4 WARNINGS

 

Timely and accurate warnings may save lives. It is this possibility that has motivated the Commission’s lengthy examination of bushfire warnings issued in February 2009 and of what constitutes effective warnings. This chapter first considers definitional matters relating to warnings and the bushfire information and education that has been available in Victoria. It moves to an overview of the recommendations on warnings from recent inquiries, before considering what constitutes good warnings. The chapter then considers the warnings and information issued in Victoria prior to and on 7 February and the way in which the community received and understood this material. Finally, triggers and signals, sirens, and a telephony-based emergency warning system are considered.

 

4.1       There is a significant difference between the provision of general information about bushfires and specific warnings to alert the public of a particular threat. Ongoing information provided to the community about bushfires prepares the community and educates them on the appropriate steps to take if a warning is issued. In contrast, a bushfire warning is specific advice about an imminent event. Such a warning should propel the community into action in response to a specific threat — ideally, armed with the information and education that has prepared them to respond.

4.2       The evidence before the Commission has demonstrated that the community depends on (and has come to expect) detailed and high-quality information prior to, during and after bushfires. In addition, the community is entitled to expect to receive timely and accurate bushfire warnings whenever possible, based on the intelligence available to the control agencies (further discussion in Chapter 10). Though they are distinct concepts, the successful provision of information and warnings are inextricably linked.

4.3       In relation to the provision of information about bushfires, the Emergency Services Commissioner, Mr Bruce Esplin, made the following comments when asked about the best time for the effective provision of bushfire information:

4.4       The success of specific bushfire warnings partly depends on the standard of the information and education provided to the community prior to its issue. In some instances, specific bushfire warnings — and use of ‘triggers’ such as the Standard Emergency Warning Signal (SEWS) and sirens — will be less effective in the absence of high quality information and education campaigns that increase a community’s preparedness to meet the threat and its understanding of how to respond to a warning.

4.5       It is also clear that on receipt of bushfire warnings, people often seek further information and advice. For example, after receiving a specific bushfire warning, people often want or need further information from sources like 774 ABC Radio, agency websites or the Victorian Bushfire Information Line (VBIL). It emerged during the hearings that on 7 February people were sometimes unable to access the information they needed to respond to the warnings they had received. In other cases, it was clear that in the absence of timely warnings, the public turned to other sources of information for assistance. This placed pressure on the agencies providing that information, and was a source of great frustration and stress for those seeking, but unable to obtain, information and advice. Victoria’s information and warning systems operated under great stress on 7 February. The systems broke down in a number of respects. The question of information is addressed in more detail in Chapter 5.

4.6       The content of warnings is separate from the mode of disseminating warnings. The content of warnings raises considerations of drafting and construction, while the dissemination of warnings is about the means and modes by which warnings are communicated to the public. This includes existing modes of communication, such as radio broadcasts and web pages, and new and emerging technology, including Twitter and telephony-based warning systems.

4.7       SEWS (further described at paragraph 4.188) and sirens are generally not warnings. Rather, they are triggers, signals alerting the listener to the fact that a warning is to follow. They are a means of attracting attention and prompting the audience to listen carefully for a warning and/or to search out more information. Such triggers and alerts are important, and have a role in the suite of responses that should be available to deal with bushfire threat.

 

4.8       The publication of information about bushfires and materials designed to educate the Victorian community about bushfire risk has received considerable attention.

4.9       A Fire Communications Taskforce was established in August 2005 by the Department of Justice to undertake a whole of government approach to community education and communication about fires. This Taskforce coordinates communication activities and plans. It has overseen the implementation of a number of flagship projects, and monitors the success of its approaches.2

4.10     The State Government and the Country Fire Authority (CFA) have sponsored a number of high-quality campaigns to deliver key messages to the community about the risk of fire, including campaigns known as Fire Ready Victoria and Living with Fire.³ Those campaigns are explained in publications including:

•       Fire Ready Victoria Strategy 2004–2007⁴

•       Living in the Bush: Bushfire Survival Plan Workbook 2nd ed (2008)⁵

•       Fire Safety Victoria 2006⁶

•       Living with Fire: Victoria’s Bushfire Strategy 2008⁷

•       Living with Fire: A Community Engagement Framework 2008–2012.⁸

4.11     Information and education programs provided by the State and the work of the Community Fireguard program have been instrumental in delivering messages about bushfire preparedness. These education programs are ongoing, and are an important part of the context in which key messages and advice are delivered in Victoria. It is clear that the CFA and the State have given considerable thought and effort to ensuring that, as far as possible, the community is well educated and prepared about fire risk before it receives any particular bushfire warning. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

4.12     Prior to 7 February 2009 the State Government devoted unprecedented efforts and resources to informing the community about the fire risks Victoria faced (paragraphs 4.81 to 4.92). That campaign clearly had benefits, but it could not, on its own, translate ‘levels of awareness and preparedness’ into universal successful risk minimisation on the day of the fires. Indeed, no campaign will have universal success. All campaigns are dependent for their effectiveness on the quality of information, the modes of dissemination and the willingness and capacity of people to hear, understand and act on the message. As discussed in the Introduction, this is a shared responsibility between government and the people.

4.13     This chapter takes lessons learned on the content and process of warnings presented to the Commission so far and makes recommendations for the next fire season. This report does not analyse the effectiveness of warnings across all the fires. Chapter 1 includes information about initial and critical warnings issued for each fire and Chapter 9 analyses warnings for the Kilmore East fire. Further evidence on warnings will be heard by the Commission in future hearings.

 

4.14     The review and analysis of warnings and their mode of delivery is not new. Successive inquiries, reviews and reports have considered bushfire warnings. Some have focused on warning content and construction, others on delivery systems.

4.15     Some matters highlighted in these reports have received government support and been implemented. Others, in particular the national adoption of standard bushfire warnings and the development of a telephony-based warning system, received insufficient attention in the years after their recommendation.

1984 Report on Ash Wednesday

4.16     The 1984 inquiry into the 1983 Ash Wednesday fires produced a report, On Bushfire Disaster Preparedness and Response in Victoria.⁹ That report noted the difference between warnings that simply raise general awareness and specific warnings about particular fires:

4.17     The Ash Wednesday report went on to address warning and information systems generally. It emphasised the importance of maximum warning lead time, accurate meteorological information, standardisation and clarity of warnings. It also explored the methods of providing information, such as special messages or warnings that alert people to switch to a designated system, such as the ABC. It found that greater use should be made of local TV and radio stations and that ‘Special fire warning sirens should be located at police and fire stations; also, church bells should be utilised’.11

4.18     The goal that warnings be standardised and their meaning rendered ‘clear and unambiguous’ was not fully achieved by 7 February. While sirens and church bells received specific attention in the report, the evidence before this Commission is that use of sirens was contrary to CFA policy on 7 February (further discussion at paragraph 4.224).

4.19     The report emphasised the importance of informing the community about warning systems, and advising people about how to respond to them. It also recommended that ‘new systems which offer possibilities of enhancing warning capability should be examined’.12

4.20     These comments appear just as relevant today as when they were published in 1984. While new systems were indeed examined and kept under review in the years since 1984, the available technology for a telephony-based warning system was not used or introduced prior to the February 2009 fires. This represents a missed opportunity, and is addressed in more detail below.

2002 COAG Report

4.21     In 2002, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) commissioned a review of Australia’s approach to dealing with natural disasters. The review was carried out by a high level group of officials representing all levels of government. The product of that review was a report titled, Natural Disasters in Australia — Reforming Mitigation, Relief and Recovery Arrangements13

4.22     The report concluded that current arrangements ‘could be improved to ensure that Australia has a world class national framework for disaster management’.14 Significantly, the report recommended what it described as ‘a paradigm shift to disaster mitigation’. It recommended the implementation of a Disaster Mitigation Australia Package, which would include funding for programs such as disaster warning systems and community awareness and readiness measures.15

4.23     The report contained a number of recommendations, three of which are summarised below:

•       there should be legislative obligations on all broadcasters to broadcast natural disaster warnings to the public via radio and television (Recommendation 26)

•       guidelines should be prepared for best practice in the development of local area emergency warning systems (Recommendation 27)

•       post disaster assessments should routinely review the effectiveness of warning systems (Recommendation 28).16

4.24     The Victorian Government has entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the ABC, which appears to reflect part of the aims of Recommendation 26. Otherwise, the above recommendations were referred to the Australian Emergency Management Committee (AEMC) (a standing committee of the Ministerial Council for Police and Emergency Management — Emergency Management). An AEMC working group undertook to identify ‘the requirements for a nationally consistent emergency warning system’. Other initiatives such as the establishment of the National Forum on Emergency Warnings to the Community were undertaken. However, work on the development of a national telephony-based warning system did not come to fruition for a number of years.17

2004 COAG report

4.25     The question of warnings was again considered by the COAG National Inquiry on Bushfire Mitigation and Management of 31 March 2004 (the 2004 COAG report).18 This inquiry recommended that the content of bushfire threat warnings should be nationally consistent, and that SEWS should be used.

4.26     The features of a warning system emphasised in the 2004 COAG report are:

a)  A warning system should involve use of ‘a consistent warning signal’ at the beginning of the advice in circumstances where lives are at risk or there is a major threat to property to attract the attention of those who should be alerted to the warning that follows.

b)  A bushfire warning should provide information about the location, size and intensity of a bushfire threat.

c)  A warning should inform the listener as to the expected movement of the fire front and should identify the communities at threat.

d)  A good warning advises communities on the appropriate action to take.19

4.27     As discussed further in this chapter, some of the warnings on 7 February were deficient with regard to matters raised in paragraph 4.26 b, c and d — and SEWS was not used at all.

4.28     Recommendation 8.5 of the 2004 COAG report endorsed the recommendations on warning systems from the 2002 COAG report and further recommended that all fire ban advice and bushfire warnings should be used consistently (including SEWS) where lives or property are threatened. The 2004 COAG report also called for the introduction of a nationally uniform bushfire warning system.20 Finally, it recommended that the structure of warnings should be based on the findings of the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre’s (Bushfire CRC) project ‘Communicating Risk to Communities and Others’.

4.29     The 2004 COAG report also indicated some logistical concerns about the use of SEWS. In particular, it noted that due to its infrequent use in southern Australia, television and radio stations ‘have difficulty locating the signal when they need to play it and the public is largely unaware of its significance. Reluctance to use the signal when local communities are threatened by bushfire has led to the signal being virtually ineffective as a national warning measure’.21 It advocated the regular use of SEWS during periods of bushfire threat.

4.30     COAG’s findings and recommendations were sound and have been justified in light of the evidence before the Commission. It is regrettable that a nationally consistent approach to bushfire warnings has not been developed, and that SEWS fell into disuse in Victoria prior to 7 February 2009. This is discussed in more detail at paragraphs 4.189–4.205.

2005 Catastrophic Disasters Report

4.31     In October 2005 the report, Catastrophic Disasters Emergency Management Capability Working Group — Review of Australia’s Ability to Respond to and Recover from Catastrophic Disasters was prepared by the Catastrophic Disasters Emergency Management Capability Working Group, chaired by Mr Tony Pearce, then Director of Emergency Management and Security of the Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner (OESC) in Victoria.22

4.32     The 2002 COAG report had recommended the creation of the Working Group that then prepared the 2005 report. It found that ‘whilst existing State/Territory and national emergency management arrangements are robust … Australia is currently not as prepared as it should be to manage the consequences of a catastrophic disaster impacting the country’.23

4.33     The Working Group modelled four hypothetical scenarios to assist in identifying the likely impact of catastrophic events: a cyclone impacting on Cairns, a major earthquake impacting the wheat-belt of Western Australia and the City of Perth, a tsunami impacting on the mid New South Wales coast and an influenza pandemic.24 The report found that ‘there is an overwhelming national need for the development of appropriate, effective and timely community information and warning systems’. It also emphasised the desirability of a national approach, and the potentially counter-productive consequences of disparate systems being developed in isolation.25

4.34     It is disappointing that what was identified in October 2005 as an ‘overwhelming national need’ for a national warning system, was not the subject of agreement by the states and territories until April 2009. It is also a matter of concern that the 2005 Catastrophic Disasters report, which revealed significant areas for improvement in Australia’s capacity to respond to natural disasters, was not made public until summonsed and tendered in the Commission’s hearings.26 One of the clear lessons from the fires of 7 February and from the substantial body of material on natural disaster and warning systems generally, is that the community, governments and emergency services benefit from the free flow of information. The decision not to release this important report for a number of years did nothing to increase community preparedness to meet the challenges posed by natural disasters.

2006 Fire agencies’ internal review

4.35     In 2006, the CFA and the Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE) commissioned Mr John Schauble to conduct a review of information processes during fire incidents, including the issue of provision of warnings to the community during fires: Joint CFA/DSE Review of Effectiveness of Information Flow to Communities and Media During Fire Incidents — Preliminary Findings.²⁷

4.36     This review involved a series of debriefs and interviews with CFA and DSE personnel engaged in the information management process. It focused on the work of the Information Units in Information Management Teams in the fire services. The report noted:

 

4.37     The Commission received expert advice on what constitutes an effective warning in written submissions and in oral evidence.29 Other key documents on this topic include:

•       2005 and 2009 Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council (AFAC) position papers30

•       2008 Australian Government advice Emergency Warnings — Choosing your Words³¹

•       Material relating to the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP).32

4.38     There is a high level of consistency between these key documents and the expert advice received by the Commission. The State has committed to implementing improvements in bushfire warnings for the forthcoming fire season.33 This guidance highlights that the content of a warning should be driven by its aim. In this context, Professor Handmer, Innovation Professor in Risk and Sustainability and Director of the Centre for Risk and Community Safety at RMIT University, set out the features of a good warning.34 In particular, it should let people know what they should or should not do to protect themselves, empower them to respond appropriately, be ‘people centred’ and be based on local needs and expectations.35

4.39     In oral evidence, Professor Handmer added that the purpose of a warning is to ‘provide a signal for some action’.36 He noted that it is important to ensure that people realise that the warning relates to their personal situation.37

4.40     Professor Handmer also suggested that messages should set out the expected timing and severity of the event, say what is likely to happen and when it will occur, indicate how people should act and identify the source of the message (which should be one that is trusted as credible by those at risk).38 He noted the phenomenon of people seeking to confirm and discuss warnings in their personal networks.39 He said that language should be vivid, rather than vague or abstract; messages should be positive, rather than negative (that is, they should advocate what to do); and they should invite sociability (for example, by recommending that people check on their neighbours) because people like to ‘do something’.40

4.41     Urgent messages should contain locally specific information.41 Professor Handmer recommended that messages should include information about the degree of severity of the fire, or the predicted event.

4.42     He made the following further suggestions for improvements to existing materials:

•       consideration should be given to having another level of fire danger for particularly extreme conditions43

•       high-risk areas and vulnerable groups should be targeted for more personalised messages and bushfire-related education44

•       commercial media needs to become part of the fire and emergency management system45

•       informal networks could be used more to disseminate warnings, and to add locally specific information to the message46

•       to be useful, warnings need to provide those at risk with enough time to take protective action.47

4.43     Mr Alan Rhodes, Manager Community Safety Research and Evaluation for the CFA, referred to the research of two American experts, well known in the field, Mr Dennis Mileti and Mr John Sorensen. He set out their view that for a warning to be effective, it must:

•       describe the precise nature of the threat and how it poses a danger to the public

•       communicate the exact location of the threat

•       provide guidance as to the specific actions the public should undertake

•       specify the time when the hazard is likely to impact

•       state the agency which is giving the warning (multiple sources are preferable).48

These statements provide sound guidance as to what constitutes a good warning.

4.44     Many of the matters explored in the evidence of Professor Handmer are strikingly similar to the views of the Emergency Services Commissioner, Mr Bruce Esplin. The OESC has produced a number of significant reports in relation to warning systems, emergency management and emergency events in Victoria.49 The Commission commends the work of Mr Esplin’s office and its contribution to the development of the learning and research in the area, in particular its work on the Community Information and Warning System: The Report of Trial and Evaluation (2006).50

4.45     In evidence, when asked what constitutes a ‘good warning’, Mr Esplin said the following:

4.46     It is also useful to consider the work of the American expert, Mr Sorensen. In his article, Hazard Warning Systems: Review of 20 Years of Progress, Mr Sorensen referred to six warning myths that ‘all too often constrain the effectiveness of warning systems when implemented’.52 He describes the six myths:

(1) the myth of ‘public panic’: Mr Sorensen says that social scientists have shown this is not the case, except in situations affected by closed physical space and an immediate and clear source of death where escape routes are not available to everyone affected.

(2) the second myth Mr Sorensen cites is that ‘officials are usually worried about overwhelming people with too much information’: in his opinion, the public ‘rarely, if ever’ receives too much information during an emergency.

(3) Mr Sorensen refers to the concern about raising ‘false alarms’: he notes that the likelihood of people responding to warnings is not diminished by what has been labelled the ‘cry wolf’ syndrome — so long as the basis of the false alarm is understood.

(4) the belief on the part of authorities that a single spokesperson is good practice when disseminating emergency information: indeed, to the contrary, says Mr Sorensen, the public needs information from a variety of sources.

(5) it is a common belief that people will take action immediately on receipt of a warning: however, most people ‘simply do not’ do so, says Mr Sorensen.

(6) the sixth myth is that officials often think people will follow all recommendations made in a warning, but research shows people will not blindly follow instructions, unless the basis for the instruction is clear and that basis makes ‘common sense’.53

4.47     The myths described by Mr Sorensen appear to have underpinned some of the development of our current bushfire warning systems. The challenging of these myths assists in assessing the system with fresh eyes. An improved understanding of the way in which people react to warnings assists in crafting better warnings.

THE WARNING POSITION ADOPTED BY AFAC

4.48     In 2005, AFAC prepared a draft position paper on bushfire information and warnings.54 The paper was last modified on 24 April 2007, but remained in draft form.55 The AFAC paper is described as being ‘In Response to Recommendation 8.5 from the COAG Report on Bushfire Mitigation and Management’.56

4.49     The 2005 AFAC paper emphasised the importance that messages should use plain language and should address the following questions:

•            Where is the threat now?

•            Where is the threat expected to move to next?

•            What are the immediate risks faced by people in the threat area?

•            What are the public advised to do about those risks?

4.50     It indicates that bushfire information and warning messages should also include:

•       clear information about the area of risk

•       where a specific location is provided, information about the general location — local place names should not be used unless supplemented with general location details

•       the time and date that the message was issued, including the length of time that the message is current.58

4.51     Though this 2005 paper has been superseded, it expressed a number of sound principles, drawing on the work of COAG in 2004, and it constitutes a useful guide to a clear approach to the construction of bushfire warnings.

4.52     The call for clearer content in warnings was reiterated in a subsequent AFAC draft paper titled A National Systems Approach to Community Warnings: Discussion Paper Draft Version 2.0 (May 2009).59 This paper proposes a systems approach to warnings incorporating four elements:

•       preparing the community

•       situational awareness

•       message construction and dissemination

•       appropriate action taken.

4.53     This 2009 AFAC paper advocates a consistent national approach given the transient nature of the population and the fact that ‘emergencies have no regard for jurisdictional boundaries’.60 The paper observes that the ‘most crucial aspect of the warnings system is the continued development of community survivability strategies that are in place well before any emergency event occurs’.61

4.54     The second element, ‘situational awareness’, refers to the information and awareness that resides in individuals, communities, industry and the emergency services. The paper notes that individuals and emergency service organisations all receive information from a range of sources, formal and informal. Based on that information, organisations decide to warn, and individuals to act — but these actions may not align (for example, people may act prior to the warning). This is not necessarily a problem, as:

4.55     The evidence before the Commission tends to confirm that while emergency services are monitoring natural disasters, gathering intelligence and considering issuing official warnings, many (but not all) in the community are likely to be responding to the environmental cues and informal sources of information available to them. On receipt of an official warning, people commonly seek corroboration from other sources, and further information about the appropriate response.

4.56     The 2009 AFAC paper also notes that there is no consistent Australian standard for message construction, or protocol for triggering a warning and calls on COAG to adopt the use of the CAP as the basis for messaging in Australia and to set a timeframe for its implementation by emergency agencies.63

4.57     Finally, the AFAC paper notes studies that demonstrated the significant association between community education and higher levels of household preparedness and the taking of appropriate protective action.64 This is certainly consistent with the evidence before this Commission.

Best practice IN BUSHFIRE WARNINGS: Choosing Your Words

4.58     In 2008, the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department released Emergency Warnings — Choosing Your Words.⁶⁵ This document is a valuable guide to best practice in drafting warnings. Its content is practical and clear. The paper set out a number of guiding principles. It counselled against making assumptions about the audience, noting that warnings will need to reach a broad audience and that any message needs to be appropriate for those at home, at work, in the car or visiting the area.66

4.59     The paper noted that an emergency warning is a ‘dialogue with the community, not a command situation’. It promoted seeking cooperation with a suggested action, not compliance with an order: ‘This is best achieved by giving people information that convinces them that a particular course of action is the best one to take’.67

4.60     In describing the way in which people generally respond to warnings, the paper suggested that this is a process and not a single step. People generally follow a certain thought process before deciding to respond, starting with receiving a message, believing its credibility, confirming it, personalising it, determining what action is required and ending with determining whether the action is feasible.68

4.61     Professor Handmer agreed that the advice in Choosing Your Words is sound.69 Ms Jillian Edwards, Manager Strategy and Knowledge, AFAC, said that it was ‘a very good piece of work that provides a lot of insight into some of the language that could be used to elicit certain reactions from people’.70 Mr Pearce, now Director General of Emergency Management Australia, agreed it was provided to agencies to guide them in best practice.71 Mr Rhodes accepted that CFA messages could benefit from some of the paper’s suggestions.72

4.62     Choosing Your Words provides excellent practical guidance as to the best method of drafting and constructing a clear and useful bushfire warning. There is general support among the parties for the proposition that the content of bushfire warnings should be based on the principles set out in Choosing Your Words.⁷³ The State indicated in its submissions that it would, before the next fire season, refine fire messages based upon the Choosing Your Words publication.74

The Common Alerting Protocol IN BUSHFIRE WARNINGS

4.63     There is evidence before the Commission concerning the development of a protocol and standard digital format for expressing the content of warnings, known as CAP.

4.64     CAP was designed in the United States by emergency managers and technology experts and ultimately adopted there in April 2004 by the Organisation for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS). Use of CAP is mandated in the United States.75 It is now being introduced in other countries including Italy, Canada, Indonesia and Japan.76

4.65     The use of CAP permits a consistent warning message to be disseminated simultaneously over different media (for example, internet, SMS, landlines, email).77 Once adopted, CAP can be incorporated into any number of technology applications.78 It has been described as a ‘write it once’ tool.

4.66     As Ms Edwards explained, CAP is two things:

4.67     The benefits of the adoption of CAP have been described as including:

•       efficiency and minimisation of confusion during emergencies

•       reduction of costs and operational complexity by eliminating the need for multiple custom software interfaces to the many warning sources and dissemination systems involved in all hazards warning

•       facilitation of movement towards coordinated warning messages over multiple delivery systems

•       distribution of authoritative alert messages to those who need them in a timely and effective way, ultimately reducing damage and loss of life

•       capability of conversion to and from the ‘native’ formats to all kinds of sensor and alerting technologies, forming a basis for technology independent of national and international alerts and warnings.80

4.68     In April 2008, AFAC formally adopted the position that its member agencies will use the OASIS Common Alerting Protocol, V1.1, or its derivative, as the standard alerting protocol for handling the essential content of alert warning messages.81

4.69     In its 2009 draft paper A National Systems Approach to Community Warnings, AFAC suggested that a ‘standards based, all media, all hazards public warning strategic framework makes for a more effective solution and more efficient use of resources’.82 The paper went on to note that the OASIS CAP provides a suitable basis for messaging format, with some adjustments for Australian content and terminology.83

4.70     The introduction of CAP would assist in simplifying bushfire warnings in Victoria, and would contribute to what should ultimately be a nationally uniform approach. The written submissions of AFAC endorsed the adoption of CAP.84 The State undertook in its written submissions to adopt CAP in the next fire season.85

 

The State ensure that bushfire warnings issued in Victoria:

•      are founded on the principle of maximising the potential to save human lives;

•      embody the principles encapsulated in Recommendation 8.5 of the Council of Australian Governments report the National Inquiry on Bushfire Mitigation and Management (2004);

•      embody the principles endorsed in the Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council Draft Discussion Paper, A National Systems Approach to Community Warning (May 2009); and

•      incorporate the use of the Common Alerting Protocol, as adapted for the Australian context.

 

 

4.71     Before examining the evidence on bushfire warnings issued on 7 February it is important to understand the system for disseminating bushfire warnings in Victoria in effect on that day.

The procedure set out in the Emergency Management Manual

4.72     The Emergency Management Manual Victoria (the Manual) states that:

4.73     While some of this text cannot be faulted — such as the first sentence — other parts of it are outdated and confusing, such as the statement about loud hailers and door knocks. The text does not refer to websites, yet there is clear evidence that many in the community rely on the fire agencies’ websites to obtain bushfire warnings. When referring to the issuing of warnings, the two apparently simple statements about who issues warnings in different circumstances mask the considerable complexity about who is responsible for issuing warnings in Victoria during fires (Chapter 9). Finally, the evidence before the Commission demonstrates that many bushfire warnings issued on 7 February were not simple and suited to the needs of the affected community. The particular shortcomings evident in relation to the content of the CFA’s awareness, alert and urgent threat messages are discussed in more detail below, and summarised at paragraphs 4.163–4.164.

4.74     The degree to which current policies and protocols on warnings are, in many respects, divorced from the reality of what occurred on 7 February is troubling. If the Manual is to be useful to emergency services it should contain information that reflects current best practice.

Dissemination of BUSHFIRE warnings by the fire agencies

4.75     The evidence before the Commission demonstrates that there were generally two types of material made available to the public in early February 2009 concerning the bushfire threat in Victoria. First, general information (including weather and fire risk predictions) was disseminated prior to 7 February. This information (which is dealt with in more detail from paragraph 4.82) focussed principally on the risk of fire and the conditions facing Victoria throughout the fire season, particularly during the heatwave between late January and early February.

4.76     Secondly, there were the specific bushfire warnings for each of the fires issued in one of three categories — awareness, alert, urgent threat — prepared by the CFA or DSE using pre-existing templates. The information units in each Incident Management Team created information releases at the incident level. The information releases were provided to the Integrated Emergency Coordination Centre (iECC), Regional Emergency Coordination Centres, the ABC and local media agencies for broadcast, and to the VBIL. When the iECC information unit received these messages from the IMT, they were generally uploaded onto the CFA or DSE websites, albeit with some delay.87

4.77     The evidence reveals that the CFA and DSE websites were a key source of information for the community and that many people relied on the internet as their principal source of information.88 Broadcasts by the ABC, in its role as the emergency broadcaster, were also critical in the flow of information to the public.89 The role of the ABC is addressed in more detail below.

4.78     Mr Rees explained that the CFA has developed standard form information releases to describe fire situations. Three levels or ‘grades’ of message are created. The standard information releases for fire situations were presented in his witness statement.90

Table 4.1: Current CFA types of information releases for fire situations

Title of Message	Description	Review Time
Awareness Message – Initial Advice	To be issued when a fire first commences, when there is not currently a threat to life or property but local interest may be generating.	Within four hours of issue depending on conditions.
Alert Message	To be issued when a heightened level of awareness is required by people and communities in close proximity to a fire. There is still no direct threat, but there is the potential for direct impact should conditions change or escalate. May include a time parameter within message if known. It is important not to over exaggerate the risk so that people in the area do not feel unnecessarily threatened.	Within two hours of issue, depending on conditions.
Urgent Threat Message	To be issued when direct impact from a bushfire is imminent.	Within 30 minutes of issue, depending on conditions.

 

RADIO Broadcasts by the ABC — the ‘emergency broadcaster’

4.79     On 4 February 2004, the ABC entered into an MOU with the State of Victoria pursuant to which the ABC has undertaken to broadcast information and warnings provided to it by relevant emergency services organisations during an emergency.92

4.80     Emergency messages are provided by the emergency services to the ABC via a special hotline number staffed by the ABC 24 hours a day. Local radio Victoria broadcasts the messages immediately and then regularly repeats them every 15 minutes until the threat message is downgraded by the emergency organisation that issued the alert. The messages can be broadcast on 774 ABC Radio Melbourne, the regional ABC local radio network in Victoria, a specific Victorian local radio station or the whole Victorian radio network.93 Ms Samantha Stayner, Acting Program Director 774 ABC Radio, gave evidence about the process followed by the ABC to meet its obligations under the MOU and in relation to the events of 7 February, during which the ABC devoted significant resources and effort to covering the fires.94 This is discussed further below.

 

4.81     A significant body of information about bushfires was made available to the public during the 2008–09 bushfire season. There was also intensive coverage of weather forecasts, fire danger predictions and information about the risk of bushfire during the period from October 2008 onwards. Dissemination of this sort of material is vital to maintaining the community’s knowledge about the risk of fire.

4.82     During the 2008–09 bushfire season, senior government figures made key announcements about the high risk faced by Victoria during the season. The approach adopted to these messages was laudable. Significant resources and time were devoted to ensuring that Victorians were aware of the risk during the summer months.95 The campaigns reflected a sound emphasis on improving community preparedness.

4.83     For example, on 27 October 2008, the Premier, the Minister for Police and Emergency Services and the Chief Fire Officers of each of the CFA, DSE and the Metropolitan Fire and Services Board announced the beginning of the 2008–09 bushfire season. The announcement emphasised the need for preparedness, the significant investment of State resources in fire response, and the high-risk outlook for the 2008–09 bushfire season.96

4.84     Major announcements, media releases, press conferences and events aimed at alerting the community to the extreme fire risk took place throughout November and December 2008, and January 2009. There was intense media coverage of the issue from late January through early February 2009.97 On 4 February, Mr Esplin met with the Chair of the Fire Communications Taskforce, Ms Louise Martin, Director Strategic Communications, Department of Justice, and Ms Amber Brodecky, Manager Media and Community Relations, OESC. In light of the weather forecast, they agreed on the need to urgently renew the FireReady advertising campaign. A decision was made to immediately resume and extend that advertising campaign.98 This was a timely and commendable decision.

4.85     Announcements were made by senior members of the government and the emergency services. For example:

•       30 January at a press conference the Premier urged Victorians ‘to be vigilant’ and he said: ‘we are right on the edge today’.99

•       2 February the Premier said ‘this is not over yet’.100

•       4 February: a media release (titled Fire Services Warn of Continuing Fire Threat) was jointly issued by the CFA, DSE and the Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board, warning of the continuing fire threat and extreme weather forecast for Friday and Saturday.101

•       4 February the Premier was reported in the Herald Sun saying that the State was ‘set to burn’ with or without the extreme heat.102 The Premier also said that the CFA warned people to ‘be alert and do not get caught out when a bushfire strikes’.103

•       5 February: a press conference was held at the iECC. A number of media releases were issued by the CFA and DSE for the event, titled Victoria’s fire agencies and police warn of extreme danger,¹⁰⁴ This is the weekend to be bushfire alert¹⁰⁵ and High Fire Danger Saturday 7 February.¹⁰⁶

•       5 February the Premier was quoted in the media saying: ‘Everything is just absolutely tinder dry and we don’t even need the high temperatures now for high fire alerts’.107

•       5 February: the CFA’s Chief Officer and DSE Chief Fire Officer were on ABC statewide radio. They referred to the ‘unprecedented fire weather’, the fact that, ‘Saturday appears to be worse in terms of weather forecast terms, than the 16th of February 1983’. In his interview, Mr Rees noted in particular that people might form the view: ‘given where the situation is, I’m going to make the decision not to be there — that is a very valid decision’. Mr Ewan Waller, Chief Fire Officer, DSE, noted that people should ‘get mentally prepared as well as physically prepared for a very, very, very difficult day’. He also stated that fire ‘could be anywhere in Victoria’. Mr Rees noted the concern that fires in these sort of conditions ‘can pop up really quickly and unless you’re vigilant, and alert and looking about you may not even get that warning’.108

•       6 February: further media releases were issued, for example: Campers urged to stay home during extreme conditions;¹⁰⁹ Extreme Fire Threat;¹¹⁰ Extreme Fire Weather Warning;¹¹¹ Avoid all unnecessary travel tomorrow;¹¹² and High Fire Danger Saturday 7 February.¹¹³

•       6 February: during the press conference at Ballarat, the Premier said: ‘The worst day ever in the history of this State’…‘I can’t stress this enough, I mean I know the Chief Fire Officer has been out and he said it will be as bad as you can get and he is not exaggerating’.114

•       6 February: Mr Rees said we would see ‘weather that perhaps we have never had in the State of Victoria in respect of fire danger’.115 He also released a podcast which was available online at www.cfa.vic.gov.au in which he provided a series of statements about the weather, the state of the fuel and the legitimacy of leaving property. He said ‘we would rather be talking about lost houses than lost lives’.116

•       7 February: Mr Esplin was interviewed on ABC Radio at 11:15am, where he said, among other comments: ‘These fires can come and go in the space of an afternoon and do untold damage and that’s what happened in Ash Wednesday in 1983 — rapid onset, fast moving into built up areas and the human toll was huge and we don’t want that today’.117

4.86     This narrative indicates that a great deal of information on bushfires and the risk of bushfires was broadcast in Victoria throughout the 2008–09 bushfire season, and particularly in early February 2009. This material was generally of a high quality, attracted significant media attention and achieved high media ‘penetration’.118 Professor Handmer expressed the view that the use of a person such as the Premier to disseminate messages is very useful and likely to carry high credibility.119

4.87     Mr Esplin remarked:

4.88     After the fires, the OESC commissioned an independent media analysis of the radio, television and print coverage for the period 4–7 February.121 The media analysis confirms that terminology related to fire predictions and the dire weather forecasts, such as ‘warnings’, ‘heatwave’ and ‘bushfire’ were used repeatedly in the lead up to 7 February.122

4.89     Professor Handmer stated that the ad hoc high-level ‘warnings’ from people such as the Premier, the Chief Fire Officers and the Emergency Services Commissioner were ‘very clear not only about the risk in physical terms, but also the types of people who might be most vulnerable and the sorts of things that perhaps people could do’.123

4.90     The message delivered in the days leading up to 7 February were direct in their meaning. The words of the Premier, the Chief Fire Officers and the Emergency Services Commissioner showed foresight. Each of them was honest, forthright and explicit in the information and advice they gave. There is no doubt that each went to great lengths to disseminate the message that Victoria was facing an extreme fire risk.

4.91     These messages no doubt contributed to many Victorians’ preparedness and, possibly, were responsible for saving the lives of some who heeded those words and left bushfire prone areas prior to 7 February and/or undertook additional preparations for the bushfire threat.

4.92     However, it is also clear that for many Victorians these general awareness messages and advice were not sufficient to alert them to the threat caused by any particular bushfire, nor were they translated into a ‘call to action’ in all cases. Such statements in the media prepare the community only to the extent that individuals respond, prepare and listen for specific bushfire warnings which may follow. This can in part be explained by the evidence of Professor Douglas Paton, Chair, School of Psychology, University of Tasmania, who discussed the various factors (individual, social and structural) that influence a person’s level of bushfire preparedness.124

 

4.93     An outline of the specific warnings issued on 7 February is provided in Chapter 1. This section provides a broader discussion about different types of warnings. The Commission will hear further evidence on the warnings given for each major fire in future hearings.

4.94     Mr Rhodes stated that the methods the CFA uses to disseminate information include:

•       information releases, which are uploaded to the CFA website (www.cfa.vic.gov.au), read aloud on ABC Radio, and provided to the VBIL, so that they can be used to respond to public enquiries

•       a hotline number established with ABC Radio, so that a designated CFA officer can contact the control room direct to broadcast urgent threat messages

•       the VBIL, which is a free call number the public can call to obtain information about current fire threats, preparedness advice and also recovery information

•       community meetings held during fire threats that provide community-specific warning information and advice

•       information releases provided to local radio stations by regional offices and Incident Control Centres before they have been sent through to the iECC

•       community fireguard telephone trees, which work by one member contacting two or more other members when they become aware of a threat, who in turn contact other telephone tree members and so on

•       local community members with access to scanners that can monitor CFA radio communications to pick up information direct from the fire ground.125

4.95     There is evidence before the Commission about each of these methods of information dissemination. It emerged that on 7 February agency websites and ABC broadcasts were the most common sources of information and warnings about bushfires for most Victorians, though other sources played a complementary role.

THE CFA and DSE websites

4.96     On 7 February the CFA and DSE issued warnings for a large number of fires. The pressure on the agencies’ staff and volunteers was extreme and all those involved were forced to cope with a rapidly evolving situation and threats posed by multiple emergencies. At times, there were obvious limitations on their capacity to supply information on fires. Mr Waller noted the following:

4.97     Mr Rees produced a copy of all bushfire warning messages posted to the CFA website on 7 and 8 February.127 Mr Waller produced a detailed compilation of all the information and warnings issued by DSE on 7 February, including the information posted on the DSE website and sent to the ABC.128

4.98     This demonstrates that a very large number of awareness, alert and urgent threat messages were posted to the CFA and DSE websites throughout the day. Information contained in the awareness, alert and urgent threat messages was conveyed to the ABC and to commercial media for broadcast. It was also supplied to the VBIL to be used by staff providing information to the public.129

Warnings broadcast by the ABC

4.99     Consistent with the MOU, many bushfire warnings were broadcast by the ABC on 7 February. After the usual midday news bulletin, local radio Victoria began its scheduled grandstand sports broadcast but interrupted this at about 12:30pm to broadcast fire-related information. As information about the number of bushfires burning in various parts of Victoria was received, and the growing seriousness of the situation became apparent, Victorian local radio management decided to cancel scheduled programming and switch to continuous rolling coverage of the bushfires.130

4.100  During the day, much of the content broadcast on local radio Victoria was sourced from 774 ABC Radio Melbourne. In some areas, local ABC radio stations made local broadcasts at some stages of the day.131

4.101  The information concerning bushfires received by the ABC came from multiple sources:

•       telephone calls from representatives of emergency services made on the hotline directly to 774 ABC Radio Melbourne production studio in Southbank and to regional radio stations and directly to ABC local radio staff

•       emails from the fire agencies and Victoria Police

•       ABC staff monitoring the DSE and CFA websites: on the afternoon of 7 February a person in the Ballarat studio was rostered to monitor the messages being posted on the agencies’ websites and as appropriate to read those messages on air on 774 ABC Radio Melbourne

•       direct conversations between CFA and DSE staff and ABC personnel located at the iECC

•       ABC staff speaking directly to Incident Controllers by telephone, and sometimes the Incident Controllers being interviewed on air

•       telephone calls with representatives of the Bureau of Meteorology

•       telephone calls, SMS messages and emails from members of the general public.132

4.102  There are in evidence transcripts of the 774 ABC Radio broadcasts on 7 February.133Additional audio files and transcripts of ABC Central Victoria Radio, ABC Gippsland Radio, ABC Western Victoria Radio, 3AW and ABC local radio were also tendered.134 In addition, a chart setting out the first mention of warnings for the Kilmore East and Murrindindi fires was tendered.135

4.103  It is clear from this material that bushfire awareness, alert and urgent threat messages were read multiple times throughout the day. ‘On the spot’ coverage was provided throughout the day. Interviews were conducted with representatives of the emergency services, callers from the public provided information and reporters on the ground provided additional coverage.

4.104  An extremely high volume of calls was received by ABC Radio on the afternoon of 7 February. The Melbourne Southbank studio received just over 6000 calls. In comparison, on an ordinary day it expects to receive approximately 800 calls.136

4.105  Ms Stayner said calls to the ABC were being made simultaneously and continuously on multiple lines. Producers and editorial staff were answering calls for over 10 hours commencing at about midday on 7 February.137 The events of the afternoon presented a ‘very challenging situation even for experienced staff’.138 Some members of the public called in a distressed state seeking information, which presented difficulties for ABC staff.139 The public increasingly called the studio looking for specific information and reporting problems with the VBIL.140 Some callers rang back repeatedly and became increasingly frustrated.141

4.106  In addition to the information broadcast on ABC Radio:

•       ABC television broadcasts on 7 February carried ‘crawlers’ which advised viewers that there were fires burning throughout Victoria and that they should listen to their ABC local radio for further information. The first crawler went to air at 1:45pm and they continued regularly until nearly 10:00pm on 7 February.142

•       Information was published on the 774 ABC Radio Melbourne Twitter account from about 12:30pm on 7 February until the early hours of the following morning.143 The information published on the Twitter account came from information already broadcast by the ABC, the CFA website and information on the ABC news site.144

4.107  The ABC played a vital role on 7 February in informing and warning the community. The efforts of its staff are commended. The level of public trust in and reliance on the ABC is evident. However, in a number of key instances the information provided by the ABC was out of date, or inaccurate — or there was simply no information that particular communities were under threat. The ABC was reliant on accurate and timely advice from the emergency services, and when this was not available, the quality of information relayed by the ABC was inevitably compromised. The specific circumstances around warnings for the Kilmore East fire are discussed in Chapter 9. The Commission will hear further evidence for each major fire in future hearings.

Commercial media

4.108  The commercial media also played a role in alerting the community to bushfire warnings. A compilation of media clips (including commercial TV news bulletins) was played during the hearing.145 These clips graphically illustrated the level of attention that the bushfire risk gained in the commercial media on 7 February.

4.109  There is scope for increasing the involvement and profile of the commercial media in emergency broadcasting. As Mr Rees noted, the MOU between the ABC and the emergency services agencies acknowledges that ABC local radio broadcast to a maximum of about 25–30 per cent of Victorians at peak listening times, and a smaller number outside those hours.146 Attention needs to be paid to reaching those who are not within the ABC’s audience.

4.110  Mr Grant Johnstone, General Manager of ACE Radio Traralgon stations TRFM and Gold 1242, gave evidence.147 ACE Radio is Victoria’s largest regional commercial radio network. It operates 13 AM and FM radio stations throughout Victoria. Mr Johnstone noted that ACE Radio and other commercial radio networks are not recognised officially as emergency broadcasters.148 However, ACE Radio follows the procedures contained in the Commercial Radio Australia Limited codes of practice and guidelines for broadcasts of emergency information.149 Pursuant to those guidelines, ACE Radio broadcasts emergency information. ACE Radio broadcast the warning messages it received on 7 February and undertook substantial efforts to obtain information directly from Incident Controllers to supplement that information.

4.111  ACE Radio’s system for broadcasting emergency service announcements relies heavily on the emergency services directly contacting ACE Radio by telephone, fax or email and on ACE Radio staff being able to speak to emergency service personnel directly when the need arises.150

4.112  Mr Johnstone noted, however, that there are two major consequences of ACE Radio not having the status of the emergency broadcaster:

(1) Incident Controllers and others charged with dissemination of information do not automatically and routinely provide emergency information to commercial regional radio networks. As a result, the information available for broadcast is more limited than it should be.

(2) Commercial broadcasters are not promoted in the mind of the public as ‘emergency broadcasters’.151

4.113  Mr Johnstone expressed the firm view that all radio networks that are prepared to broadcast emergency service information during bushfires and other emergencies, and to maintain appropriate standards when doing so, should enjoy equal access to the emergency service information to maximise public accessibility. He noted that ACE Radio would be prepared to enter into an undertaking with the relevant authorities to guarantee the extent and integrity of its emergency information broadcasts in a similar way to the MOU that presently exists between the ABC and Victorian emergency services organisations.152 He said:

4.114  Efforts should be made to pursue this willingness of commercial radio interests to enter into arrangements and commitments similar to those with the ABC.

4.115  The State indicated in its submissions that the OESC has already decided to negotiate with commercial broadcasters who wish to act as emergency broadcasters and thereby ‘extend the reach of warnings delivered by radio and beyond the audience of the ABC’.154 This development is welcomed. However, the Commission notes that success in extending the emergency broadcaster network will require commitment by the parties on an ongoing basis.

 

4.116  Evidence previously described in this chapter confirmed that a large volume of warnings was issued in various forms and at different times during 7 February. The Commission has also paid careful attention to the content, accuracy and timelines of the warnings, the detail of their accessibility to the communities directly affected by the fires, and to the nature of their general dissemination.

Interim report of the Bushfire CRC

4.117  The Bushfire CRC has produced an interim report on its investigation into the fires: Victorian 2009 Bushfire Research Response Interim Report (June 2009).155 That report included a detailed study of human behaviour and community safety.156 The themes that emerged included the existence of low levels of awareness prior to 7 February, criticisms of some of the sources of information relied on by the community and concerns about an absence of timely warnings.

4.118  The report’s findings were based on preliminary analysis of 201 (or approximately one third) of the interviews conducted by the research team.157 The researchers’ preliminary analysis of the material indicated that a minority of those interviewed (about one in five) spoke of some level of awareness of heightened risk of fire predicted for 7 February, although it was noted that not all interviewees were asked specifically about this.158 Very few of those interviewed indicated that the forecast and warnings had resulted in them changing their behaviour prior to 7 February. The report noted that:

4.119  Most interviewees reported receiving information via the radio on 7 February. Very few made references to specific and useful information having being broadcast.160 The report noted that for many interviewed, the lack of timely information about developing threats to communities such as St Andrews, Strathewen, Kinglake, Kinglake West, Narbethong and Marysville, especially late in the day when fire activity was rapidly increasing, may have contributed to people being surprised by the sudden impact of the fires. Because those communities were not identified as being under threat, many residents appear to have assumed they were unlikely to be threatened.161

4.120  Many interviewees reported seeking information from the CFA and DSE websites and were critical of those sites.162 Particularly in Bendigo and Marysville, those interviewed also indicated that direct verbal warnings from police officers and CFA and SES volunteers were very important in enabling residents to evacuate safely.163 The report concluded:

analysis of a SPECIFIC BUSHFIRE WARNING ISSUED ON 7 FEBRUARY

4.121  Professor Handmer was asked to comment on the effectiveness of the bushfire warning messages issued during the fires.165 In particular, he was asked to comment on bushfire warnings placed on the CFA website on 7 February. One of these warnings is replicated below.

Table 4.2: Alert Message for the Saunders Rd, Kilmore East fire, 2:20pm

CLICK FOR IMAGE

 

4.122  In relation to this message, Professor Handmer made the following points:

•       Layout: subheadings are present but hard to find, people have to read the whole statement carefully to find what they might want.

•       Content and wording: This is an alert message, but the timeframe it is relevant for is only 15 minutes. This appears inconsistent with the message ‘the fire is not currently posing a threat to communities’, and the statement that the fire ‘is impacting’ on the outskirts of the Wandong township. He concludes that ‘much of that message is generic in all the alert messages but it is quite confusing, more than quite confusing’.167

4.123  The confusion caused by a message which states both that, ‘this fire is not currently posing a threat to communities’ and that ‘the fire is impacting on the outskirts of the Wandong township’ is particularly problematic. Mr Rhodes accepted that this rendered the message ‘contradictory’.168

4.124  The reference to a fire being 600 hectares in size is not, on its own, particularly informative to most members of the public, unless accompanied by an indication of the severity and speed of the fire. The reference to a VicRoads map (which appears in this warning, but not all those posted on the CFA website) may be very useful to those travelling, but other information describing the location and predicted spread of the fire is likely to be more useful to residents who are in their homes when they receive the warning.

4.125  In the context of an exploration of these mixed messages, Mr Esplin stated that he was aware the CFA and DSE were already reviewing the language in the messages.169 The terminology, design and content of the messages indeed needs urgent review.

4.126  A real problem with this message, and others like it, is the failure to indicate the severity of the approaching fire, and the failure to refer explicitly to the window of time until the fire reaches Wandong and other communities.

4.127  When asked to comment on urgent threat messages, Mr Esplin said such a message should not be regarded as a warning to leave. He asserted that it is rather ‘the last bit of information for a community that has prepared itself to stay and defend its property’. He said ‘If you get an urgent alert message [sic], it is to help those people who are planning to stay and defend their properties and it should not be seen as a trigger to flee, which all the research at that stage had highlighted was the most dangerous option to you’.170

4.128  This suggests that urgent threat warnings carry meaning only for those who have determined to stay and defend their properties. However, it is clear that many in the community decide to leave when threatened by fire and that for some, an urgent threat message is the first indication they receive of fire in their area. Such messages must be crafted with this reality in mind.

LAY WITNESSES VIEWS ON THE WARNINGS

4.129  Lay witnesses provided useful evidence about warnings relevant to their communities. A number of those who gave evidence did not hear specific bushfire warnings for their community. Some did not receive a warning because a timely warning was not disseminated for their community. Some were unable to receive warnings as their homes had lost power by the critical time. Others did not actively seek warnings or ‘missed’ specific warnings, because they were engaged in other activities, or were preparing their homes or focusing on other communication sources when the warning was disseminated. Some heard warnings, but found them inadequate in their description of the speed and severity of the fire.

4.130  Many of those who gave evidence before the Commission expressed grief, anger and frustration about the fact that they or their family members did not receive timely or accurate (or in some cases any) warnings sufficient to enable them to take steps to protect themselves and their families.

4.131  Witnesses drew on various sources for information and warnings. Dr Lachlan Fraser of Marysville was aware of the weather forecast. He saw smoke at about 3:30pm on the afternoon of 7 February and then sought information from the VBIL, which confirmed that there was a fire at the Murrindindi Mill. He listened to commercial radio rather than the ABC.171

4.132  Mr John O’Neill of Steels Creek listened to the commercial stations and 774 ABC Radio. He monitored the CFA website. His family also made use of a telephone tree in their area.172 Ms Alice Barber of Pheasant Creek heard on the television and radio about fires in Kilmore East.173

4.133  Mr Peter Olorenshaw of Calignee was aware of the severe weather and fire risk. In particular, he listened to the ABC and monitored the Bureau of Meteorology website. Mr Olorenshaw is the leading Senior Constable attached to the Latrobe Traffic Management Unit. In that capacity he attended Red Hill Road where fire was already burning, and he and his partner drove to a number of homes and personally advised residents of the approaching fire.174

REACTIONS TO THE INFORMATION BROADCAST PRIOR TO 7 FEBRUARY

4.134  Some lay witnesses reported their reactions to the information concerning the weather predictions for the weekend disseminated in the days before the fire. Ms Jesse Odgers of Kinglake left her home at lunchtime on Friday 6 February having heard that ‘conditions would be worse than that of Ash Wednesday’.175 Ms Odgers said:

4.135  Mr Peter Newman of Buxton said:

4.136  Mr Brian Patten of Upper Plenty said: ‘I was well aware that Saturday was going to be a big day for fires or a dangerous day for fires’.178 Mr Ken Rogers of St Andrews was aware that 7 February had been declared a day of Total Fire Ban and regarded this as ‘an indication’ and had undertaken various preparations but was nevertheless expecting to hear a specific warning.179 Mr Rogers said:

4.137  Dr John Ferguson of Buxton was aware of weather predictions to the effect that it was to be ‘potentially the worst bushfire day in Victoria’s history’. Dr Ferguson was listening to ABC Radio, but did not hear the warning message for Marysville and Buxton at 5:34pm, as by then the power had gone off at his home. He noted, however, that by that time he could see the smoke in the sky and it was obvious the fire was coming.181

Waiting for a trigger

4.138  A common theme among lay witnesses was that they expected to receive information about whether the fire had reached certain areas or towns, which they regarded as an indication that the fire was ‘in their area’. Some of those witnesses were then overtaken by the speed of the fire when it reached their homes. For example, Mr Denis Spooner of Strathewen and his family were waiting for an indication that the fire was in or near Whittlesea.182 Ultimately, the family left their home, but became separated.183 Sadly, Mr Spooner’s wife and adult son died in the fire.

4.139  Ms Jacqueline Hainsworth of Kinglake West, heard the warning from the Premier on the Friday.184 But she anticipated that the trigger for her to leave would be news of a bushfire anywhere in her area including Whittlesea, Mount Disappointment, Humevale, Strathewen, St Andrews or Kinglake, rather than declaration of a Total Fire Ban day.185

4.140  Mr Illiya Ananiev of St Andrews said his family was relying on a ‘trigger’ from the internet or the CFA scanner. Mr Ananiev was aware of the high fire danger, but his first awareness of a fire in his area was being showered by blackened sticks in his family swimming pool. At that time, the only information on the website was that a Kilmore fire was ‘going’ and Mr Ananiev was not concerned by this information. In the end his family had to evacuate at the very last minute.186

4.141  Mr Bevan Gobbett of Clonbinane planned to commence his preparations when he received word that a fire had started in his shire. Mr Gobbett was first notified by a friend that a fire had started in Kilmore East. He accepted that due to a family function on that day he had not heard or seen some of the earlier warnings. Mr Gobbett had access to a CFA scanner, and the CFA and DSE websites, but found that the substantive web pages were inaccessible. He also listened to ABC Radio.187

4.142  Mrs Joan Davey was aware that her son and daughter-in-law from Kinglake were making preparations while monitoring the CFA website and looking for information about fires in their area. The fire consumed the family home and tragically took the lives of the young family, including Mrs Davey’s two grandchildren.188

Informal sources AND visual cues

4.143  Some who gave evidence were not aware of a fire until they saw smoke in the area — for example, Mr Daryl Hull working in Marysville.189 Others first heard of fire in their area from friends and family.190 Others heard information on CFA scanners — or later expressed the wish that they had been able to do so.191

4.144  Mr Christopher Casey of Long Gully heard nothing about the fires as he was listening to a commercial radio station. His first indication was noticing smoke in the distance. Ultimately Mr Casey went out into his local area and was advised by a police officer of the need to evacuate.192

4.145  Ms Sharon McCulloch of Kinglake was aware that the weather conditions leading up to 7 February were as bad or worse than Ash Wednesday, but the first indication she had that the fire was approaching was when she saw smoke and was informed by a relative. She did not hear any warnings for Kinglake on ABC Radio during the brief period she listened to it.193

4.146  Mr Douglas Walter of Taggerty had been listening to 774 ABC Radio and heard notification of a fire in Kilmore that was moving quickly. However, the first indication he had of the progress of the fire was his direct observations of the smoke.194

4.147  Mr David O’Halloran and his family monitored ABC Radio and the DSE and CFA websites. He did not hear a warning for his town of Flowerdale, although he accepted that a warning was broadcast on the ABC shortly after ten past six. He heard from a neighbour that fire was approaching Kinglake.195

4.148  Ms Anastasia Scott of Marysville was aware of the forecast weather. But her first indication that a fire had started at the Murrindindi Mill came from a phone call from a friend. She also received advice personally from a DSE employee who happened to live nearby.196

4.149  Ms Christine Glassford of Reedy Creek was aware of the weather forecasts and knew it was going to be very hot. Ms Glassford’s first information concerning the fire was when she noticed smoke; she then checked that information on the CFA website but it did not appear to match her observations.197

Lack of timely warnings

4.150  Chapter 1 describes the main fires on 7 February and contains information on the provision of warnings. For a number of the fires there is a serious time lag from the point of activation of emergency services to the provision of information, alert and warning messages to the community. The Commission will hear further evidence on the timeliness and accuracy of the warnings given for each major fire in future hearings.

4.151  Mr David Brown of Strathewen was aware of the predictions for fire risk for Saturday 7 February. He said that they were waiting for a trigger, that is an indication a fire was in their vicinity. The fire that came upon them had started over four hours before it reached them.198 Mr D Brown said:

4.152  Mrs Carol Matthews of St Andrews knew that her children were monitoring the CFA website while undertaking careful preparatory steps for the approach of possible fires. There was no reference in the material available to her children to fire approaching or reaching the town of St Andrews. Mrs Matthews listened to 774 ABC Radio herself and could hear no mention of St Andrews being in the path of the fire.200 The fire approached the family home rapidly, and tragically took the life of her son.

Views about the content of the warnings

4.153  A number of witnesses expressed concerns about the way in which information was conveyed to the public, and suggested improvements.

4.154  For example Dr Christopher Harvey of Kinglake was aware of the weather predictions for 7 February.201 But in his view, there were shortcomings in the way in which the extreme fire danger was conveyed to the community:

4.155  Dr Harvey called, in particular, for more information about the fire danger index, noting that this would have to be accompanied by an education program.203

4.156  Mr D Brown explained that his wife listened to the radio all day and monitored the CFA website. They became aware that there was a fire in Kilmore East early in the afternoon, but were surprised by the speed by which it came to their property.204 Mr D Brown also stated that information about the fire danger index would have helped people understand the severity of the fire. He said:

4.157  Mr Peter Brown of St Andrews became aware of the Kilmore East fire via an ABC Radio broadcast. He said they only heard ‘snippets of information’ about the Kilmore East fire on the radio and had to ‘wade through everybody else’s fires before we would get a little snippet about our fire’. A broadcast heard on ABC Radio at about 4:00pm informed him that there was a fire in the Clonbinane area, which was advancing slowly with a south-westerly change already coming through. This caused him to believe the fire would be pushed to the north-east, away from his valley:206

4.158  Mr P Brown also called for use of plain language:

4.159  Ms Karen Ward of Mudgegonga was aware of the weather forecast and predictions. She heard a message on ABC Radio in the evening, which was helpful because ‘it let us know that it was going to be us that was directly affected’. Ms Ward also sought more information about warnings and suggested it would be useful if fire was rated so it was clear if the approaching fire is going to be extreme.209

4.160  Mr John Williams of Yarra Glen noted that on Friday ‘the tempo of the warnings certainly increased’ and recalled seeing the warning given by the Premier.210He took this as a trigger to commence preparations to defend the winery. He said, however, that the warnings he heard on ABC Radio were difficult to understand:

4.161  He emphasised the need for short messages and suggested the following model:

4.162  Ms Jillian Kane of Bendigo, gave evidence on the death of her disabled brother in Long Gully. She noted that given his vulnerability he, and those like him, require ‘a more effective warning system’ and advance notice to be able to arrange to relocate.213

 

4.163  Changes should be made to the content of bushfire warnings. Many of the warnings used by the fire agencies on 7 February were deficient in the following respects:

•       many warnings did not indicate the likely severity of the fire; this is a significant shortcoming

•       the warnings rarely identified the window of time during which the fire was predicted to reach certain towns or communities; this information is vital to the community

•       some warnings were imprecise in their description of the location of a particular fire or the direction in which the fire was spreading; again, this information is important to those preparing to meet the threat

•       the advice in many warnings was lengthy and confusing, sometimes even contradictory; it was difficult to identify the important information

•       the terminology used in some warnings was vague and euphemistic; it did not serve to grab the audience’s attention.

4.164  On the particular language to be used in bushfire warnings, as Mr Rees agrees, terms like ‘going’ and ‘out of control’ — though they have meaning to fire specialists — fail to convey sufficient meaning to the public.214 In his evidence, Mr Lawson agreed that the use of a term such as ‘extremely dangerous bushfire’ would be in keeping with the desire to use plain language.215 Mr Pearce agreed that using the term ‘severe’ would improve communication about the severity of fires.216 Terms which convey clearly the severity and intensity of bushfires should be used.

 

The State ensure that the content of bushfire warnings issued in Victoria reflects the principles set out in the Commonwealth policy paper Emergency Warnings — Choosing Your Words (2008). In particular, all bushfire warnings issued in Victoria must use clear language, avoid euphemisms, and contain explicit information in relation to:

•      the severity, location, predicted direction and likely time of impact of bushfires on specific communities and locations; and

•      the predicted severity of impact of the bushfire and whether a specific fire poses a threat to human life.

 

 

4.165  A number of witnesses who appeared before the Commission said that it may be desirable to develop a clearer means of communicating the severity of a bushfire to the public. Some witnesses proposed drawing on the ‘category one, category two’ terminology used in cyclone warnings. For example, Mr P Brown suggested an improved system of fire danger rating:

4.166  Similarly, Mr Ananiev suggested, ‘All we are looking for is a category 1, 2, 3, or 5, and maybe a colour, red, yellow, green, to mix in with it’. When asked about use of the terminology ‘extremely dangerous’, he said ‘For me it would be category 1. One red’.218

4.167  Ms Glassford said she found the information on ABC Radio confusing:

4.168  Dr Harvey agreed:

4.169  Professor Handmer drew comparisons with other warning systems used for natural disasters. He explained that in relation to cyclones, there is a categorisation system ranging, ‘from 1 or 2, very low impact, to 5, extreme cyclone’. He explained further the benefits of cyclone warnings, while noting that cyclones are easier than bushfires to ‘detect, track and issue warnings for’.221

4.170  There are important differences between floods, cyclones and fires, and different challenges are raised in relation to warning systems for each. However, a more readily understood ‘severity scale’ to be used when grading bushfires would assist the community in responding to bushfire warnings.

4.171  The AFAC 2009 draft paper, A National Systems Approach to Community Warnings, recommended that categorisation levels should be developed for other emergencies, and in particular that the use of the fire danger index should be reconsidered, incorporating the experiences of dealing with cyclones.222 Such an approach has benefits and may be capable of more starkly bringing to the attention of the public the severe risks attached to some fires.

4.172  In a related context, a number of witnesses spoke of the difficulty of conveying the severity of extreme fires by reference to the current fire danger index scale. This matter is discussed in more detail below in Chapter 5.

4.173  In relation to the possible introduction of a numerical system of grading severity of fires, Professor Handmer said that it may require some years of education but people would understand it, so long as it was accompanied by an appropriate education awareness program.223

 

 

The State commission research into the development of a new fire severity scale that denotes the risk posed by dangerous and extremely dangerous bushfires (similar to the cyclone categories 1 to 5).

4.174  In January 2005, the Wangary fire on the Eyre Peninsula in South Australia resulted in the deaths of nine people and the destruction of 93 homes. After the Wangary fire, Mr Andrew Lawson was appointed as the Country Fire Service of South Australia (CFS) Liaison Officer to the Coronial Investigation Team and to assist those conducting an independent review into the same fire.224

4.175  Mr Lawson is currently Deputy Chief Fire Officer of the CFS. He is also a member of the AFAC Operations Strategy Group and the Urban Strategy Group. Mr Lawson has extensive experience in all areas of the fire industry, including operational firefighting, fire planning and mapping, administration, management and policy development.225

4.176  Mr Lawson gave evidence effectively ‘wearing two hats’. He attested to his experience dealing with the aftermath of the Wangary fires and the implementation of a new bushfire warning system in South Australia. He also gave evidence in his capacity as a member of AFAC’s Operations Strategy Group and as principal author of the 2005 AFAC draft paper discussed at paragraph 4.48.

4.177  Mr Lawson explained that as a result of the Wangary fires, the CFS immediately commenced an extensive ‘lessons learnt’ process known as Project Phoenix. The aims of that project included identifying and implementing improvements prior to the 2005–06 fire danger season.226 One such improvement was the introduction of a new bushfire warning system.

4.178  In January 2005, the CFS was using four levels of bushfire warnings. Part of the learning of Project Phoenix was that there was widespread confusion about the numbering system and the meaning of each phase in the system.227 The CFS has since simplified the warning system to two levels, comprising bushfire information messages and bushfire warnings. The new system is now known as the CFS Bushfire Information and Warning System.228

4.179  Bushfire information messages inform the community about a bushfire that is burning or ‘going’, and may be threatening, but does not necessarily demand urgent action by the community. Bushfire information messages may also include information and advice on the state of a more distant bushfire.229

4.180  The second stage, the bushfire warning message, warns the community that a major bushfire is burning out of control under high to extreme conditions and is a threat to public safety. A significant threat to life exists, and the community needs to respond immediately to ensure their safety and survival. In South Australia, a bushfire warning message is accompanied by use of SEWS.230

4.181  Compared with the Victorian bushfire warnings, the South Australian regime involves less dense text, and more explicit reference to a ‘threat to public safety’. Mr Lawson explained that the construction of the South Australian messages takes into account the COAG recommendation of 2004. He said ‘we believe that it is most important that the community understand what the risk is in as simple and as plain terms as possible’.231

4.182  Professor Handmer was asked to consider the South Australian warning examples for comparison. He said the South Australian examples were clear and straightforward and that the wording was ‘better practice’ in how it describes the fire and locality.232

4.183  When issued, CFS warning messages are displayed on the CFS website, broadcast on ABC Radio and 5AA (a commercial radio station) and sent to subscribers who opt in to receive CFS messages via email and fax stream.234

4.184  Mr Lawson explained that the CFS has an MOU with the ABC and the commercial radio station 5AA. Those radio stations have undertaken to read on air a bushfire warning message immediately, regardless of their programming commitments and to repeat it every 15 minutes thereafter. Each bushfire warning message is preceded by SEWS.235

4.185  South Australia implemented changes to its warning system very rapidly following the January 2005 fires. The new system was in place by May 2005. Mr Lawson explained that ‘we had to do something prior to the 2005–06 fire season’.236 He indicated that it would be difficult for a new system to be introduced in Victoria by October or November this year but that this should nonetheless be undertaken.237

4.186  The State of Victoria’s submissions note that steps are ‘already being taken’ to ensure changes to warnings will be implemented by next fire season.238

4.187  Use of a two-part system of warnings, instead of the three used in Victoria, has appeal as a simpler approach that is likely to be more easily understood by the public. The first level is essentially an information or alert message of the existence of a fire, which does not necessarily require any action to be taken by the public, other than to keep it under notice. The second level encourages urgent action, such as to activate a pre-determined fire plan. The level of threat can range from low to high depending upon the language used. The Choosing Your Words publication provides a hierarchy of terms to match the assessed degree of risk, urgency and need for action.

 

 

The State ensure bushfire warnings in Victoria are confined to two categories or stages:

•      Bushfire Information — a message providing information to the community on a bushfire that is ‘going’ and has the potential to threaten public safety; and

•      Bushfire Warning — a warning to the community about any dangerous or extremely dangerous bushfire, particularly one that is burning out of control and poses a threat to human life.

4.188  As noted in paragraph 4.7, SEWS is not a warning. It is a distinctive alert tone or signal broadcast prior to warnings for major emergencies. It is designed to ‘alert listeners or viewers of radio or television that an official emergency announcement is about to be made concerning an actual or potential emergency which has the potential to affect them’.239

4.189  The use of SEWS is not referred to in the Emergency Management Manual Victoria, but a protocol is set out in a document titled SEWS Guidelines for its Use in Victoria (October 2006).240 The current protocol for the use of SEWS requires the control agency to request the police to authorise its use.241

4.190  SEWS was not used in Victoria on 7 February. There were no discussions with the Chief Commissioner of Victoria Police about the use of SEWS on the day.242

4.191  The Commonwealth had been considering a ‘relaunch’ of SEWS; however, it ceased that work in anticipation of the findings of this Commission.243

4.192  There is evidence of a clear reticence on the part of the emergency services in Victoria to use SEWS. The signal has not been regularly used in Victoria, because of concerns about its so called ‘overuse’ and the emergency services’ view that its use may cause confusion.244 This appeared, in part, to be derived from reviews of past fires. For example, Mr Rees said:

4.193  In evidence, Mr Rees expressed the view that SEWS does not have a place if there are multiple fires,246 and expressed concern that if SEWS had been used on 7 February prior to each urgent threat message on the ABC, it would have been played 510 times on the day.

4.194  There was criticism about the use of SEWS following the 2005–06 fires in the report Debrief Outcomes Significant Victorian Fires December 2005 and January 2006, Review by Ross Smith 12 July 2006. In particular, the report was critical of the risk of ‘SEWS overload’. It also noted that messages were broadcast late, and that SEWS messages must be initiated well before the anticipated fire impact.247

4.195  It is obvious that SEWS has little utility if broadcast too late. However, a criticism about the late use of SEWS does not justify a conclusion that SEWS should not be used at all or that the mere use of SEWS has the capacity to confuse the listener. Mr Esplin agreed that there were no reports following the 2005–06 fires of dangerous or late evacuations or death that could be traced back to use or misuse of SEWS.248

4.196  Further consideration was given to use of SEWS in the report Joint CFA/DSE Review of Effectiveness of Information Flow to Communities and Media During Fire Incidents – Preliminary Findings (July 2006) (CFA/DSE Review of Information Flows).249 This review suggested that the use of SEWS during 2006 fires was inconsistent and sometimes inappropriate. It was overused to the degree that the public were ‘sick of it’. The consensus in the debriefs was that SEWS messages had become counter-productive.250

4.197  The use of SEWS must be consistent. This could be achieved by adopting appropriate protocols, such as one that the signal would be used to precede the proposed bushfire warning messages that relate to fires of a particular severity — namely those which are ‘extremely dangerous’ and those that pose a threat to human life.

4.198  The CFA/DSE Review of Information Flows report contains a curious comment. It states that, ‘other than performing the role of an initial notification, SEWS in this context may arguably have become obsolete’.251 However, the only appropriate role for SEWS is just that — as a signal, or what the review refers to as the ‘initial notification’. When seen in the correct light, SEWS does have an important and useful role to play, as has been demonstrated in South Australia.

4.199  The South Australian CFS uses SEWS whenever lives are at threat or when a fire is burning out of control on a very high to extreme fire danger day.252 SEWS precedes each bushfire warning message. Mr Lawson explained that an education program was implemented prior to the re-introduction of SEWS. He was asked whether, since the changes to the warning system were introduced in May 2005, the CFS had received feedback about the use of SEWS, including any suggestions of irritation, confusion or panic. Mr Lawson indicated the following:

4.200  When asked why the CFS continues to use the warning in the face of such criticism, Mr Lawson stated the following:

4.201  Professor Handmer suggests that SEWS can be useful: ‘warnings to me operate in a competitive environment often with everything else people are doing or listening to, and there is often, not always, but often needs to be some way of cutting through all the haze and the idea of SEWS is to do that’.255Mr Esplin said that he would prefer SEWS to remain available as a tool for the control agencies to use ‘if they believe it will materially assist the delivery of messaging to the community’.256

4.202  The State and the ABC expressed concerns during the hearing that the introduction of a protocol for the use of SEWS may lead to irritation or confusion in the community.257 However, it has been possible to overcome these issues in South Australia, as Mr Lawson outlined, by disaggregating the broadcasting network and issuing warning and information messages to specific communities through the regional radio system.258

4.203  The concerns expressed about the use of SEWS may be addressed by various means, including adopting a sensible approach to a new protocol for its use. This could include:

•       grouping bushfire warnings that require the use of SEWS

•       reducing the length of time SEWS is played when used multiple times

•       disaggregating ABC broadcasts on occasions when multiple fires are threatening different parts of the State

•       arrangements concerning the number of times particular warnings are repeated.

4.204  Professor Handmer indicated that, in his view, SEWS could be introduced to the Victorian community before the next fire season.259

4.205  In light of this discussion, it appears likely that a reintroduction of SEWS, accompanied by appropriate education, could indeed be achieved prior to the next fire season. Of course, its reintroduction must be accompanied by education on its purpose.260 Further, any concerns about the effects of overuse of SEWS could be addressed by the ABC, CFA and DSE implementing a protocol for a streamlined process for the use of SEWS on ABC Radio and television.

 

The State ensure that the Standard Emergency Warning Signal (SEWS) be used in Victoria to precede each bushfire warning or group of warnings for bushfires that are dangerous or extremely dangerous, particularly for a fire that is burning out of control and poses a threat to human life, subject to appropriate limits on the maximum frequency of use.

 

The State invite commercial operators to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), similar to its MOU with the ABC, on the dissemination of bushfire warning messages and the use of the Standard Emergency Warning Signal by those operators.

 

4.206  Sirens are intended as a signal to those in the vicinity to seek further information or take protective action according to procedures established in the minds of those hearing the siren.261 When understood correctly (that is, as a trigger used against the background of an existing procedure for correct response) it is clear that a siren may have a useful role as part of an overall system of bushfire warnings.

4.207  CFA policy is that sirens are not to be used for warning the public.262 Mr Rhodes expressed the view that sirens have many limitations.263He confirmed that the CFA does not advocate the use of sirens.264

4.208  The Commission has heard evidence on the use of sirens in some communities in Victoria and South Australia. Whether the use of a siren is appropriate as a fire danger warning depends on local circumstances, including a developed community appreciation of its function. There is scope to investigate and develop the use of sirens in communities that would benefit from such an alert system. In addition, sirens may be useful outdoors, particularly for travellers and campers.265

4.209  A small number of lay witnesses who gave evidence before the Commission referred to the use of sirens. For example, Mr Hull and Dr Fraser spoke of hearing the siren in Marysville sound briefly, but Mr Hull thought it was a false alarm, given how quickly it stopped.266 Dr Fraser heard something, but it was not a ‘wail’ and did not appear to indicate that there was a fire in the area.267 Ms Barber was waiting to hear the CFA siren in Kinglake West, but it did not sound.268

Ferny creek — a local solution

4.210  There is compelling evidence before the Commission of the manner in which a siren may be developed for use by a town to serve its local needs and purposes. In 2001, the OESC facilitated the trial of a siren in Ferny Creek. That process gave rise to a written report, The Ferny Creek Fire Alert Siren Evaluation Report — Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner (2001).269

4.211  The Ferny Creek fire alert siren trial was initiated following the recommendations of the State Coroner’s inquest into the deaths of three people during the Ferny Creek fire on 21 January 1997.270 A number of residents expressed concern that the CFA fire siren could not be heard in their location and, as a result, they had received little or no warning of the impending fire. This concern prompted a group of residents to lobby all levels of government for the installation of a CFA-type siren that was audible to all residents in an identified area in Ferny Creek.271

4.212  The Ferny Creek trial was conducted by a working group of representatives from the CFA, Victoria Police, Shire of Yarra Ranges, the OESC and three community resident representatives.272 The report noted that the process of reaching consensus about use of a siren involved a ‘shift from antagonism to acceptance’, and that ‘it is also an example of the emergency services having the courage to move outside their comfort zone and actively contribute to the trial of a system about which they have strong reservations’.273

4.213  The CFA’s opposition to the use of sirens is recorded in the report.274 In this context, the report noted that statewide CFA messaging does not always suit local issues: ‘It does not consider people such as recreational bushwalkers who may not have any warning about an approaching bushfire and those residents (children and older people) who are not aware of safety procedures or who are not able to leave their homes on days of total fire ban’.275

4.214  It appears that the tension referred to above, which may exist between the statewide bushfire preparedness policy and local interest in early warning systems that suit a particular community, continues to plague the development of local solutions. One of the lessons from February 2009 is that greater weight ought to be given to communities’ desires to fashion warning systems appropriate to their location and their needs.

4.215  Mr Esplin described the Ferny Creek siren in the following way:

4.216  The community in Ferny Creek use their siren as a ‘contribution to promoting appropriate bushfire survival behaviour’. It is not promoted as a trigger to evacuate, but rather it prompts residents to ‘access further sources of information’277 and to activate defensive actions.

4.217  The progress of the Ferny Creek fire alert siren was further considered in a subsequent evaluation report: Community Alerting For Bushfire — A Local Solution For a Local Need: The Ferny Creek Fire Alert Siren Follow-up Evaluation 2002 conducted by the OESC.278 The follow-up evaluation confirmed that the fire alert siren is now ‘an established element within bushfire preparedness planning and response. The fire alert siren is one link in a chain of communication being used and accessed by community residents’.279

4.218  The evaluation noted that a belief remains in the emergency management sector that sirens encourage residents to unsafely leave their homes if a bushfire threatens. The evaluation has in fact shown that, with appropriate community education and communication ‘the role of the alert siren can be incorporated into appropriate and safe planning and decision making’.280

4.219  This example provides robust evidence that a siren can be part of a successful program for bushfire preparedness and that, if properly understood and implemented, a protocol for the use of a siren does not undermine statewide policies such as ‘stay or go’, which is further discussed in Chapter 7. The success of the project is the result of considerable effort and goodwill on the part of the community, the local CFA and the OESC.

THE USE OF SIRENS IN Boolarra

4.220  The Commission heard evidence from Mr Lou Sigmund on the use of a CFA siren in the town of Boolarra on 30 January 2009, when the town was impacted by the Delburn fires. This evidence provides a vivid example of how a siren might be used in a particular community and its capacity to save lives.

4.221  Mr Sigmund, who lives in Boolarra, has been a CFA Group Officer responsible for eight brigades in the Morwell Group. He has been a volunteer fire fighter for the CFA since 1998. He has fire-fighting qualifications and fought in a number of major fires. He was Operations Officer for the Ashfords Road fire (part of the Delburn fires) between 28 and 30 January 2009.281

4.222  Mr Sigmund gave a detailed account of his efforts while fighting the fires near Boolarra and about his role in deciding to sound the siren.282 The idea of sounding the siren came about at a community meeting on 30 January 2009, at which Mr Sigmund had expressed his strong view (contrary to advice from a CFA representative) that the town was in imminent danger of being overrun by the fire.283 Mr Sigmund then told the meeting that once the ember attacks started ‘we will set the sirens’.284

4.223  The CFA siren was activated in Boolarra shortly after 1:00pm that day. A large number of people evacuated the town. The main street was described as filled with caravans, boats and horse floats hooked up to cars heading for Churchill.285

4.224  Mr Sigmund’s direction to use the siren was contrary to CFA policy. Mr Sigmund was aware of the policy against use of the brigade siren and he was chastised for its use.286 He attested that he had received ‘nothing but positive feedback from townspeople. They have written letters; rung me and given me nothing but support for the actions I took’.287

4.225  Mr Sigmund, by his own account, acted on the spur of the moment.288 He accepted that his decision carried risks and that if the fire had come from another direction, he might have been sending people into danger.289 In this context, Mr Sigmund expressed the view that the ‘stay or go’ policy is impossible for ordinary people to apply, because there are no trigger points to allow the average resident to make a judgement as to their safety.290 He said: ‘that is why at the meeting we decided to give them a trigger in the form of a siren’.291

4.226  Twenty nine houses were lost in the fires at Boolarra but no-one died.292 Despite the siren being used in a manner that is contrary to CFA policy, it appears to have served a useful purpose in warning townsfolk to leave. Many appear to have acted on that trigger.

4.227  Mr Rhodes expressed serious reservations about the use of sirens, but he did note that the siren worked in Boolarra on that occasion because its use was defined at the community meeting and the residents understood its use.293

4.228  In addition, Mr Lawson gave evidence that sirens are used in South Australia to alert the community to the activity of the fire service. The South Australian CFS encourages local brigades to engage with their communities and to use sirens for purposes determined by the community in consultation with the brigade.294 Some brigades use sirens to alert the community to fire, others do not. Mr Lawson said: ‘We leave it to the brigade to make that decision with the community’.295

USE OF SIRENS AND REFUGES

4.229  There is also evidence before the Commission concerning the use of sirens in a number of communities in conjunction with the use of refuges. One such community is Walhalla. The town of Walhalla uses the Long Tunnel Mine as a refuge.296 The use of this refuge is described in more detail in Chapter 8. Woods Point also has an established procedure for the use of a siren in conjunction with its refuge.297

4.230  The Commission also heard evidence about the use of a police car siren as a means of getting people’s attention in Marysville.298

Support for a new approach TO THE USE OF SIRENS

4.231  Mr Esplin accepted in evidence that individual communities who support the use of sirens as a means of taking action to preserve lives and property should be supported by agencies in doing so.299 Mr Rees also accepted that the use of sirens should be reconsidered.300

4.232  There is potential for more communities to attempt a comparable approach as that in use in Ferny Creek, Walhalla or Woods Point. Not all communities will want to institute a local alert siren. Some communities will determine to use their siren in different ways for different purposes. The option to pursue local solutions, including sirens, should be part of Municipal Emergency Response Plans and should also be given more prominence and assistance in the education campaigns and advice concerning bushfire preparedness. As Mr Esplin notes in relation to the Ferny Creek fire alert siren:

4.233  Sirens are one of a number of options that might be deployed in some areas to ensure the community is alerted to the need to be ready to receive warnings, search out further information, take defensive actions or prepare to implement a protocol for a local refuge.

 

The Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner and the CFA develop guidelines for the use of sirens in communities that decide to use a siren as part of their response to bushfires.

 

 

4.234  The evidence before the Commission establishes that the principal modes of warning the community about the threat of fire on 7 February were broadcasts on ABC Radio and messages displayed on the CFA and DSE websites.

4.235  However, the evidence also shows that members of the community often sought out more than one source of information. Sources such as the VBIL, commercial media, CFA scanners, Twitter sites, phone calls and text messages from friends or family were also important sources of information and warnings. Others formed their own views based on their own observations of events as they unfolded.

4.236  Employing multiple modes to disseminate warnings is desirable to ensure the widest possible audience is reached and to guard against the risk of failure of any one mode. Technology in particular has a role to play but should not be solely relied upon.

4.237  This section considers the new technology, in particular a telephony-based warning system, that is available to disseminate warnings.

TRIALlING A nATIONAL EMERGENCY WARNING SYSTEM

4.238  In 2005, the OESC — in partnership with Telstra, ABC Radio, DSE, Victoria’s emergency services, the Shires of Yarra Ranges and Northern Grampians and the communities of Mt Evelyn, Stawell and Halls Gap — ran a successful trial of an opt-in landline telephony-based community warning system known as CIWS: see the report Community Information and Warning System — The Report of the Trial and Evaluation Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner Report 2006.³⁰² The report stated that:

4.239  At the time of the trial there were restrictions on Telstra’s use of the Integrated Public Number Database (IPND). The IPND is an industry-wide database of all listed and unlisted public telephone numbers. It was established in 1998 and is managed by Telstra under the terms of its carrier licence condition. As a result, it was necessary to seek participating residents’ permission to use their telephone numbers and property addresses to develop the CIWS trial database.304 The report indicated that the CIWS Trial and Evaluation was informed by key national and international research.

4.240  The report concluded:

4.241  The Victorian trial of CIWS was a clear success. There were high hopes that the success could be built on and a national telephony-based warning system could be implemented. Regrettably, these hopes did not bear fruit until 2009.

4.242  Since the 2005 trial, Victoria’s position has been that a national community information and warning system should be implemented. Victoria has advocated this position repeatedly and forcefully at the highest level.306

4.243  For a national warning system to be implemented, a number of matters had to be resolved:

•       Amendments to the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) to enable access to the IPND for the purpose of issuing warnings were required.307 There was considerable debate about the need for legislative amendments. For example, Telstra argued initially that they were not required. The Commonwealth disagreed and in the end amendments were made.308

•       Agreement reached among the states and territories as to the model of warning system to be implemented (for example, whether it be opt-in or compulsory).

•       Funding for the establishment of the warning system needed to be secured.

4.244  The chronology of events that unfolded after 2005 indicates that although steps were taken by governments, sufficient priority and urgency was not given to implementing a national warning system.

4.245  It is not possible to set out every meeting, item of correspondence, event, review and paper that occurred or was produced between 2005 and 2009 on this issue. Suffice to say that despite political will from the Victorian Government and a lot of bureaucratic activity, progress was slow and debate was protracted.309

4.246  The end result was that:

•       On 23 February, legislative amendments were introduced to permit disclosure of data in the IPND in certain circumstances. The amendment now permits IPND information to be disclosed in the event of an emergency or when an emergency is considered likely. The Telecommunications Amendment (Integrated Public Number Database) Bill 2009, which was hastened as a result of the Victorian bushfires, received Royal Assent on 26 March 2009.310

•       On 23 February, a press release was issued announcing $11.3 million of Commonwealth funding to contribute to the development of the warning system.311

•       On 20 March, a tender was released for the construction of a database known as the Location Based Number Store, to provide a warning delivery mechanism to the states and territories. Funding for the development of the Location Based Number Store database and the first four years of operation is to be drawn from the $11.3 million Commonwealth contribution announced in February 2009.312

•       On 30 April, it was announced that COAG had agreed to develop a national telephone emergency warning system. Further, the Prime Minister and the Attorney-General announced the Commonwealth investment of up to $15 million to assist the states and territories in establishing the national system.313

4.247  The new national telephone emergency warning system will be operated by the states and territories, and will be developed following an open tender process. The system will send emergency warning alerts by recorded voice and text to landline and mobile phones based on an owner’s billing address. A proposed second stage, sending warnings based on the location of a mobile (rather than its billing address) will be the subject of further research.314

4.248  It now appears that the first stage of the warning system is capable of being implemented by October 2009.315

4.249  Victoria is managing the call for tenders for the proposed national Emergency Warning System. On Tuesday 14 July 2009, the Victorian Premier issued a media release Brumby releases national emergency warning system tender ahead of bushfire season.³¹⁶ The selective tender apparently involves two major telecommunication providers, Optus and Telstra. Mr Brumby is quoted in the release as saying:

4.250  The Commission is encouraged by reports that this project is currently ‘on track’ but, the Commission remains cautious given the projects history. The Commission will hear further evidence on the progress of this project during future hearings.

THE USE OF SMS ON 2 MARCH 2009

4.251  Another ‘post fire’ event is worth mentioning in this context. On 2 March, Victoria Police and the OESC decided to issue a mass warning message via SMS to warn of predicted severe weather.318 The message was in the following terms:

4.252  The message did not rely on the amendments to the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), as it was sent before they came into force. Approximately 2.07 million SMS messages were sent out over a number of hours to Telstra mobile phone customers.319

4.253  Due to time constraints, it was not possible to geo-code Victorian mobiles, that is, to allow warning messages to be sent to all mobiles located in a defined area at the time of the transmission. As a result, some Tasmanian customers received the SMS message. This was known prior to the message being sent, and efforts were made to minimise any confusion that might have resulted.320

4.254  A review of this event revealed a high rate of recall by recipients and ‘success’ in the message delivery.321 The apparent success of the 2 March SMS message (and the fact that the capacity to send such messages has existed for some time) underscores the utility of a telephony-based warning system.

 

CLICK FOR IMAGE

 

A MULTI-MODE APPROACH TO EMERGENCY WARNINGS

4.255  The implementation of the first phase of the new telephony-based warning system appears to be proceeding in a timely fashion, and, as noted, the State Government has announced it believes it will be in place by October 2009. The Commission commends the leadership role adopted by Victoria in the implementation of the system and the considerable work undertaken by Telstra in the development of the technology.

4.256  If, by September 2009, it appears unlikely that the first phase of the system will be operational throughout Australia, steps should be taken to ensure that the system is, nevertheless, operational in bushfire prone parts of Victoria as soon as practicable thereafter, and ideally in time for the 2009–10 bushfire season.

4.257  The introduction of the second stage of the system should be investigated and implemented as a matter of urgency. This stage will offer improvements, including the capacity to issue a warning of an emergency to visitors to an area who have access to mobile telephones.

4.258  The introduction of a new national telephone emergency warning system should not replace, but rather supplement, other modes of disseminating warnings, including unofficial messages. Multiple message dissemination modes are essential, as any single mode is unlikely to reach everyone, and in a crisis some dissemination modes can fail.322 Mr Esplin said:

 

The Australian Government, Council of Australian Governments and the State determine whether it is technically possible to implement the second phase of the national telephony-based warning system (that is, the delivery of warning messages to mobile phones based on the physical location of a handset at the time of the emergency) with a view to implementation for the 2009–10 bushfire season.

 

[1]     Esplin T552:19–T553:28

[2]     Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 29 (WIT.005.001.1957)

[3]     Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin (WIT.005.001.0001) [86]

[4]     Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 26 (WIT.005.001.1931)

[5]     Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 22 (WIT.005.001.1816)

[6]     Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 4 (WIT.005.001.0595)

[7]     Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 21 (WIT.005.001.1776)

[8]     Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 28 (WIT.005.001.1949)

[9]     Exhibit 141 – Report of the Bushfire Review Committee – On Bushfire Disaster Preparedness and Response in Victoria, Australia, Following the Ash Wednesday Fires 16 February 1983 (TEN.048.001.0001)

[10]   Exhibit 141 – Report of the Bushfire Review Committee – On Bushfire Disaster Preparedness and Response in Victoria, Australia, Following the Ash Wednesday Fires 16 February 1983 (TEN.048.001.0001) [45]

[11]   Exhibit 141 – Report of the Bushfire Review Committee – On Bushfire Disaster Preparedness and Response in Victoria, Australia, Following the Ash Wednesday Fires 16 February 1983 (TEN.048.001.0001) [152]–[159]

[12]   Exhibit 141 – Report of the Bushfire Review Committee – On Bushfire Disaster Preparedness and Response in Victoria, Australia, Following the Ash Wednesday Fires 16 February 1983 (TEN.048.001.0001) [157(c)]

[13]   Exhibit 45 – Pearce Tender (TEN.004.002.0037)

[14]   Exhibit 45 – Pearce Tender (TEN.004.002.0037) at 0042

[15]   Exhibit 45 – Pearce Tender (TEN.004.002.0037) at 0075–0076

[16]   Exhibit 45 – Pearce Tender (TEN.004.002.0037) at 0080–0081

[17]   Exhibit 143 – Report on Progress on Recommendations of COAG Natural Disaster Related Reports (TEN.045.001.0009) at 0013

[18]   Exhibit 142 – National Inquiry on Bushfire Mitigation and Management (TEN.049.001.0001)

[19]   Exhibit 142 – National Inquiry on Bushfire Mitigation and Management (TEN.049.001.0001) at 0187–0188

[20]   Exhibit 142 – National Inquiry on Bushfire Mitigation and Management (TEN.049.001.0001) at 0187–0188

[21]   Exhibit 142 – National Inquiry on Bushfire Mitigation and Management (TEN.049.001.0001) at 0188

[22]   Exhibit 45 – Pearce Tender (TEN.004.002.0285); Statement of Pearce (WIT.032.001.0001) [3]; T1452:26–T1452:30

[23]   Exhibit 45 – Pearce Tender (TEN.004.002.0285) at 0293

[24]   Exhibit 45 – Pearce Tender (TEN.004.002.0285) at 0302–0305

[25]   Exhibit 45 – Pearce Tender (TEN.004.002.0285) at 0322

[26]   Pearce T1455:14–T1455:16

[27]   Exhibit 83 – Rees Tender (SUMM.022.002.0297)

[28]   Exhibit 83 – Rees Tender (SUMM.022.002.0297) at 0300

[29]   Exhibit 96 – Statement of Handmer (WIT.044.001.0002_R) [8]–[26]; T3083:22–T3090:10

[30]   Exhibit 85 – Statement of Gledhill, Attachment 1 (WIT.025.002.0027); Exhibit 90 – Statement of Edwards, Attachment 9 (WIT.039.001.0087)

[31]   Exhibit 45 – Pearce Tender (TEN.004.002.0478)

[32]   Exhibit 90 – Statement of Edwards, Attachment 7 (WIT.039.001.0049); Attachment 8 (WIT.039.001.0053)

[33]   State of Victoria (SUBM.100.005.0001) [37]

[34]   Exhibit 96 – Statement of Handmer (WIT.044.001.0002_R); T3070:11–T3190:24

[35]   Exhibit 96 – Statement of Handmer (WIT.044.001.0002_R) [10]–[14]

[36]   Handmer T3077:13–T3077:21

[37]   Handmer T3080:25–T3081:4

[38]   Exhibit 96 – Statement of Handmer (WIT.044.001.0002_R) [30]

[39]   Handmer T3080:15–T3080:19

[40]   Handmer T3092:2–T3093:27

[41]   Exhibit 96 – Statement of Handmer (WIT.044.001.0002_R)

[42]   Handmer T3092:9–T3092:21

[43]   Handmer T3164:10–T3164:29

[44]   Handmer T3079:10–T3079:17; T3084:28–T3085:10

[45]   Handmer T3144:9–T3145:1

[46]   Handmer T3086:20–T3086:30

[47]   Handmer T3097:18–T3097:23

[48]   Exhibit 101 – Statement of Rhodes (WIT.3004.002.0001) [24]; Attachment, Communication of Emergency Public Warnings – A Social Science Perspective and State of the Art Assessment (WIT.3004.002.0149)

[49]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 8, Ferny Creek Fire Alert Siren Evaluation Report (WIT.005.001.0738); Attachment 9, Halls Gap Fire Risk Management Project (WIT.005.001.0784); Attachment 7, Coode Island Community Warning and Information System (WIT.005.001.0784); Attachment 10, Community Information and Warning System: Report of the Trial and Evaluation (WIT.005.001.0833); Attachment 13, A Report of the Response to an Emergency at Melbourne Airport on 21 February 2005 (WIT.005.001.1462); Attachment 14, Westpoint Chemical Fire Report to the Community (WIT.005.001.1496)

[50]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 10 (WIT.005.001.0833)

[51]   Esplin T214:7–T214:19

[52]   Exhibit 102 – Rhodes Tender (TEN.036.001.0001)

[53]   Exhibit 102 – Rhodes Tender (TEN.036.001.0001) at 0003. The article was put to Mr Esplin at T592:9–T594:13 and to Mr Rhodes at T3328:29–T3330:23

[54]   Exhibit 89 – Statement of Lawson, Attachment 5 (WIT.024.002.0035) at 0036

[55]   Exhibit 89 – Statement of Lawson (WIT.024.002.0001) [28]; Lawson T2840:12–T2840:15. The 2005 paper has been superseded by a new discussion paper dated May 2009; Lawson T2840:16–T2840:19

[56]   Exhibit 89 – Statement of Lawson, Attachment 5 (WIT.024.002.0035) at 0036

[57]   Exhibit 89 – Statement of Lawson, Attachment 5 (WIT.024.002.0035) at 0042

[58]   Exhibit 96 – Statement of Lawson, Attachment 5 (WIT.024.002.0035) at 0042

[59]   Exhibit 90 – Statement of Edwards, Attachment 9 (WIT.039.001.0087) at 0088

[60]   Exhibit 90 – Statement of Edwards, Attachment 9 (WIT.039.001.0087) at 0096

[61]   Exhibit 90 – Statement of Edwards, Attachment 9 (WIT.039.001.0087) at 0097

[62]   Exhibit 90 – Statement of Edwards, Attachment 9 (WIT.039.001.0087) at 0098

[63]   Exhibit 90 – Statement of Edwards, Attachment 9 (WIT.039.001.0087) at 0100–0105

[64]   Exhibit 90 – Statement of Edwards, Attachment 9 (WIT.039.001.0087) at 0106

[65]   Exhibit 45 – Pearce Tender (TEN.004.002.0478)

[66]   Exhibit 45 – Pearce Tender (TEN.004.002.0478) at 0485

[67]   Exhibit 45 – Pearce Tender (TEN.004.002.0478) at 0486

[68]   Exhibit 45 – Pearce Tender (TEN.004.002.0478) at 0486

[69]   Exhibit 96 – Statement of Handmer (WIT.044.001.0002_R) [33]; T3094:22–T3097:10

[70]   Edwards T2893:4–T2893:10

[71]   Pearce T1506:27–T1507:1

[72]   Rhodes T3299:5–T3299:23

[73]   State of Victoria (SUBM.100.005.0001) [33]–[37]; Commonwealth of Australia (SUBM.100.007.0002) [13]. The Commission acknowledges the Commonwealth’s caveat that the information in the paper should be considered in conjunction with the expertise of the emergency services in local circumstances.

[74]   State of Victoria (SUBM.100.005.0001) [36]

[75]   Edwards T2868:28–T2868:29

[76]   Edwards T2869:21–T2869:22

[77]   Exhibit 90 – Statement of Edwards (WIT.039.001.0001) [22]

[78]   Exhibit 90 – Statement of Edwards (WIT.039.001.0001) [25]

[79]   Exhibit 90 – Statement of Edwards (WIT.039.001.0001) [21]

[80]   Exhibit 45 – Pearce Tender, AFAC National Information Exchange Standards: A foundation to establish interoperability within the emergency services September 2007 (TEN.004.001.0217) at 0223–0224

[81]   Exhibit 45 – Pearce Tender, AFAC Information Exchange Standards: Common Alerting Protocols and Inter-CAD Messaging April 2008 (TEN.004.001.0228) at 0230; See also Exhibit 90 – Statement of Edwards (WIT.039.001.0001) [20]; Annexure 8 OASIS Common Alerting Protocol VI.1, Oasis Standard CAP VI.1 October 2005 (WIT.039.001.0053) at 0054

[82]   Exhibit 90 – Statement of Edwards, Annexure 9 (WIT.039.001.0087) at 0101

[83]   Exhibit 90 – Statement of Edwards, Annexure 9 (WIT.039.001.0087) at 0103

[84]   AFAC (SUBM.100.002.0001) [9]

[85]   State of Victoria (SUBM.100.005.0001) [36]

[86]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 2 (WIT.005.001.0123) at 0181

[87]   Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at [196]–[204]; T42:12–T44:13

[88]   Exhibit 17 – Statement of Spooner (WIT.011.001.0001_R) [18]; Spooner T473:20–T473:25; Exhibit 87 – Statement of Ananiev (WIT.040.001.0001_R) [5]; Ananiev T2775:3–T2775:9; Exhibit 97 – Statement of O’Neill (WIT.047.001.0001_R) [11], [13]; O’Neill T3199:20–T3199:21; Exhibit 114 – Statement of D O’Halloran (WIT.058.001.0001_R) [13]

[89]   Glassford T1327:1–T1327:2; Harvey T2195:28–T2195:30; Matthews T3776:29–T3777:6; Newman T336:15–T336:20; D O’Halloran T3683:26–T3684:11

[90]   Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) [201]; See also Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [105]

[91]   Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001)

[92]   Exhibit 58 – Statement of Stayner (WIT.033.001.0001) [23]; Attachment F (WIT.033.001.0069) at 0070

[93]   Exhibit 58 – Statement of Stayner (WIT.033.001.0001) [24]–[27]

[94]   Exhibit 58 – Statement of Stayner (WIT.033.001.0001) [23]–[55]; T1809:20-T1813:1; T1802:14–T1842:4

[95]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 29 (WIT.005.001.1957) at 1975–1978

[96]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 33 (WIT.005.001.2242)

[97]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin (WIT.005.001.0001) [140]–[199]

[98]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin (WIT.005.001.0001) [168]

[99]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 42 (WIT.005.001.2304)

[100]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 44 (WIT.005.001.2306)

[101]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 49 (WIT.005.001.2314)

[102]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 50 (WIT.005.001.2316)

[103]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 51 (WIT.005.001.2320)

[104]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 58 (WIT.005.001.2358)

[105]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 59 (WIT.005.001.2359)

[106]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 61 (WIT.005.001.2361)

[107]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 62 (WIT.005.001.2362)

[108]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin (WIT.005.001.0001) [184]; Attachment 63 (WIT.005.001.2363)

[109]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 67 (WIT.005.001.2370)

[110]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 68 (WIT.005.001.2371)

[111]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 69 (WIT.005.001.2373)

[112]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 71 (WIT.005.001.2376)

[113]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 72 (WIT.005.001.2378)

[114]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 76 (WIT.005.001.2383)

[115]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 77 (WIT.005.001.2399)

[116]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 78 (WIT.005.001.2400)

[117]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 80 (WIT.005.001.2406)

[118]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin (WIT.005.001.0001) [101]–[103]

[119]  Handmer T3083:8–T3083:21

[120]  Esplin T580:11–T580:14

[121]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 24 (WIT.005.001.1860)

[122]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin (WIT.005.001.0001) [101]–[103]; Attachment 24 (WIT.005.001.1860)

[123]  Handmer T3139:16–T3139:25

[124]  Exhibit 69 – Statement of Paton (WIT.031.001.0001) [6], [13], [14], [15.2]

[125]  Exhibit 101 – Statement of Rhodes (WIT.3004.002.0001) [28]

[126]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [374]

[127]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees, Attachment 31 (WIT.004.001.0509)

[128]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller, Annexure 37 (WIT.002.002.0108)

[129]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) [198]

[130]  Exhibit 58 – Statement of Stayner (WIT.033.001.0001) [74]–[75]

[131]  Exhibit 58 – Statement of Stayner (WIT.033.001.0001) [76]

[132]  Exhibit 58 – Statement of Stayner (WIT.033.001.0001) [48]

[133]  Exhibit 7 – Schedule, 774 ABC Radio Broadcast on 7 February 2009 7.00 AM to 12.00 midnight (SUMM.001.002.0001)

[134]  Exhibit 79 – Rees Tender (ENDX.0079.001.0001); Exhibit 144 (TEN.052.001.0001)

[135]  Exhibit 7 – Schedule, 774 ABC Radio Broadcast on 7 February 2009 7.00 AM to 12.00 midnight (SUMM.001.002.2752)

[136]  Stayner T1816:21–T1816:29

[137]  Exhibit 58 – Statement of Stayner (WIT.033.001.0001) [50]

[138]  Exhibit 58 – Statement of Stayner (WIT.033.001.0001) [53]

[139]  Exhibit 58 – Statement of Stayner (WIT.033.001.0001) [53]-[55]

[140]  Stayner T1819:15–T1819:28

[141]  Stayner T1819:29–T1820:7

[142]  Exhibit 58 – Statement of Stayner (WIT.033.001.0001) [93]

[143]  Exhibit 58 – Statement of Stayner (WIT.033.001.0001) [96]

[144]  Exhibit 58 – Statement of Stayner (WIT.033.001.0001) [98]–[100]

[145]  Exhibit 78 – Rees Tender (EXH.078.0001)

[146]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) [210]

[147]  Exhibit 111 – Statement of Johnstone (WIT.7500.001.0001); T3571:1–T3587:28

[148]  Exhibit 111 – Statement of Johnstone (WIT.7500.001.0001) [34]

[149]  Exhibit 111 – Statement of Johnstone, Attachment (WIT.7500.001.0016); (WIT.7500.001.0017)

[150]  Exhibit 111 – Statement of Johnstone (WIT.7500.001.0001) [14]

[151]  Exhibit 111 – Statement of Johnstone (WIT.7500.001.0001) [34]

[152]  Exhibit 111 – Statement of Johnstone (WIT.7500.001.0001) [35]–[37]

[153]  Johnstone T3575:20–T3576:2

[154]  State of Victoria (SUBM.100.005.0001) [51(b)]

[155]  Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R)

[156]  Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0079–0114

[157]  Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0083–0085. The second stage of the research, yet to be completed, involves a mail survey of households in bushfire-affected communities.

[158]  Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0094

[159]  Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0095              

[160]  Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0096

[161]  Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0096

[162]  Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0096

[163]  Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0096

[164]  Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0098

[165]  Exhibit 96 – Statement of Handmer (WIT.044.001.0038)

[166]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees, Annexure 31 (WIT.004.001.0509) at 0530–0531

[167]  Handmer T3111:2–T3112:6

[168]  Rhodes T3297:17–T3297:21

[169]  Esplin T587:6–T587:12

[170]  Esplin T584:14–T584:21; T580:15–T580:30

[171]  Exhibit 95 – Statement of Fraser (WIT.048.001.0001_R) [5], [7]–[8], [11]; T3047:14–T3047:21; T3048:15–T3049:10; T3049:25–T3049:31

[172]  Exhibit 97 – Statement of O’Neill (WIT.047.001.0001_R) [11]; T3196:23–T3196:28; T3199:18–T3199:21; T3201:5–T3201:18

[173]  Exhibit 103 – Statement of Barber (WIT.046.001.0001_R) [13]; T3339:14–T3339:21

[174]  Exhibit 61 – Statement of Olorenshaw (WIT.034.001.0001_R) [5]–[7], [23]–[25]; T1873:13–T1873:30; T1877:19–T1877:29

[175]  Exhibit 10 – Statement of Odgers (WIT.008.001.0001_R) [11]–[13]; T193:3–T193:10

[176]  Odgers T192:8–T192:30

[177]  Newman T336:6–T336:14

[178]  Patten T414:9–T414:13

[179]  Rogers T605:8–T605:22

[180]  Rogers T610:22–T610:31

[181]  Ferguson T930:1–T930:9; T955:24–T956:18

[182]  Exhibit 17 – Statement of Spooner (WIT.011.001.0001_R) [18]–[19]; T472:9–T472:27; T474:18–T475:14; T498:25–T499:6

[183]  Exhibit 17 – Statement of Spooner (WIT.011.001.0001_R) [21]–[23]; T478:12–T480:28

[184]  Exhibit 134 – Statement of Hainsworth (WIT.059.001.0001_R) [12]; T4534:20–T4534:25

[185]  Hainsworth T4533:11–T4533:22

[186]  Exhibit 87 – Statement of Ananiev (WIT.040.001.0001_R) [16]; T2774:29–T2775:5; T2776:12–T2779:27

[187]  Exhibit 46 – Statement of Gobbett (WIT.026.001.0001) [4]–[5]; T1493:11–T1493:26; T1495:29–T1496:3; T1500:30–T1502:2; T1496:5–T1496:30

[188]  Exhibit 23 – Statement of Davey (WIT.019.001.0001_R) [1], [8]; T780:22–T780:29

[189]  Hull T1164:14–T1164:16

[190]  Gobbett T1495:31–T1496:2

[191]  P Brown T3511:24–T3511:27

[192]  Exhibit 70 – Statement of Casey (WIT.035.001.0001_R) [4], [7]; T2355:4–T2355:16; T2356:20–T2357:11

[193]  Exhibit 73 – Statement of McCulloch (WIT.043.001.0001_R) [10], [14]; T2473:16–T2473:23; T2474:12–T2474:22; T2447:14–T2448:6

[194]  Exhibit 77 – Statement of Walter (WIT.041.001.0001_R) [19]–[20]; T2585:21–T2586:3

[195]  Exhibit 114 – Statement of D O’Halloran (WIT.058.001.0001_R) [11], [13], [15]; T3683:9–T3683:30; T3684:19–T3685:10; T3687:14–T3687:29

[196]  Exhibit 91 – Statement of Scott (WIT.045.001.0001_R) [8], [11], [18]; T2918:30–T2919:3; T2919:27–T2919:30; T2922:1–T2922:5

[197]  Exhibit 43 – Statement of Glassford (WIT.028.001.0001_R) [11]–[12]; T1326:14–T1326:29

[198]  D Brown T1652:9–T1652:27; T1653:12–T1653:22

[199]  D Brown T1654:29–T1655:8

[200]  Exhibit 116 – Statement of Matthews (WIT.057.001.0001_R) [19]–[23]; T3778:31–T3780:29; T3785:11–T3785:18

[201]  Exhibit 67 – Statement of Harvey (WIT.036.001.0001_R) [15]

[202]  Harvey T2194:11–T2195:20

[203]  Harvey T2202:6–T2202:29

[204]  Exhibit 48 – Statement of D Brown (WIT.029.001.0001_R) [4]–[8]

[205]  D Brown T1646:11–T1646:21

[206]  Exhibit 108 – Statement of P Brown (WIT.053.001.0001_R) [17]–[20]; T3509:14–T3509:30; T3511:5–T3511:14

[207]  P Brown T3511:15–T3511:23

[208]  P Brown T3531:20–T3531:30

[209]  Exhibit 121 – Statement of Ward (WIT.052.001.0001_R) [13], [16]; T4031:25–T4031:28; T4033:9–T4034:1; T4038:18–T4039:14

[210]  Exhibit 125 – Statement of J Williams (WIT.055.001.0001_R) [14]; T4212:26–T4213:5

[211]  J Williams T4229:3–T4229:15

[212]  J Williams T4229:19–T4229:23

[213]  Exhibit 34 – Statement of Kane (WIT.017.001.0001_R) [13]; T1053:26–T1054:28

[214]  Rees T2532:2–T2532:18

[215]  Lawson T2847:2–T2847:6

[216]  Pearce T1514:21–T1514:27

[217]  P Brown T3529:24–T3532:4

[218]  Ananiev T2787:8–T2787:17

[219]  Glassford T1328:11–T1328:26

[220]  Harvey T2203:27–T2203:30

[221]  Exhibit 96 – Statement of Handmer (WIT.044.001.0002_R) [58]; T3074:1–T3074:29

[222]  Exhibit 90 – Statement of Edwards, Annexure 9 (WIT.039.001.0087) at 0105

[223]  Handmer T3105:20–T3106:1

[224]  Exhibit 89 – Statement of Lawson (WIT.024.002.0001) [8]

[225]  Exhibit 89 – Statement of Lawson (WIT.024.002.0001) [1]–[10]

[226]  Exhibit 89 – Statement of Lawson (WIT.024.002.0001) [14]–[16]

[227]  Exhibit 89 – Statement of Lawson (WIT.024.002.0001) [17]–[18]

[228]  Exhibit 89 – Statement of Lawson (WIT.024.002.0001) [19]

[229]  Exhibit 89 – Statement of Lawson (WIT.024.002.0001) [21]

[230]  Exhibit 89 – Statement of Lawson (WIT.024.002.0001) [24]–[25]

[231]  Lawson T2834:29–T2835:8

[232]  Handmer T3116:5–T3116:19

[233]  Handmer T3182:19–T3182:25

[234]  Lawson T2823:26–T2824:7

[235]  Exhibit 89 – Statement of Lawson (WIT.024.002.0001) [23], [25]

[236]  Lawson T2820:17–T2820:24; T2822:1–T2822:4

[237]  Lawson T2851:1–T2851:14; T2856:6–T2856:13; T2858:10–T2859:2

[238]  State of Victoria (SUBM.100.005.0001) [37]

[239]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin (WIT.005.001.0001) [104]

[240]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 25 (WIT.005.001.1924)

[241]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin (WIT.005.001.0001) [105]; Attachment 25 (WIT.005.001.1924) at 1926–1927

[242]  Esplin T253:14–T254:27; T245:15–T245:17; Walshe T632:24–T632:25

[243]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin (WIT.005.001.0001) [107]; T256:18–T256:24; Pearce T1447:22–T1448:15

[244]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin (WIT.005.001.0001) [106]; Esplin Tender (TEN.002.001.0002) at 0037; T243:17–T245:14

[245]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) [233]

[246]  Rees T2485:13–T2485:18; T2486:18–T2486:31

[247]  Exhibit 11 – Esplin Tender (TEN.002.001.0002) at 0037

[248]  Esplin T245:10–T245:14

[249]  Exhibit 83 – Rees Tender (SUMM.022.002.0297)

[250]  Exhibit 83 – Rees Tender (SUMM.022.002.0297) at 0312

[251]  Exhibit 83 – Rees Tender (SUMM.022.002.0297) at 0312

[252]  Exhibit 89 – Statement of Lawson (WIT.024.002.0001) [24]–[25]; T2825:26–T2826:3

[253]  Lawson T2827:6–T2827:15

[254]  Lawson T2827:16–T2827:20

[255]  Handmer T3090:21–T3090:27

[256]  Esplin T317:4–T317:10

[257]  State of Victoria (SUBM.100.005.0001) [54]–[56]; ABC (SUBM.100.011.0001) [8]–[10]

[258]  Lawson T2852:26–T2853:23

[259]  Handmer T3162:26–T3162:28

[260]  Exhibit 96 – Statement of Handmer (WIT.044.001.0002_R) [112]

[261]  Exhibit 96 – Statement of Handmer (WIT.044.001.0002_R) [81]–[82]

[262]  Rees T53:23–T53:25

[263]  Exhibit 101 – Statement of Rhodes (WIT.3004.002.0001) [32]–[33]

[264]  Exhibit 101 – Statement of Rhodes (WIT.3004.002.0001) [33]

[265]  Handmer T3101:3–T3101:5

[266]  Hull T1167:15–T1167:31

[267]  Fraser T3050:9–T3050:29

[268]  Exhibit 103 – Statement of Barber (WIT.046.001.0001_R) [18]

[269]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 8 (WIT.005.001.0738)

[270]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 8 (WIT.005.001.0738) at 0742

[271]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 8 (WIT.005.001.0738) at 0742

[272]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 8 (WIT.005.001.0738) at 0748

[273]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 8 (WIT.005.001.0738) at 0739, 0751

[274]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 8 (WIT.005.001.0738) at 0743

[275]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 8 (WIT.005.001.0738) at 0743

[276]  Esplin T290:13–T290:22

[277]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 8 (WIT.005.001.0738) at 0771

[278]  Exhibit 11 – Esplin Tender (TEN.002.001.0320)

[279]  Exhibit 11 – Esplin Tender (TEN.002.001.0320) at 0332

[280]  Exhibit 11 – Esplin Tender (TEN.002.001.0320) at 0333

[281]  Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund (WIT.020.001.0001) [2]–[6]

[282]  Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund (WIT.020.001.0001) [7]–[36]

[283]  Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund (WIT.020.001.0001) [30]

[284]  Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund (WIT.020.001.0001) [35]–[36]

[285]  Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund (WIT.020.001.0001) [41]

[286]  Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund (WIT.020.001.0001) [42]–[43]; T909:13–T909:23; T916:31

[287]  Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund (WIT.020.001.0001) [42]

[288]  Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund (WIT.020.001.0001) [36]

[289]  Sigmund T915:1–T915:6; T919:10–T920:7

[290]  Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund (WIT.020.001.0001) [49]

[291]  Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund (WIT.020.001.0001) [52]

[292]  Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund (WIT.020.001.0001) [46]; T909:4–T909:5

[293]  Exhibit 101 – Statement of Rhodes (WIT.3004.002.0001) [32]; T3299:24–T3302:22

[294]  Lawson T2854:27–T2855:14

[295]  Lawson T2855:12–T2855:16

[296]  Exhibit 88 – Statement of Seear (WIT.042.001.0001) [16]–[18]

[297]  For further information about the operation of these sirens, see Exhibit 64 – Statement of Dwight (WIT.037.001.0001_R); Attachment 3 (WIT.037.001.0023)

[298]  Dwight T2066:16–T2067:6

[299]  Esplin T317:28–T318:12

[300]  Rees T53:23–T54:24

[301]  Esplin T284:24–T285:10

[302]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 10 (WIT.005.001.0833)

[303]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 10 (WIT.005.001.0833) at 0849

[304]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 10 (WIT.005.001.0833) at 0841

[305]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 10 (WIT.005.001.0833) at 0905

[306]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin (WIT.005.001.0001) [218]; T305:15–T305:17; Consolo T3886:20–T3886:31

[307]  Exhibit 45 – Statement of Pearce (WIT.032.001.0001) [111]

[308]  Exhibit 45 – Statement of Pearce (WIT.032.001.0001) [123]–[164]

[309]  Refer to evidence set out in Submissions of Counsel Assisting (SUBM.100.001.0001) [2.3.3]; Pearce T1518:24–T1538:18

[310]  Exhibit 45 – Statement of Pearce (WIT.032.001.0001) [164]; Pearce Tenders (TEN.004.002.0541); (TEN.004.002.0527)

[311]  Exhibit 45 – Statement of Pearce (WIT.032.001.0001) [165]; Attachment 17 (WIT.032.001.0261) at 0262

[312]  Exhibit 45 – Statement of Pearce (WIT.032.001.0001) [165]

[313]  Exhibit 45 – Statement of Pearce (WIT.032.001.0001) [102]

[314]  Exhibit 45 – Pearce Tender (TEN.004.002.0561)

[315]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin (WIT.005.001.0001) [225]; T309:27–T310:1

[316]  Exhibit 155 – Brumby Releases National Emergency Warning System Tender Ahead of Bushfire Season (VBRC.002.001.0001)

[317]  Exhibit 155 – Brumby Releases National Emergency Warning System Tender Ahead of Bushfire Season (VBRC.002.001.0001)

[318]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin (WIT.005.001.0001) [220]–[222]

[319]  Exhibit 118 – Statement of Consolo (WIT.5000.001.0001) [11], [81]; T3903:19–T3904:3

[320]  Exhibit 118 – Statement of Consolo (WIT.5000.001.0001) [83]; T3905:15–T3905:30

[321]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin (WIT.005.001.0001) [223]–[224]; Esplin Tender (TEN.002.001.0106); Exhibit 96 – Statement of Handmer (WIT.044.001.0002_R) [113], [118]; Handmer T3128:4–T3128:23

[322]  Exhibit 96 – Statement of Handmer (WIT.044.001.0002_R) [43]; T3087:2–T3087:7

[323]  Esplin T215:20–T215:28