13 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [41]–[42], [44], [50], Annexure 26 (WIT.3004.032.0131) at 0132; Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund (WIT.020.001.0001) [9]–[10]; Owen T13147:22–T13147:24
- 14 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [31], [43]–[46]; Exhibit 505 – CFA Personnel for Wildfire Incident Functional Management Positions – Approval List (WIT.3004.021.0024) at 0037; Owen T13151:26–T13151:28

- 15 Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund (WIT.020.001.0001) [19]; Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [49], [54]
- 16 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [56]–[57], Annexure 16 (WIT.3004.031.0475) at 0475, Annexure 26 (WIT.3004.032.0131) at 0132; Owen T13147:27–T13147:28
- 17 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [58]; Owen T13147:24–T13148:1
- 18 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [58]–[60], [85]; Owen T13145:8–T13145:10
- 19 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [67], [72]; Owen T13147:24–T13148:1
- 20 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [70]
- 21 Sigmund T898:8–T899:14
- 22 Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund (WIT.020.001.0001) [19]; Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [54]
- 23 Exhibit 402 – Statement of Taylor (WIT.3010.007.0030) [15], [26]; Exhibit 404 – Statement of Scully (WIT.3010.008.0001) [20], [22], [26]; Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [69], [75]–[76]; Owen T13147:22–T13148:5
- 24 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [80]–[84]; Owen T13148:7–T13148:16
- 25 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [85];
- 26 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [87], [88], [118]; Owen T13148:17–T13148:24
- 27 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [4], [9], [30], [96]–[97], Annexure 19 (WIT.3004.032.0014) at 0014
- 28 Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund (WIT.020.001.0001) [30], Annexure 2 (WIT.020.001.0014); Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [88], [125], Annexure 26 (WIT.3004.032.0131) at 0136–0137
- 29 Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund (WIT.020.001.0001) [30], Annexure 2 (WIT.020.001.0014); Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen, Annexure 26 (WIT.3004.032.0131) at 0137
- 30 Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund (WIT.020.001.0001) [30], [35], Annexure 2 (WIT.020.001.0014) at 01:21:28
- 31 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [127]–[131]; Owen T13148:25–T13149:2
- 32 Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund (WIT.020.001.0001) [38], [41]–[42]
- 33 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [131]–[143]
- 34 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen, Annexure 23 (WIT.3004.032.0091)
- 35 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [131]–[143]
- 36 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [144], Annexure 19 (WIT.3004.032.0014) at 0014
- 37 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [149]; Owen T13149:13–T13149:25
- 38 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [157]–[158], [169]
- 39 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen, Annexure 8 (WIT.3004.031.0389), (WIT.3004.031.0390), (WIT.3004.031.0391), (WIT.3004.031.0392), (WIT.3004.031.0393), (WIT.3004.031.0394), (WIT.3004.031.0395), Annexure 9 (WIT.3004.031.0397), (WIT.3004.031.0398), (WIT.3004.031.0399), (WIT.3004.031.0400), Annexure 10 (WIT.3004.031.0402), (WIT.3004.031.0403), (WIT.3004.031.0404), (WIT.3004.031.0405), (WIT.3004.031.0406), (WIT.3004.031.0407), (WIT.3004.031.0408), (WIT.3004.031.0409), (WIT.3004.031.0410), (WIT.3004.031.0411), (WIT.3004.031.0412), (WIT.3004.031.0413), (WIT.3004.031.0414)
- 40 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [157]–[158], [169]–[172]
- 41 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [181]
- 42 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen, Annexure 20 (WIT.3004.032.0051) at 0057; Owen T13159:5–T13159:19, T13160:25–T13161:20
- 43 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [24], [189]–[193]; Exhibit 402 – Statement of Taylor (WIT.3010.007.0030) [26]; Owen T13150:1–T13150:5
- 44 Exhibit 389 – Statement of Lockwood (WIT.7520.001.0001) [28]; Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [26], [196]; Owen T13150:6–T13150:12, T13166:23–T13167:6
- 45 Exhibit 404 – Statement of Scully (WIT.3010.008.0001) [22], [26], [32], Attachment 7 (WIT.3010.008.0087_R) at 0088_R; English T9797:2–T9797:5
- 46 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [59], [60]
- 47 Exhibit 389 – Statement of Lockwood (WIT.7520.001.0001) [27]
- 48 Exhibit 389 – Statement of Lockwood (WIT.7520.001.0001) [8], [28]; Exhibit 408 – Statement of Tainsh (WIT.3024.003.0353) [33], [44]; Exhibit 455 – Statement of Jeremiah (WIT.3024.003.0275) [7]–[9], [19]; Lockwood T9201:25–T9203:14, T9301:19–T9301:27
- 49 Exhibit 408 – Statement of Tainsh (WIT.3024.003.0353) [44]; Exhibit 455 – Statement of Jeremiah (WIT.3024.003.0275) [7]–[9], [19]; Exhibit 386 – Churchill Fire – Command Structure Chart (TEN.110.001.0001)
- 50 Owen T13146:29–T13147:1, T13147:4–T13147:11
- 51 Exhibit 389 – Statement of Lockwood (WIT.7520.001.0001) [27]
- 52 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [198]–[199], [203]
- 53 Exhibit 425 – Statement of Sewell (WIT.7519.001.0001) [56]; Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [204]
- 54 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [205]–[208]; Exhibit 389 – Statement of Lockwood (WIT.7520.001.0001) [44], [57]
- 55 Exhibit 389 – Statement of Lockwood (WIT.7520.001.0001) [49]; Owen T13150:9–T13150:12
- 56 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [24], [196]; Owen T13145:29–T13146:4; Exhibit 786 – Statement of Clow (WIT.3004.034.0004) [19.3]
- 57 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [184]; Owen T13163:10, T13164:2–T13164:10
- 58 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0173) [27], [196]; Exhibit 980 – Correspondence – Houses Destroyed – Breakdown by Fire (CORR.1003.0048_R) at 0048_R; Owen T13162:19–T13162:25
- 59 Exhibit 611 – Statement of Owen, Annexure 23 (WIT.3004.032.0091) at 0104–0106
- 60 Exhibit 389 – Statement of Lockwood (WIT.7520.001.0001) [29]; Owen T13154:18–T13154:30