Box 1.1: Terminology to describe fire events

Area of fire – the area of burnt ground, measured in hectares, that a fire covers on the ground surface.

Blacking out – the process of ensuring that all stumps, branches and burning items are extinguished.

Contained – indicates that the spread of the fire is halted even though it may still be burning within the perimeter or control lines.

Control line – a natural or constructed barrier, or treated fire edge, used in fire suppression and prescribed burning processes to limit/prevent the spread of fire.

Crowning – occurs when the fire reaches the canopies of the trees; the fire may then jump, or run, from one crown to the next.

Direct attack – a method of fire attack where wet or dry firefighting techniques are used.

Dozer – an earth-moving vehicle with a large blade used to construct control lines.

Fire ground – the area in the vicinity of the wildfire and fire suppression operations, and the area immediately threatened by the fire.

Fire line – see control line (above).

Going – an assessment that a fire exists and is expanding.

Graders – an earth-moving vehicle with a small blade used to assist in the construction of control lines.

Indirect attack – the use of backburning as a method of suppressing and confining a fire.

Intensity – the heat output per length of fire line. Intensity is primarily influenced by the rate of spread of the fire and the quantity of fuel consumed.

Pumper – generally a 2WD firefighting vehicle, designed for urban operations, equipped with a large capacity pump and a limited capacity water tank. It requires reticulated water for firefighting operations.

Rappel crew – firefighting teams that abseil onto a fire ground via helicopter and ropes.

Rate of Spread – the forward progress of the head fire or another specified part of the fire perimeter (usually reported in kilometres per hour).

Red flag warning – critical warning for the fire group that necessitates an acknowledgment.

Safe – an assessment that no further suppression action or patrols are considered necessary.

Slip-on unit – equipment comprising a small water tank, a hose reel, a pump, and an engine that can be slipped onto a Land Cruiser or patrol-sized vehicle.

Spotting – the sparks and embers that are carried by wind and convective activity and that start fires outside the main firefront. Spotting and the development of spot fires most commonly occur in front of and around the lead edge of fires, but can also occur along the sides.

Strike team – usually five or six firefighting vehicles and crews deployed to operate as a cohesive unit on the fire ground.

Tanker – generally a 4WD firefighting vehicle, designed for rural operations.

Under Control 1 – a fire assessment that the complete perimeter of the fire is secured, no breakaway is expected, but continuous patrolling and mopping up is still required.

Under Control 2 – a fire assessment that the complete perimeter of the fire is secured and no breakaway is expected.

 

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1 THE FEBRUARY 2009 FIRES

 

This chapter presents a description of the main fires, their ignition and subsequent passage. The description of the Kilmore East fire is more extensive than others as it is the only fire that has been examined in depth during the public hearings, although there is still further evidence to be heard even in respect of that fire. The Commission will complete its examination of the Kilmore East fire and the other fires in the next block of hearings.

 

1.1       This chapter provides the context for matters discussed in the interim report. The description of the fires is sourced principally from the evidence of Mr Russell Rees, Chief Officer of the Country Fire Authority (CFA), Mr Ewan Waller, Chief Fire Officer of the Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE), together with evidence received from expert and lay witnesses. It focuses on fire ignition, its subsequent movement, and the broad fire agency response. Fire warnings are discussed in Chapter 4, although an outline of warnings for each fire is given below.

1.2       Accounts of the fires vary, as material was provided to the Commission in a range of formats. The narrative is incomplete since the Commission has yet to hear from many of the operational personnel who directly managed the fires. They will be able to provide further information to the Commission, as will other lay witnesses during future hearings. Once this additional information is received, this narrative of the fires will be updated for the final report.

1.3       A more comprehensive narrative of the Kilmore East fire is provided in the interim report, because the Commission has heard greater detail on this event.

1.4       Where timings have been provided in statements and evidence, they are outlined below. For the purposes of this chapter only, timings have been described using the 24-hour clock. Witnesses have drawn these from their own recollections or records, or from details on the CFA Incident Management System (IMS) and the DSE FireWeb.1 Where timings were not specified, they are absent. Fires are listed according to the time they were reported. Discussion on the fires is separated into:

•       fire activity before 7 February

•       fire activity on 7 February

•       fire activity after 7 February.

1.5       To put this narrative of the fires in perspective, a summary of weather information provided by the Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) is set out first, followed by observations on fire behaviour.

 

1.6       Weather conditions are invariably an important factor in all fire analysis, but a fuller understanding of the abnormal weather conditions leading up to, and on, 7 February is crucial to considering the subsequent impact of the fires. Weather information outlined below is largely drawn from the evidence of Dr Mark Williams, Regional Director of the Victorian Office of the BoM.

1.7       Central Australia has warmed 1.5–2.0°C over the last century.2 Over the last 12 years, Victoria has experienced warmer than average temperatures, and the last decade has been the warmest on record, breaking records going back 154 years.3 During the same period, there has been very little above average rainfall and most of Victoria received either below or well below average rainfall. A large portion of southern Victoria, notably the area that surrounds Melbourne, received the lowest rainfall on record. The same has been experienced in western Victoria.4 Dr Williams stated that:

1.8       Across Victoria the average annual rainfall during this drought has been 555 mm, compared with a long-term average (1961–1990) of 653 mm.6

Figure 1.1: Victorian rainfall deciles

January 2009

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February 2009

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Figure 1.2: Victorian annual mean temperature, 1910–2008, standardised against the 1961–1990 average

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Note: The annually averaged mean temperature for Victoria has deviated from the 1961–1990 average. The solid line represents an 11 year moving average.11 The grey areas indicate below average temperatures and the red areas indicate above average temperatures.12

 

2008–09 bushfire season

1.9       During the three months from October to December 2008, most of Victoria received near-average to above average rainfall.13 In contrast, the early part of 2009 was exceptionally dry, with below average to record low rainfall for January, particularly in central and western parts of Victoria. Melbourne had its second driest January on record. The dry weather continued during February 2009, with most of the western half of Victoria experiencing well below average rainfall.14 In fact, there was ‘dipole activity’, with wet monsoonal activity in northern Australia and very hot, dry conditions further south.15

1.10     After a relatively mild start to 2009, exceptional heatwave conditions developed across south-east Australia in late January. The last week of January witnessed one of the most severe, prolonged heatwaves in south-east Australia’s recorded history.16 Dr Williams noted that ‘very, very hot air and very, very high temperatures [were] experienced in Victoria during that period’.17 In southern South Australia, and much of central, southern and western Victoria, maximum temperatures widely reached their highest levels since at least 1939.18 Melbourne experienced three consecutive days over 43°C — a new record.19

1.11     The week leading up to 7 February was characterised by a series of high-pressure systems to the south of Victoria, which moved eastwards from the Great Australian Bight into the Tasman Sea. The air heated over land throughout this period, and this continued until 7 February. The set of charts in Figure 1.3, from 23:00 on 6 February to 05:00 on 8 February, demonstrate, in six-hourly intervals, the static high-pressure cell in the Tasman Sea on 7 February and the passage of the pressure trough across Victoria.20

 

Figure 1.3: The 6-hourly passage of the pressure trough across Australia on 7 February 2009

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1.12     As a result of these conditions, the BoM issued numerous forecasts and warnings of severe fire weather conditions in the week leading up to 7 February. The BoM also issued 205 public and fire weather publications (products) between 11:00 Friday 6 February and 05:00 Sunday 8 February.22

Weather conditions on Saturday 7 February

1.13     On the evening of 6 February, a high-pressure system located in the Tasman Sea was directing very hot air over much of Victoria. A cold front was located across southern Western Australia extending to the south of the Bight, and was moving eastwards towards Victoria.23

1.14     On 7 February temperatures rose quickly, and strong gale-force north-westerly winds began to reach ground level.24 By 11:00, temperatures were near 40°C, with relative humidity already below 20 per cent in many parts of the state. Both forest and grass fire danger indices were well into the extreme category by 11:00 in western and central Victoria. Fire danger indices (FDI) were approaching Extreme in the rest of Victoria.25

1.15     Many all-time site records were set in Victoria on 7 February, including Melbourne (154 years of records), where the temperature reached 46.4°C, far exceeding its previous all-time record of 45.6°C set on Black Friday (13 January 1939). It was also 3.2°C above the previous February record, which was set in 1983.26

1.16     During the day, temperatures reached mid 40°C in many parts of the state and relative humidity was mostly below 10 per cent. North-westerly winds had either maintained or increased in strength during the morning. Mount Gellibrand Automatic Weather Station (AWS) was by then recording storm-force winds (90 kilometres per hour), while winds of 40–60 kilometres per hour were recorded over much of the state. Forest and Grass Fire Danger Indices were significantly into the Extreme category in nearly all of the state.27

1.17     In the far south-west, a strong, gusty, south-westerly wind change entered the state at about 12:30, dropping temperatures and increasing relative humidity. At this stage no shower activity was associated with the change.28 Many places had now reported, if not their hottest day on record, then their hottest for February. Wind gusts to 115 kilometres per hour were reported at Mount William and Mount Gellibrand, while gusts over 90 kilometres per hour were recorded at a number of other sites.29 The strong and gusty south-westerly wind change moved eastwards at a rate of about 30 kilometres per hour. Fire danger ratings remained well into the Extreme category ahead of the wind change, and in central parts of the state these did not drop below Extreme until up to an hour after the change.30

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Figure 1.4: A post event analysis of the hourly surface positions of the wind change on 7 February 2009

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Note: Fixed and portable Automatic Weather Station (AWS) locations are indicated by place names. Stylised arrows indicate the north-westerly winds ahead of the wind change and south-westerly winds behind the wind change.32

 

1.18     Mr Rees described in his statement the weather features common to bushfire disasters in Victoria:33

1.19     The passage of the south-westerly front was a feature of the ferocity and destruction of the Ash Wednesday fires.35

1.20     On 7 February the western district fires [albeit on a smaller scale] provided an indication of what was to come with the Kilmore East and Murrindindi fires:

•       At Coleraine the eastern flank of the fire was not contained before the wind change at 13:23. There was concern for the township of Coleraine and fire behaviour was at its worst upon arrival of the change.36

•       The Pomborneit fire initially threatened Swan Marsh township. The arrival of the south-westerly change at approximately 4:15 relieved the situation and turned the fire towards Lake Corangamite.37

•       At Horsham the fire on the eastern flank was largely contained by the time of the arrival of the south-westerly change at 16:28 but it was recognised that, had the flank of this fire not been secured, the township of Horsham may have been threatened.38

The diagram below, taken from the statement of Mr Rees, depicts the impact of the south-westerly change on the fireground and the subsequent enlargement of the fire front.

Figure 1.5: Common fire behaviour in Victorian weather conditions

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1.21     In the south, it took only minutes for the wind to change from north or north-west to south-west, while at some locations north of the ranges the change in wind direction took an hour or more.40 The thunderstorms forming in the smoke plumes above fires east and north east of Melbourne (known as pyrocumulonimbus) began to produce lightning (photo 1.1 and diagram 1.1).41 Due to the heat that is generated from the condensation, the pyrocumulonimbus cloud is likely to have doubled the intensity of the fires.42 Pyrocumulonimbi were formed because of the particular extreme weather and fire conditions on 7 February. The air mass was very hot and almost dry, although it did contain small amounts of water vapour. While the general direction of the surface fire was in a southerly direction, spotting also occurred to the east, due to differences in wind direction at various levels of the atmosphere within the pyrocumulonimbus cloud.43

Photo 1.1: Massive convective plume on northern flank of the Kilmore East Fire at 15:25

Diagram 1.1: Pyrocumulonimbus cloud development

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1.22     To support the fire agencies, in 2007–08 the BoM placed a meteorologist in the then Emergency Coordination Centre for that fire season, and again in 2008–09 in the Integrated Emergency Coordination Centre (iECC).46 In addition, in 2009, it deployed 4 portable weather stations before 7 February, a fifth on 7 February, and 8 overall during the fire emergency.47

1.23     Ash Wednesday on 16 February 1983 is used by fire agencies as a benchmark for subsequent major fire events. Table 1.1, provided to the Commission by Mr Rees, indicates the forecast temperatures on 15 and 16 February 1983 compared with 7 February 2009. The more severe forecasts generally eventuated on 7 February 2009, highlighting their severity.

 

1.24     Fire behaviour results from the interaction of fuel, weather, topography and the fire itself. Overlaying this basic framework is a direct link between drought, increased fire activity and more intense fire behaviour.49

1.25     This summary of the fire behaviour on 7 February is drawn largely from the evidence of Dr Kevin Tolhurst, senior lecturer and researcher at the University of Melbourne.

1.26     The weather conditions leading up to 7 February, and the combination of the drought and the heatwave, led to increased combustibility and volatile fire behaviour because many of Victoria’s normally moist forests were dry.50 These forest fuels carried the fire more easily than ordinarily expected. In turn, this led to fires of exceptional severity. So the conditions leading up to 7 February not only dried out Mountain Ash forests, which ordinarily would have been too moist to burn, but also added additional fuel loads to these forests.51

1.27     Areas of bush had also died due to the cumulative effects of the drought over preceding years. Mr David McGahy, the Arthurs Creek-Strathewen CFA Brigade Captain who has lived in the area for 40 years, observed:

1.28     The fine fuels were desiccated by the conditions and they added again to the fuel load. Fine fuels respond much more to the short-term conditions such as the temperature, relative humidity and local wind conditions. Woody fuels — twigs, branches and fallen leaves — add to the heat coming off the burnt area. They also add considerably to the heat in the main convection column which, in turn, drives the fire. Normally those woody fuels burn behind the firefront and do not contribute much to the nature of the fire. However, when there is a large fire, under these dry conditions, they can add considerably to the convection column, which influences the whole firefront.53

1.29     The fires of 7 February did not progress in a single, easily distinguishable line — there was a ‘fire zone’ that extended kilometres ahead of the firefront.54 As described in the paragraphs below, this zone contained spotting that started further fires, which in turn burnt some areas well ahead of the main firefront. Subsequently, the main firefront passed over the same areas, further burning any remaining fuel. This process expedited the progress of the fires.

1.30     The fires varied in description and behaviour:

•       classic grass and scrub fires in western Victoria55

•       conventional bushfires progressing from ground fires to flame heights of 30(+) metres56

•       extensive spotting directly sighted 13–14 kilometres ahead of firefronts and estimated up to 35 kilometres ahead of firefronts, with greater spotting over shorter distances, causing additional fires to ignite57

•       spot fires further from the firefront, burning in the direction of the prevailing wind, while spot fires closer to the main firefront burnt back towards the fire.58

Photo 1.2: Spot fire activity on the southern escarpment of the Hume Range, north east of Whittlesea, at 16:27, 7 February 2009

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1.31     The fires did not progress in a neat linear movement across the countryside. It was a chaotic series of surging fires, with spontaneous spotting kilometres ahead of the firefronts.60 While flanks of the fires could be identified and in some cases secured, the heads of the fires were largely hidden in smoke and generated a deafening roar. Their location was not readily known until the fires were observed affecting houses, properties and other locations. From the Kangaroo Ground fire tower, Mr Gavin McCormack described the fire behaviour as: ‘the fire continued to spot in front of itself, but the fire kept catching up with the spotting. It looked liked waves of fire’.61

1.32     In summary, Dr Tolhurst advised the Commission that ‘the conditions that we saw on 7 February were as extreme as we have ever seen them’.62 7 February was anticipated to be, and in every respect turned out to be, a day of extreme fire conditions.

1.33     The fires and the conditions have been characterised in evidence before us as unprecedented.63

1.34     The volunteer Captain of the Kinglake CFA Brigade, Mr Paul Hendrie, provided the Commission with a memorandum distributed in his CFA region in preparation for 7 February. The memorandum referred to fire conditions including potential flame heights of 35 metres, spotting of 8 kilometres, a head fire rate speed of 2.5 kilometres per hour.64 In relation to fire tactics the memorandum stated ‘Crews should expect first attack to be ineffective unless the fire is small’.65

1.35     Dr Tolhurst thought these figures were based upon a fuel load of about 12 tonne per hectare, half the likely average in the Yarra Ranges and a long way short of the fuel loads observed in January by CFA personnel. Dr Tolhurst indicated the calculations contained in the memorandum were an underestimation of the likely conditions.66 Nevertheless, the information contained in the memorandum, and the flame height figure in particular, is important. The safe distance, because of heat radiation, from flame is calculated at four times flame height. Thus with a 35 metre flame height the safe distance from the fire is 120–150 metres.67 Flame height of 35 metres indicates a crown fire — a fire driven by open wind leading to an increased rate of speed of the fire.68

1.36     Mr Waller provided the Commission with a chart that demonstrates the intensity of fires that burned on 7 February against other significant fire events.

Figure 1.6: The intensity of fires that burned on 7 February

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1.37     Figure 1.6 indicates the limitations for direct attack on an intense fire. The fires of 7 February burned at a level of intensity of between 70,000 and 80,000 kilowatts per metre. Direct attack by conventional fire fighting techniques is restricted to fires of intensity of approximately 3500 to 4000 kilowatts per metres. This low level produces flame heights of just a couple of metres.70

1.38     In these circumstances, the importance of first attack, a quick response to the reported fire, was well understood. As Mr Rees pointed out in his evidence, ‘once out of control, containment could not be possible’.71

 

1.39     The CFA indicated there were a total of 1386 incidents reported on 7 February — 592 grass and bushfires, 263 structure fires and 156 reported incidents that were false alarms.72 The CFA identified 47 fires that had the potential to become ‘very severe fires’.73 A number of fires managed by DSE developed into large fires on public land but involved no threat to life or private property. Many of these fires were contained and extinguished. Of the fires that were not readily contained on or before 7 February, 14 of those 47 became ‘major fires’.74

1.40     The Commission has chosen to examine 12 fires where lives were lost or significant damage occurred. These are Kilmore East; Murrindindi; Churchill; Delburn; Bunyip; Narre Warren; Beechworth-Mudgegonga; Bendigo; Redesdale; Coleraine; Horsham; and Pomborneit–Weerite.

1.41     The Commission has recorded some detail in this interim report on each of these fires. More detailed evidence has only been received on the Kilmore East fire and is reflected in this report, though that evidence is also not complete.

1.42     In reporting these fire events and the response of the fire agencies, it is necessary to include technical terms used by the fire agencies. These terms are defined in the box at the beginning of this chapter (Box 1.1).

Naming of Fires

1.43     It became evident that the naming of fires was an issue on 7 February and it has remained an issue for the Commission. Fires were known by their point of origin, or by a name used early in the fire’s development. This became problematic on the day, as fires that began in one location spread rapidly; the continued reference to their point of origin confused many. This report refers to the fires by the names adopted by the Commission during evidence.

Warnings

1.44     This chapter provides limited information on warnings. Information was initially drawn from statements made by Mr Rees. The Commission received more information on warnings from 774 ABC Radio and its regional stations in Ballarat, Bendigo, Horsham, Mildura, Sale, Shepparton, Warrnambool and Wodonga.75 A short section on warnings is included for each fire to identify initial and critical warnings. However, this information is incomplete, and will be dealt with more comprehensively in later chapters. There is a more detailed discussion of warnings in Chapter 4 and some further analysis of warnings for the Kilmore East fire in Chapter 9.

Firefighting Resources

1.45     Significant state resources were mustered to fight the fires on 7 February and for weeks thereafter. The CFA comprises 59,000 volunteers supported by over 1100 career staff, firefighters and administrative personnel.76 The CFA indicated that on the day it engaged approximately 12,000 CFA firefighters, including those at Incident Control Centres (ICCs), and over 1000 operational vehicles. This reflects a considerable surge capacity. The State had close to 50 aircraft at its disposal but flying conditions on the day limited the use of fixed-wing aircraft.77

1.46     In comparison, Mr Waller indicated that DSE had 2347 public land firefighters available, with 569 ready for immediate deployment on 7 February.78 They maintained over 1000 firefighters on firegrounds in the week leading up to 7 February and over the subsequent four weeks.79 The firefighters are often referred to as DSE personnel but are more correctly identified as Networked Emergency Organisation (NEO) personnel.80 The Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board (MFB) also contributed crews to the fires, although specific numbers were not provided to the Commission.81

 

1.47     There was considerable fire activity prior to 7 February and the account below is drawn from evidence to the Commission by Mr Waller.

2 February

1.48     On 2 February DSE firefighters were deployed at 64 fires: 20 were going, 21 were contained and 26 were considered under control. Most of these fires were caused by lightning. The NEO committed 1295 people to firefighting.82 (As noted above, technical fire terms are defined in the box at the beginning of this chapter.)

3 February

1.49     On 3 February DSE firefighters were deployed at 67 fires: 20 were going, 21 were contained and 26 were considered under control. Most of these fires were caused by lightning. The NEO also committed 1050 people to firefighting.83

1.50     Lightning overnight ignited Bunyip State Park (two fires) and lightning ignited another fire (Nariel Ski Hut Fire), 7 kilometres south-east of Nariel in north-east Victoria.84

1.51     All sectors of the Delburn fire were contained at 16:00 on 3 February but, as it was in difficult and heavily forested terrain, significant patrolling and blacking out was required on 4 February.85

4 February

1.52     On 4 February DSE firefighters were deployed at 35 fires: 10 were going, 10 were contained and 15 were considered under control. The NEO committed 1045 people to firefighting.86

1.53     The fire at Nariel Ski Hut in north-east Victoria continued to cause concern for firefighters. The fire was located in remote, inaccessible country, making containment difficult. Ground crew and aircraft were deployed to the fire.87

1.54     The Bunyip fire was reported to have started at 17:00 on 4 February.88

5 February

1.55     On 5 February DSE firefighters were deployed at 16 fires: 5 were going, 5 were contained and 6 were considered under control. The NEO committed 1051 people to firefighting.89

1.56     The Bunyip fire continued to pose a significant risk, with the potential to spread rapidly if not contained. In anticipation that this fire would not be safe by 7 February, an integrated CFA/DSE Incident Management Team (IMT) was established at the Pakenham ICC. Further strategies were developed to contain movement of the fire, and crews constructed mineral earth control lines around its perimeter.90

6 February

1.57     On 6 February DSE firefighters were deployed at 20 fires: 9 were going, 6 were contained and 5 were considered under control. The NEO committed 1365 people to firefighting.91 Of the going fires, the following were considered significant at that time and were being managed by DSE:

•       Bunyip fires (going) — 123 hectares

•       Nariel Ski Hut (contained at 10:00 on 5 February but still active)

•       Dargo — White Timber Spur (going), started during the day from lightning.92

1.58     For the Dargo fire, rappel crews were sent in as initial attack, with retardant laid by aerial support, but feedback was that the fire was ‘too hot’ to contain.93 Additional crews from Dargo and heavy machinery were dispatched to assist.94

1.59     It was not expected that the Dargo fire and Nariel fires would cause ‘significant concern’ during the day of 7 February, nor that the Bunyip fire would affect the power line easement through the Bunyip State Forest.95

1.60     Given that the Bunyip fire did prove to be more significant than first thought, it is explained in more detail below. The Dargo fire is not examined further in this interim report.

Figure 1.7: Bunyip Ridge Track fire progression map

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Summary information

Fire Danger Index	The maximum fire danger index (FDI) was 81 at Coldstream AWS at 16:34 and an FDI of 111 was recorded at Latrobe Valley AWS at 13:30.97
Fatalities	No fatalities98
House losses	24 houses99
Overall area burnt	26,200 hectares100
Firefighting resources	At its peak, the fire was attended by 82 NEO personnel, in addition to tankers, dozers and 68 slip-on units.101 Also deployed were 900 CFA personnel and 159 appliances; 2 air cranes (up to 7 February); and 2 water-bombing aircraft (these were assigned concurrently as crews were deployed).102

 

 

1.61     The township of Drouin, on the edge of this fire area, has a population of 8000 people. The fire area encompasses the rural area of Labertouche, with a population of 1000.103

1.62     At 17:21 on 4 February, a fire at Bunyip State Park — the Bunyip Ridge Track — was reported to DSE. The point of origin was 5 kilometres north-east of Tonimbuk, in native forest. As the fire was on public land, DSE was identified as the control agency. A joint DSE/CFA IMT was established at Belgrave on 4 February.104 When it became apparent that the fire would not be readily controlled and when more severe weather was forecast, the IMT relocated to Pakenham ICC on 5 February. During 5–6 February, the fire grew to approximately 170 hectares.105

1.63     As the fire had not been extinguished beforehand, planning for 7 February was carried out for a ‘worst case’ outcome. It was anticipated that, under strong northerly winds, the fire could escape and run towards private property and other assets. Fire spread predictions were prepared on 6 February for the period 12:00–23:00 on 7 February. These gave an indication that the fire would, without control measures, extend to at least Warragul and southerly to Drouin.106

1.64     At around 03:00 on 7 February, the fire breached control lines on the eastern flank, burning through Mountain Ash and mixed species forest, with considerable spotting. The fire could be seen clearly from the Mount Gordon fire tower near Marysville.107 Crews were withdrawn because of safety concerns. Fire behaviour was erratic for around 3 hours before it moderated around daybreak. It had travelled about 7 kilometres in a south-easterly direction into adjoining farmland.108

1.65     From daybreak, aircraft bombed the fire using water and retardant to hold, for as along as possible, the southern movement of the firefront. Major runs occurred after midday, ultimately burning out of the forest area into cleared land. 109 The fire spotted and ran extensively through the farmlands but the southern edge was largely controlled into the night of 7 February. With the wind change it moved extensively in the forest to the east.110

1.66     The fire was contained at 17:30 on 4 March, having burnt approximately 26,000 hectares, including nearly 19,000 hectares of forest and park. It was declared Under Control at 14:00 on 15 March.111

Warnings

1.67     Key emergency and infrastructure managers were briefed on the afternoon of 6 February. Community meetings were held in towns in the predicted path of a fire escape, including Tonimbuk, Labertouche and Jindivick. All meetings were well attended by residents.112

1.68     The first external update to the community was at 20:30 on 5 February.113 The first urgent threat message for Garfield North, Tonimbuk, Labertouche, Robin Hood, Drouin West, Buln Buln, Tarago, Jindivick, Jindivick North, Longwarry, Longwarry North and Bunyip was issued at 13:30 on 7 February.114

Figure 1.8: Delburn fire progression map

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Summary information

Fire Danger Index	Evidence not yet before the Commission
Fatalities	No fatalities116
House losses	30 houses117
Overall area burnt	Evidence not yet before the Commission
Firefighting resources	Evidence not yet before the Commission

 

 

 

 

1.69     The Delburn fires were a group of three fires (Creamery Road, Ashfords Road and Delburn) that burnt in late January until they ultimately joined together.118 The Ashfords Road fire was reported at 07:00 on 28 January, the Creamery Road and Delburn fires were reported on the afternoon of 29 January.119 The fire was initially managed by CFA as the points of origin were on private land and the initial ICC Point was at the Fish Farm, north of Boolarra. Later on 29 January, the ICC was moved to the DSE offices in Traralgon, with DSE managing the fire.120 Overnight on 29 January the ICC was moved to Churchill.121

1.70     Poor communications between fire operations on the ground and the various ICCs (some distance away) hampered coordination of the firefighting effort. Communications around Boolarra were problematic and fire operations were assisted by the use of a Mobile Communication Van.122 Firefighters resorted to the use of their mobile phones with limited success. 123 In addition, Victoria Police roadblocks prevented an ambulance, water carriers, and firefighters (without identification) from proceeding to where they were needed.124

1.71     On 29 January, the IMT Operations Officer (the local CFA Group Officer) instructed Victoria Police to evacuate residents of McIntoshes Road, north of Boolarra.125

1.72     At 10:30 on 30 January, a town meeting was held in Boolarra where local community members were briefed on the fire by CFA representatives.126 During this meeting, at the suggestion of the CFA Captain, the local CFA Group Officer indicated he would sound the CFA siren when the town came under ember attack.127 This occurred at about 13:30 and is further described in Chapter 4.128

1.73     The fires were declared contained at 16:00 on 3 February, but because it was in difficult and heavily forested terrain, significant patrolling and blacking out was required subsequent to 3 February.129 The Churchill fire was originally considered a division of the Delburn fires before it was independently managed.130

 

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1.74     The 7 February fires that ultimately proved difficult to contain and the times when they were reported are:

(going — 4 February)             Bunyip131

(going — 28 to 29 January)  Delburn 132

11:49                                         Kilmore East133

12:26                                         Horsham134

12:36                                         Coleraine135

13:17                                         Pomborneit–Weerite136

13:33                                         Churchill137

15:00                                         Murrindindi138

15:11                                         Redesdale139

15:32                                         Narre Warren140

16:34                                         Bendigo141

18:09                                         Beechworth–Mudgegonga142

 

Figure 1.9: Fires adjacent to Melbourne on 7 February

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Figure 1.10: Kilmore East interim fire progression map

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Summary information

Fire Danger Index	The maximum FDI was greater than 100 at Kilmore Gap AWS at 14:42, and an FDI of 97.3 was reached at Viewbank AWS at 16:30.146
Fatalities	121 fatalities147
House losses	1244 houses148
Overall area burnt	The combined total size of the Kilmore East and Murrindindi fires was 255,300 hectares.149
Firefighting resources	The peak CFA resource commitment over the Kilmore East and Murrindindi fires was 514 appliances and 2750 people (the figures were not presented separately).150 At the time the fire crossed the Hume Highway at 14:00, 32 NEO tankers, 7 slip-on units, 8 dozers and 9 support vehicles were on the fireground.151 One air crane and 2 other helicopters were working the Kilmore East fire.152 An unknown number of MFB appliances were deployed to the Kilmore East fire by mid-afternoon.153

 

1.75     Towns in the heart of the fire area were Kinglake, Kinglake West, St Andrews and Wandong, all with a population of about 1500. Smaller towns affected included Toolangi, Dixons Creek, Chum Creek, Hazeldene and Clonbinane, each with a population between 500 and 900. The fires came close to Yarra Glen (population 2600) and Whittlesea (population 4500).154

1.76     At 11:49 the Emergency Services Telecommunications Agency (ESTA) took a call for a fire at Saunders Road, Kilmore East, in undulating pasture country interspersed with native vegetation alongside cleared and standing plantations. Initial reports were from the Mount Hickey fire tower, together with reporting on the ground through Triple Zero calls.155 At 12:08 the Kangaroo Ground fire tower operator sighted the fire and reported it to the Kangaroo Ground ICC.156 As the point of origin was on private land, the CFA was identified as the control agency for this fire.157 The Kilmore East fire was managed from the Kilmore ICC located at the Kilmore fire station.158 The Incident Controller was initially the local CFA Brigade Captain.159 He was relieved by a career staff member at 16:30.160 The Kangaroo Ground ICC operated as a Divisional Command on 7 February but overnight the management of the Kilmore East and Murrindindi fires was rearranged.161 According to the evidence of Mr Rees, from the morning of 8 February, Kilmore and Kangaroo Ground ICCs managed the Kilmore East fire and Alexandra and Woori Yallock ICCs managed the Murrindindi fire.162

1.77     The fuel loads in and around areas where the Kilmore East fire burned — Mount Disappointment, Humevale, Strathewen, Kinglake and Glenvale — were extremely high. Senior, highly experienced CFA volunteer officers inspected these areas 3 to 4 weeks before 7 February. They were horrified by the fuel loadings; 40 to 50 tonnes per hectare. There was a recognition they would be unable to control fire in these areas.163

The first phase of the fire

1.78     Mr Rees defined the first phase of the fire as ‘that period before it has crossed the Hume Freeway’.164

1.79     At about 11:50 5 local brigades (Kilmore, Broadford, Clonbinane, Wandong and Wallan) were paged to respond to the fire.165 At 11:51 the Kilmore Brigade received a second pager message to respond to a second fire on the Wandong–Kilmore Highway, 3 kilometres south of Kilmore. One pumper was deployed.166 At 12:02 a further 7 brigades were deployed, including the Midway Forest Industry Brigade.167 A strike team of 5 tankers responded about 30 minutes later.168 Aircraft were also requested; however, due to the conditions at the time, aircraft were ineffective in direct attack and were used to protect assets.169 A fire-spotting aircraft operated from about 12:30 to 13:30.170 Two aerial line scans were conducted at 12:45 and 12:55, leading to the production at the iECC of a fire prediction map at 13:40.171 A further map based on the line scan was produced at 17:43. The line scans were not passed to the ICC at Kilmore.172 According to Mr Rees, further line scans were not able to be completed until 21:45 that evening.173

1.80     Initial efforts were directed at controlling the fire before it crossed the Hume Highway into more open country; however, this was unsuccessful.174 At 12:45 it was requested that the Hume Highway be closed.175 The fire crossed the Hume Highway at Heathcote Junction at 13:58.176 At that time, the firefront was reported to be 3 kilometres wide, between Clonbinane Road and the Broadford–Wandong Road.177 The fire had a very elongated shape under the influence of north-westerly winds, with a length to breadth ratio of approximately 7:1.178 Given the terrain and fuel conditions, it was difficult for many appliances to access the fire edge from the north.179 Significant resources were deployed to the southern edge of the fire to protect townships from Whittlesea into the Yarra Valley and Healesville area.180

1.81     At the Kangaroo Ground fire tower, local weather observations at 13:45 were 47°C and relative humidity of 7 per cent.181 At about 14:30 winds were gusting 60–70 kilometres per hour and the temperature was 43°C.182 Burnt leaves were falling on the fire tower as early as 14:13.183

The second phase of the fire

1.82     Mr Rees defined the second phase of the fire as the period after it crossed the Hume Highway and went into the slopes of Mount Disappointment.184

1.83     Between 14:00 and 17:00 the firefront travelled another 6 kilometres under the influence of a 60–90 kilometres per hour north-westerly wind, through timber plantations and agricultural land, before entering forest areas. It then travelled across the Great Dividing Range at Mount Disappointment (reaching the base of Mount Disappointment at 15:30), and then onto the Whittlesea–Yea Road, just south of the settlement of Kinglake West.185 Spotting was reported at Smith Gully at 16:00.186 Between Wandong and Kinglake, the forest fuels of Stringybark and Peppermint species, with pockets of Manna Gum, Grey Gum and Mountain Ash, resulted in significant spotting.187 The fire travelled at up to 8 kilometres per hour to the crest of Mount Disappointment.188

1.84     On 7 February Arthurs Creek and Whittlesea CFA Brigades were not attached to strike teams.189 They were operating independently in their areas of responsibility.190 The Arthurs Creek–Strathewen Brigade Captain learnt of the Kilmore East fire from his Group Officer ‘some time after midday’.191 He did not receive any advice on the fire from the Kilmore ICC or the Kangaroo Ground Divisional Control Centre.192 His brigade first responded to fire (after several false alarms) at 15:43.193 He received a ‘red flag’ warning at 17:45 of a pending ‘very strong southerly change...in the next 10 minutes’.194 Once spotting commenced he was unable to access Strathewen but eventually drove into the hamlet at about 19:00.195 Nearly every structure in the hamlet was burnt.196 Analysis by the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre (Bushfire CRC) suggests that the fires reached Strathewen from a north-westerly wind and also via a major firefront approaching from the south.197

1.85     At Kinglake, power failed across the town at 16:55 and soon after smoke was heavily entering the town from the direction of St Andrews.198 By 17:30 Kinglake was under heavy ember attack with spot fires occurring close to the CFA station. It was dark.199 Embers started burning in the town at 17:45. Ms Sharon McCulloch, owner and operator of the National Park Hotel described the experience: ‘Embers were now hailing down and being blown with such force onto the hotel roof that I thought there was every chance of something in or around the hotel catching fire’.200 Ms McCulloch and her husband managed to save their hotel, although this meant they could not actively protect their home. It survived. On reflection, she said:

1.86     By the time the fire had reached the Whittlesea–Yea Road, it was reported to be approximately 6 kilometres wide.202 Between 17:00 and 18:00 spot fires were reported at Humevale, St Andrews (at 17:46) and Steels Creek.203 The Kangaroo Ground fire tower operators, Ms Colleen Keating and Mr Gavin McCormack, made the following observations:

             And subsequently:

1.87     Residents defending their homes described the fires from inside their houses. Mr John O’Neill, of Steels Creek, described the experience of his family:

1.88     The first reports of casualties were received at the Kangaroo Ground Divisional Control Centre at 17:00 from the Arthurs Creek Captain.207 The fire reached the National Park Hotel on Main Road, Kinglake at approximately 17:45.208 The Kangaroo Ground tower had advised by radio of the wind change occurring at Kangaroo Ground at 17:43.209  At 17:55 the tower recorded the wind change blowing at over 90 kilometres per hour and reported it to the fireground.210 By 18:00 CFA tankers, pumpers and communications vehicles were responding to new fires at Humevale, Strathewen, Arthurs Creek, Yarra Glen, Gruyere and Healesville. All of these fires were caused by spotting.211

1.89     At 18:01 the wind change had come through St Andrews.212 When the south-westerly wind change reached these fires between 18:00 and 19:00, it was not possible to secure the eastern flank of the fire due to the heavy forest and plantation fuel loads.213 The main fire, and the subsequent spot fires, headed in a north-easterly direction, burning through heavy fuels.214 At 19:40 the fire was recorded in Flowerdale.215 The Kilmore East–Wandong section of the fire headed generally north along the Hume Highway towards Reedy Creek impacting at 20:00, burning through the remainder of the Wallaby Creek catchment, the Kinglake National Park and the Mount Disappointment Forest.216 Progressively through the evening it impacted the settlements of Hazeldene and Silver Creek. The fire was recorded at Mudgegonga at about 22:00.217

1.90     From Strathewen and Humevale, the fire headed generally north, through Kinglake central, Castella and along the Melba Highway towards the settlement of Glenburn. The Kilmore East fire did not join with the Murrindindi fire on 7 February.218 The fire was never under control on 7 February.219

1.91     Throughout the night of 7 February, and the following days, as the fire reached grassland, it was stopped and the edge of the fire progressively secured. However, in forested areas, particularly in the Maroondah catchment, Toolangi State Forest and Yarra Ranges National Park, containment was difficult. In particular, the fire caused considerable concern around the Healesville area over the next few days as containment works, including back burning, continued.220 The fire was listed as contained on 16 February.221

Warnings

1.92     Some warning messages for the Kilmore East fire were issued from the Seymour Regional Emergency Coordination Centre (authorised by the Regional Coordinator) and from the iECC (authorised by the State Duty Officer), in addition to those issued from Kilmore ICC.222

1.93     At 12:40 an initial awareness message was issued for the Kilmore East fire for Kilmore East, Wandong and Clonbinane.223 Urgent threat messages were issued progressively for communities to the south-east and east of the fire, and subsequently updated as further information was available.224 At 13:59 an urgent threat message was issued for Wandong.225 At 14:40 an urgent threat message was posted to the CFA website for the community of Wandong, and messages were progressively posted for the communities of Hidden Valley (at 15:05), Whittlesea (at 15:33), Heathcote Junction and Upper Plenty (at 16:05), Humevale, Arthurs Creek, Eden Park, Nutfield and Doreen (at 16:35) and for communities from Kinglake to Flowerdale (at 17:55).226

1.94     At 17:20 an urgent threat message was released from Kangaroo Ground Divisional Control Centre indicating Wandong, Wallan, Wallan East, Eden Park, Whittlesea, Humevale, Bruces Creek, Upper Plenty, Kinglake West, Pheasant Creek, Smiths Gully, Kinglake, Flowerdale, Glenburn and Hurstbridge might be affected by the fire.227 It also referred to road closures.228 Urgent threat messages had been drafted earlier in the afternoon (from 14:30) at Kangaroo Ground Divisional Control Centre, but had not been released as the fire was being controlled from the ICC at Kilmore.229

1.95     At 18:45, an urgent threat message posted to the CFA website noted that Wandong, Wallan, Wallan East, Eden Park, Whittlesea, Humevale, Bruces Creek, Upper Plenty, Kinglake West, Pheasant Creek, Smiths Gully, Kinglake, Flowerdale, Glenburn and Hurstbridge might be directly affected by fire.230

1.96     As the fire continued to burn through the night, an urgent threat message was posted to the CFA website at 22:32 advising of possible direct attack on Broadford, Broadford East in the area of O’Gradys Road, south of Broadford, Broadford–Wandong/Sunday Creek Road, Reedy Creek and Tyaak. Residents were advised not to expect firefighting trucks to be in attendance if the firefront approached their properties.231

1.97     On the morning of 8 February, the fire was described as burning in the Yarra Valley near Kinglake, in a north-easterly direction. At 04:38 an urgent threat message was posted to the CFA website stating that Kinglake, Kinglake West, Toolangi, Glenburn, Strathewen, Chum Creek, Dixons Creek, Castella, Pheasant Creek, Doreen, Yan Yean, Woodstock, Mernda, Mittons Bridge, Hurstbridge, St Andrews, Panton Hills, Arthurs Creek, Smiths Gully, Christmas Hills, Healesville, Yarra Glen, Coldstream, Tarrawarra and Steels Creek had been or might be directly affected by this fire.232

1.98     Further messages posted to the CFA website at 09:29 on 8 February advised that the fire was burning towards the Glenburn area, in particular Glenburn and settlements to the north and north-east along the Melba Highway, and Yea River Valley towards Murrindindi. Warnings were also posted for Yea, Seymour and Toolangi.233 Warnings issued for the Kilmore East fire are discussed further in Chapter 9.

 

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Figure 1.11: Horsham interim fire progression map

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Summary information

Fire Danger Index	The maximum FDI was greater than 100 at Horsham AWS at 14:00 and again at 14:30.235
Fatalities	No fatalities236
House losses	68 houses237
Overall area burnt	2200 hectares238
Firefighting resources	The peak CFA commitment was 41 appliances and 253 CFA personnel. DSE crews from the Horsham area also assisted. Local water-bombing aircraft were used when weather conditions permitted.239

 

1.99     This fire occurred on the outskirts of Horsham, a regional centre of over 13,000 people. The area directly affected by the fire was Haven, with a population of 940 people.240

1.100  At 12:26 ESTA took a call for a fire at Remlaw Road, Vectis, west of Horsham, burning through crop and grazing land in a south-easterly direction.241 As the point of origin was on private land, the CFA was nominated as the control agency.242 An ICC located at the DSE Office in Horsham managed the fire.243

1.101  Tankers were deployed from 4 local brigades and subsequently, at 12:33, a further 6 tankers were requested.244 Aircraft were requested at 12:46.245

1.102  The light-to-moderate fuel loads meant the fire was of moderate-to-high intensity, but it was fast running in a south-easterly direction. At approximately 13:15, the fire was entering the Wimmera River area and, as the fire burned through the dry river bed and surrounding river flats, the River Red Gums and associated scrub provided elevated fuels, resulting in spotting being reported around the Haven area.246 The fire burned the Horsham Golf Club, destroying the club house and burning the rough areas of the golf course.247

1.103  At 14:15 the fire’s run to the south was stopped.248 Most of the eastern flank of the fire was contained, although a narrow section of the fire broke out with the wind change, which moved through Horsham at 16:28.249 Had most of the eastern flank not been secured, the town of Horsham might have been threatened.250 By 16:52 the fire was reported to have crossed the Western Highway and was subsequently controlled and stopped at various land features, including roadside and irrigation channels.251 At 18:20 it was reported that the fire was stopped at the Horsham–Lubeck Road.252 It was listed as contained at 15:31 on 8 February.253

Warnings

1.104  An urgent threat message for the communities of Haven and McKenzie Creek, through to Wonwondah, west of Horsham, was posted to the CFA website at 13:20.254 An urgent threat message for the communities of Haven, McKenzie Creek, Bungalally, Green Lake and west of Horsham, was posted to the CFA website at 14:56. This warning noted that when the wind change came through the area, the communities on the eastern side of the Western Highway between Drung Drung South and Horsham might be under threat. A further message providing information on the progress of the wind change was posted at approximately 16:35. An alert message was posted at 22:55 advising of fire suppression activity continuing in the area.255

 

 

Figure 1.12: Coleraine interim fire progression map

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Summary information

Fire Danger Index	The maximum FDI was greater than100 at Hamilton AWS at 13:00 and an FDI greater than 100 was reached at Casterton AWS at 12:00.257
Fatalities	No fatalities258
House losses	1 house (as reported on 8 February)259
Overall area burnt	775 hectares260
Firefighting resources	Resources were progressively deployed from local brigades and other regions. At the fire’s peak, there were 55 CFA appliances attending, including a number of forest industry brigade vehicles, with approximately 280 personnel. At least 35 DSE fire personnel attended this fire.261

 

1.105  At 12:36 ESTA took a call about a grass fire in undulating grazing land adjacent to the Glenelg Highway, north-west of Coleraine.262 As the point of origin was on private land, the CFA was nominated as the control agency.263 A CFA ICC, located at the DSE Heywood offices, managed the fire.264

1.106  At 12:36 5 CFA tankers were deployed and 2 water-bombing aircraft were requested at 12:42.265 Local reports indicated that the fire was growing rapidly and at 12:43 a further 8 tankers were requested.266

1.107  The fire behaved typically for a fire occurring in the western districts, albeit in extreme weather conditions.267 The countryside is undulating grazing land and fuel loads were medium to relatively heavy.268 The fire ran through a dry creek bed to the south-west of the town and then, following the wind change at 13:23, burned in a north-easterly direction.269 The eastern flank of the fire was not contained before the wind change. The timing of the wind change was critical to the safety of the town. Fire behaviour was at its worst in the heavy fuel areas with flame heights reported at approximately 12 metres.270

1.108  There was concern that the wind change would push the fire into the town of Coleraine. Plans to evacuate the Coleraine District Health Service were made although evacuation did not eventuate.271 The fire was stopped at its most easterly point at 15:21, and was formally listed as contained at 17:21.272

Warnings

1.109  The first urgent threat message for this fire was posted to the CFA website at 13:30 for Muntham, Coleraine and Hilgay. The message stated that the fire was burning immediately west of Coleraine, had jumped the Glenelg Highway, and was burning in an easterly direction. A prior alert or awareness message was not issued for this fire. Updated urgent threat messages were provided as the fire progressed. At 18:16 a threat downgrade message was posted to the CFA website, advising that the fire was contained. 273

 

 

Figure 1.13: Pomborneit–Weerite interim fire progression map

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Summary information

Fire Danger Index	The maximum FDI was greater than 100 at Mortlake AWS at 13:30.275
Fatalities	No fatalities276
Overall area burnt	1300 hectares277
Firefighting resources	The CFA deployed 42 appliances and 298 personnel to this fire.278

 

1.110  At 13:17 an initial call was recorded of a grass and scrub fire west of Pomborneit/Stony Rises and south of the Princes Highway at Weerite.279 As the point of origin was on private land, the CFA was identified as the control agency for the fire.280 The ICC was located at Colac in a temporary DSE facility.281

1.111  At 13:18 5 local brigades were paged to respond to the fire. At 13:21, aircraft were requested although subsequent advice at 13:42 indicated that the prevailing weather conditions meant aircraft could not operate. Police were requested to close roads.282

1.112  The fire burned south, crossing and damaging the Geelong–Warrnambool railway line. At 13:42 VLine was contacted to stop trains using the damaged railway line.283 Ground resources were progressively increased to protect the Swan Marsh township.284 The south-west wind change was reported as passing Mount Pardon at 14:15, which is about 5 kilometres south of the fire area.285 When it reached the fire, the direction of the wind changed and headed north-east towards Lake Corangamite. As a result, the additional resources protecting Swan Marsh were redeployed for direct attack. At approximately 15:07 the fire crossed Pomborneit Foxhow Road and continued unchecked in a north-easterly direction until 16:35, when it was reported as stopped.286

1.113  The fire was listed as contained at 12:11 on 8 February.287

Warnings

1.114  The first urgent threat message was posted to the CFA website at 14:15 for ‘Scollers Road, Caters Road Settlement and Swan Marsh [sic]’. At 14:25 an awareness message was posted for Pomborneit, Stonyford and Swan Marsh.288 At 19:18 a message was posted on the CFA website advising that the threat had been downgraded to alert status.289

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Figure 1.14: Churchill interim fire progression map

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Summary information

Fire Danger Index	The maximum FDI was 82.7 at Latrobe Valley Aerodrome at 16:00 and an FDI greater than 100 was reached at Yarram Airport AWS at 14:00.291
Fatalities	11 fatalities292
House losses	247 houses293
Overall area burnt	24,500 hectares294
Firefighting resources	The peak CFA commitment to this fire was 227 appliances and 1250 personnel.295

 

 

1.115  The main communities affected in this fire were Callignee (population 495) and Hazelwood South (population 533).296

1.116  At 13:33 a fire was reported in open country but rapidly spreading uphill into a Blue Gum plantation on the south side of Glendonald Road, 3 kilometres south-east of Churchill.297 This report was received concurrently with one from the public direct to the Churchill CFA Fire Station. As the point of origin was on private land, the CFA was identified as the control agency for the fire.298 The ICC was located at Traralgon, initially as a Divisional headquarters, then as an ICC.299 The Churchill fire was originally considered a division of the Delburn fires before it was independently managed.300

1.117  At 13:35 4 brigades were paged to respond to the fire. On arrival at 13:39 additional tankers were requested. At 13:36 aircraft were requested although, at the peak of the fire, aircraft were unable to operate because of weather conditions. The fire quickly burned into pine and gum plantations to the south and south-east, through steep gullies, north facing slopes and valleys of the Strezlecki Ranges.301 Fuel loads were high due to a mixture of natural and plantation fuels. The main fire front travelled 7 kilometres in 50 minutes and, by 14:20, the fire had reached Jeeralong Creek West Branch.302

1.118  Spotting was reported up to 20 kilometres ahead of the fire outside Yarram and then, by 14:40 near Balook.303 At 15:02 a spot fire was reported at Jack River, 6 kilometres west of Yarram. At 16:50 there was reporting of multiple spot fires around the township of Yarram.304 By 17:15 the main firefront was approaching Mount Tassie, with spot fires on the east side of the mountain.305

1.119  Between 18:00 and 18:30 the wind change altered the direction of the fire, resulting in continued spotting but in a north-easterly direction towards Callignee, Traralgon South and Koornalla.306 At 18:04 a spot fire was reported 9 kilometres east of Yarram on the South Gippsland Highway. At 18:05 a further spot fire was reported on the Hyland Highway, 4 kilometres north of Yarram. It burnt into the Won Wron State Forest. At 18:10 a spot fire was reported on the Currajung Woodside Road, 4 kilometres east of Carrajung South.307

1.120  The wind change meant that 13 kilometres of the eastern flank, from near Churchill to Mount Tassie, was burning through steep, inaccessible country that carried high fuel loads of native forest and pine and Blue Gum plantations.308 This had a progressive impact on areas such as Hazelwood South, Koornalla, Traralgon South, Callignee, Callignee South, Callignee North, Jeeralang North, Devon, Yarram and Carrajung South.309 By around 20:00 the rate of spread had slowed; however, the fire was continuing to spread in a north-easterly direction.310 While much of the fire was stopped on 8 February, some areas remained inaccessible and burning continued in heavy fuel areas. The fire was listed as contained at 17:00 on 19 February.311

1.121  Loy Yang Power Station was identified as strategic infrastructure at risk, and substantial planning for its protection was undertaken. Ultimately, the fire did not affect this area but there was concern about the critical communications assets on Mount Tassie, including Loy Yang system controls and a variety of commercial and emergency communication transmitters.312 The ABC FM transmitter failed on Mount Tassie; however, the ABC continued transmitting on the AM band.313

Warnings

1.122  From 13:51 there were a series of alerts and urgent threat messages.314 An urgent threat message was posted to the CFA website at 14:05 stating that the communities of Hazelwood South, Jeeralang, Jeeralang North and Jeeralang Junction might be affected by fire. At 15:45 alert messages were posted for the communities of Jumbuck, Le Roy, Budgeree East, Valley View, Traralgon South and Balook, and an urgent threat message was extended to the communities of Balook, Le Roy, Jumbuck, Valley View and Budgeree East.315

1.123  At 16:20 alert messages were posted to the CFA website for the communities of Madalya, Womerah, Callignee, Callignee South, Callignee North, Carrajung, Carrajung South and Won Wron. These were upgraded to an urgent threat message for Womerah and Macks Creek at 16:30. The communities of Devon North and Yarram were also included in urgent threat messages at 16:40.316

1.124  At 17:05 Woodside, Alberton, Tarraville, Manns Beach, Robertsons Beach, Woodside Beach and McLoughlins Beach were included in alert messages. At 17:28 an urgent threat message was posted for the communities of Alberton, Tarraville, Port Albert, Langsborough, Manns Beach and Robertsons Beach. At 18:03 Devon North, Yarram and Calrossie were added to this warning, as were campers in the coastal area between Port Albert and Woodside Beach.317

1.125  At 18:10, with the onset of the wind change, further alert messages were posted listing communities such as Willung South, Willung, Stradbroke, Stradbroke West, Giffard West, Darriman, Hiamdale and Gormandale.318

1.126  Following the wind change at 20:25 an urgent threat message was issued advising that the Glendonald Road fire was currently burning in and around Traralgon South, Callignee, Callignee North and Callignee South. At 20:47 the communities of Carrajung South and Carrajung Lower were included in an urgent threat message advising of impact in 20 minutes or less. At 01:05 on 8 February, following an unexpected change in conditions, further urgent threat messages were posted for the townships of Carrajung South, Carrajung Lower, Won Wron and Woodside.319 Messages were issued to lower alert levels, when appropriate, on 8 February.320

 

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Figure 1.15: Murrindindi fire progression map

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Summary information

Fire Danger Index	The maximum FDI was 81 at Coldstream AWS at 16:34 and an FDI of 92 was reached at Eildon AWS at 16:31.322
Fatalities	38 fatalities323 In addition, on 17 February one ACT firefighter died as a result of a fallen tree branch.324
House losses	590 houses325
Overall area burnt	168,542 hectares326
Firefighting resources	Records show that 167 NEO personnel, 4 CFA personnel, 2 dozers and 3 slip-on units attended the fire on 7 February. This increased significantly through to 12 February, by which date 660 NEO personnel, 1 dozer, 1 tanker and 94 slip-on units were deployed, along with 970 CFA personnel and 187 tankers.327

 

1.127  Marysville was most affected by this fire, with a resident population of 517. The area surrounding Marysville has a population of 1200 people.328

1.128  Just before 15:00 a fire at Murrindindi Mill was reported to the Broadford and Alexandra DSE offices from the Mount Despair fire lookout tower.329 The point of origin was estimated to be 2 kilometres south of Murrindindi on private land within the fire protected area,330 and while this was not clear in the early stages of the fire, DSE became the control agency for this fire.331 Fire control was through a DSE ICC at Alexandra.332 DSE had already deployed IMT personnel from Alexandra to support the CFA IMT managing the Kilmore East fire.333 This included information and situation officers. Because of this, DSE advised that the Alexandra IMT was initially under-resourced.334

1.129  CFA resources were deployed from the Yea Group and were the first to arrive at the fire.335 All local DSE fire line resources that had not been deployed to the Kilmore East fire (which was reported at 11:49), were deployed to the Murrindindi fire (being crews from Toolangi, Alexandra and Broadford).336 The Toolangi DSE crew is recorded as responding at 15:00, with an estimated time of arrival of 15:30, although the first DSE resources were recorded as arriving at the fire at around 16:15.337 Care was taken not to direct crews to take roads that might be affected by this fire, with the Alexandra crew taking a circuitous route. This initial attack on the fire included 6 personnel, 1 tanker, 2 slip-on units and 1 ‘first attack’ dozer.338

1.130  Early observations reported by the IMT were of severe fire behaviour, with flames 20 metres high and an estimated rate of spread of 8 kilometres per hour. Spotting was estimated at 5 kilometres.339 Post-fire analysis indicated this was under-estimated — the likely spread of the fire was around 12 kilometres per hour with spotting to 15 kilometres.340 The Alexandra DSE Office estimated a rate of spread of 8 kilometres per hour earlier in the day, based on the weather forecast. This was twice the speed of fire spread normally experienced in forest fire.341

1.131  The severity of the fire behaviour precluded direct attack, and both DSE and CFA resources concentrated on community and asset protection. Aerial support was sought to manage fire spread.342

1.132  The fire spread rapidly into the forests of the Black Range, between the Melba and Maroondah Highways, and began spotting when it reached the top of the range. In fact, the fire was burning in forest 3 kilometres from its point of origin, until it reached the outskirts of Narbethong, a further 17 kilometres away. Additional response resources were mobilised.343 The Mount Gordon tower observer reported that at 16:20 the fire was crossing the Black Range.344 The tower was abandoned at 16:30.345

1.133  Two water-bombing aircraft and 1 light helicopter left Mansfield, arriving at the fire around 15:45.346 Water bombing was ineffective, due to the weather conditions, and each aircraft only made one bombing run.347 Additional dozers and graders were deployed from DSE and Murrindindi Shire for control line construction. DSE ground crews were deployed to communities to the east and west of the Black Range.348

1.134  The fire moved across the Black Range very quickly and was spotting long distances. At 16:30 spot fires and ember attack were reported in the Narbethong area, and aircraft were forced to suspend operations due to the increasingly hazardous flying conditions.349 The Bushfire CRC Report indicates fire spread was likely to have been the result of ‘substantial spotting’.350

1.135  Fire crews were hampered by new fires created by spotting; these were moving towards the Marysville area. Firefighters continued to work on asset protection under extremely difficult conditions. A back burn was attempted around 18:00 east of Marysville, although it was quickly abandoned ‘when it became hazardous and was going to be overrun by the main fire’.351

1.136  After 18:30 the south-westerly wind change arrived. Advice from DSE indicates the wind change arrived earlier and passed through the area with greater force than forecast.352 The wind continued to change direction during this period, making it difficult to identify the direction of spotting and firefront movement.353 Lightning from intense smoke plumes and atmospheric interaction with the south-west change triggered other fires between the Murrindindi and Bunyip fires.354

1.137  The eastern flank of the fire became an extensive front. Asset protection was extremely hazardous.355 The spot fires that had grown in the Narbethong and Marysville areas now joined and burnt towards Marysville, from both the south-west and south-east.356 A convoy of about 50 cars, led by Police, left Marysville at 16:45.357 Embers started falling in the town at about 18:50.358 CFA and DSE appliances withdrew to the Gallipoli Park Oval where some community members sheltered.359 Embers were recorded falling in Marysville at 18:50 and many houses in the town were destroyed within an hour.360 The wind change led to the fires reaching Buxton at 19:30 and travelling as far north as Taggerty.361

1.138  The fire eventually slowed under cooler conditions early on 8 February. It continued to burn for another 26 days before it was contained. This was after an immense effort in the forest on control line construction, back burning and burning out to stop the fire moving south and threatening the water catchments of Melbourne.362

1.139  The fire was listed as contained at 18:00 on 5 March and Under Control 2 at 11:00 on 13 March.363

Warnings

1.140  Mr Waller commented that early in the fire, the IMT was hampered by a lack of information on the fire, as aerial observation was not possible and it was travelling through remote areas.364 At 15:45 an awareness message was issued indicating there was a fire in the Murrindindi area moving south-east.365

1.141  At about 16:20 an urgent threat message was prepared and sent from the Alexandria ICC for Clonbinane, Mount Disappointment, Kinglake, Heathcote Junction, Upper Plenty, Humevale, Reedy Creek and Strath Creek.366 However, it was not posted on the website.367 At 16:45 an urgent threat message was issued for Narbethong.368 At 17:15 an urgent threat message was sent to agencies, media and the Victorian Bushfire Information Line (VBIL) for Marysville, Narbethong and Buxton, and at 17:34 a threat message for Marysville was relayed on 774 ABC Radio.369

1.142  At 17:20 an urgent threat message relating to Yea and Whittlesea roads was released. A further urgent threat message for areas from Kinglake to Flowerdale was released, although this second message was not posted to the CFA website until 17:55.370 An urgent threat message for Buxton was also raised prior to 18:00.371 Further urgent threat messages were issued through the night.372

 

Figure 1.16: Redesdale interim fire progression map

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Summary information

Fire Danger Index	The maximum FDI was 87.2 at Redesdale AWS at 16:00.374
Fatalities	No fatalities375
House losses	7 houses (as reported on 8 February)376
Overall area burnt	9500 hectares377
Firefighting resources	The CFA’s peak commitment to the fire was 73 appliances and 400 personnel. DSE fire personnel also attended this fire.378

 

 

1.143  At 15:11 a fire at Coliban Park Road, Redesdale was reported to the CFA.379 As the point of origin was on private land, the CFA was identified as the control agency, although responsibility passed to DSE when the fire was burning on public land after 7 February.380 The ICC was located at Huntly, Bendigo, which was the ICC for the Maiden Gully fire.381

1.144  At 15:11 5 local brigades were paged. At this time no aircraft were available for this incident. Two strike teams were activated at 15:30.382 The fire burned through undulating grassland and scrub fuels and grazing country with steep gullies and washaways.383 It burnt in a south-easterly direction and crossed the Metcalfe–Redesdale Road at 15:27 and the Kyneton–Heathcote Road at 15:42. At 16:49 Victoria Police was advised to close Watchbox Road to traffic. Further road closures followed.384

1.145  Direct attack on this fire was made wherever possible. However, due to the terrain, dozers and other equipment were needed to secure the fire edge. The speed of this fire was so rapid that there was concern that the fire might reach the Cobaw Ranges or further beyond to the communities of Lancefield and Carlsruhe. This did not eventuate.385

1.146  At approximately 18:30 the wind change reached the fire. Approximately two-thirds of the eastern flank of the fire was secured. The remaining eastern flank that did break away was in rough steep-gullied country. This part of the fire was progressively contained.386

1.147  Over the next few days firefighters continued to secure the fire.387 This involved the strategic redeployment of resources between this fire and the nearby Maiden Gully fire. The fire was listed as contained at 09:56 on 10 February.388

Warnings

1.148  At 16:13 an urgent threat message was posted on the CFA website for the communities of Barfold, Langley and Metcalfe East. At 16:47 a revised alert message was posted for the communities of Sidonia, Pastoria, and other communities to the east of Kyneton.389

1.149  As the fire progressed, urgent threat messages were updated, advising ‘the communities of Pipers Creek, Carlsruhe, Woodend North, Newham, Cadello and Carbow [sic]’ to be alert and implement their fire plans. The messages advised that when the wind change arrived the fire would run in a north-easterly direction. Residents in Redesdale, Glenhope, Baynton and Baynton East, and residents in the areas between Glenhope, Baynton, Redesdale, Heathcote, Tooborac and Pyalong, were advised that they might also be under threat when the wind change passed through.’390

1.150  Threat messages were downgraded to alert status on 8 February, as the fire was controlled. Further urgent threat messages were issued when the fire again threatened communities on 9 February.391

 

1.151  The Commission has not yet taken evidence on the Narre Warren Fire that began at 15:32.392

 

Figure 1.17: Maiden Gully interim fire progression map393

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Summary information

Fire Danger Index	The maximum FDI was greater than 100 at Bendigo AWS at 15:31.395
Fatalities	1 fatality396
House losses	58 houses397
Overall area burnt	330 hectares398
Firefighting resources	The CFA deployed 70 appliances and 420 personnel to the fire. DSE fire equipment and personnel were also deployed (numbers not provided).399

 

1.152  This fire burnt a small area of Bendigo, including Bendigo West and parts of Long Gully.400

1.153  At 16:34 a fire at Bracewell Street, Maiden Gully, Bendigo was reported.401 The fire was a classic ‘interface fire’ as it burned in and amongst houses and commercial premises on the outskirts of a large provincial city.402 Resources from the Bendigo region had already been deployed to the Redesdale fire.403 As the point of origin was on private land, the CFA was identified as the control agency and managed it from the Huntly ICC (from where the Redesdale fire was also managed).404

1.154  Three brigades responded at 16:35. An unspecified number of additional brigades were paged at 16:38.405 The fire burned through disused mining country in and about the townships of Maiden Gully, Long Gully, California Gully and Eaglehawk.406 Resources were deployed as the fire spotted into grassland from scrubby areas where access was difficult. Early in the fire’s development, as it ran to the south-east, it burnt houses and other structures. The wind change, which moved through the area at approximately 18:45, extended the fire to the north-east.407

1.155  The existence of relatively large tracts of vacant, unused land, coupled with scrub and recreation areas, made control extremely difficult.408 While the fire was limited by an area of land in Pascoe Street, where fuel reduction had been undertaken, crowning and short distance spotting occurred elsewhere hampering firefighting efforts.409 The fire burned within 1.5 kilometres of the centre of Bendigo and posed a considerable threat to the city before being contained at 21:52.410

1.156  The Bushfire CRC Report indicates that the Bendigo fire spread was faster by a factor of two to three times more than what was predicted using either the Forest Fire Danger Meter or the Project Vesta model (a comprehensive research project to investigate the behaviour and spread of high intensity bushfires). The Bushfire CRC suggests that the very open nature of the forest resulted in higher wind speeds under the canopy than is assumed by either model.411

Warnings

1.157  An awareness message providing initial advice for the Maiden Gully area was posted to the CFA website at 17:17.412 Numerous warnings and commentary were provided from 17:10 through to 21:10.413 At 21:37 an urgent threat message was posted noting that the fire west of Bendigo and Specimen Hill was burning in a northerly and north-easterly direction, and a section of the fire was moving towards Eaglehawk. Residents in the Upper California Gully Road and Hall Street area were warned that their area was under ember attack. This information was updated progressively through the night as the fire was brought under control.414

 

Figure 1.18: Beechworth–Mudgegonga fire map

 CLICK FOR IMAGE

 

 

Summary information

Fire Danger Index	The maximum FDI was 42 at Hunters Hill AWS at 13:06 and an FDI of 126 was reached at Wangaratta AWS at 13:30.416
Fatalities	2 fatalities417
House losses	29 damaged or destroyed418
Overall area burnt	Approximately 31,000 hectares419
Firefighting resources	On 7 February 35 NEO personnel, 2 tankers, 2 dozers and 12 slip-on units attended the fire. Another 50 CFA personnel and 18 tankers responded together with 1 helicopter and 2 fixed-wing aircraft. From 8–12 February up to 386 NEO personnel per day attended the fire, with 7 dozers, 8 tankers and 39 slip-on units. Up to 644 CFA personnel and 24 tankers were deployed,420 together with appliances from Hancocks Plantations and the NSW Rural Fire Service.421

 

 

1.158  The largest population in the immediate area is Yackandandah (population 2100). The towns most affected were Gapsted (population 294), Mudgegonga (population 385) and Dederang (population 422). The outer areas of Stanley (population 689) were also affected.422

1.159  At around 18:09 on 7 February a fire was reported to the DSE Beechworth depot via a mobile phone call from the Beechworth DSE office.423 At around the same time a DSE staff member at the depot received a phone call from a member of the public reporting the fire. The point of origin was reported to be around 4 kilometres south of Beechworth.424 As the point of origin was on public land DSE was the control agency for the fire.425 The ICC was located at the Beechworth DSE office and at Ovens from 8 February.426 It was a joint DSE/CFA ICC.

1.160  Personnel at the Ovens, Beechworth and Bright DSE work centres were deployed to the fire.427 At 18:10 the DSE Incident Controller called back a strike team he had stood down at 18:00 (expecting them to be deployed to the Kilmore East fire the next day). The team responded to the Beechworth fire, along with local CFA crews, at an estimated arrival time of 18:30 (earlier in the day a Beechworth DSE task force had already been deployed to assist the CFA at the Kilmore East fire).428

1.161  Access to the fire was hindered near the point of origin due to sagging power lines.429 Reports from the fireground indicated that the fire was moving rapidly under the influence of a strong north, north-westerly wind, gusting up to 60 kilometres per hour, with subsequent spotting.430 Initial fire behaviour was not extreme given that the fire was burning over areas previously burnt in 2002–03. However, the south-easterly spread of the fire into steep, inaccessible areas with heavy fuel loads led to some extreme fire behaviour.431 Spotting occurred a ridge ahead of the firefront.432

1.162  The first attack dozer was at the fire by 19:00. At about this time 2 fixed-wing bombers and a light helicopter based at Mansfield were deployed. The bombers made several drops until nightfall when they were stood down.433

1.163  The fire was burning in a south-easterly direction, through a steep, inaccessible sluiced area containing heavy, unburnt forest fuels. This limited access for CFA crews. Crews therefore worked the northern flank. Live low-hanging power lines prevented direct attack, and so indirect attack was undertaken.434 Heavy smoke and limited fire line communications during the night made it difficult to estimate where the fire was. Overnight Victoria Police organised road blocks across the area.435

1.164  Throughout the night the power outage created significant issues for the operation of the ICC. Communications, situation reporting and planning activities were constrained, and communication and coordination were conducted on mobile phones and from vehicles.436

1.165  During the night the Incident Controller decided that due to the cramped conditions in the Beechworth ICC, the ICC would be relocated to Ovens from 07:00 on 8 February. That location was better equipped as a level 3 facility.437

1.166  At 06:00 on 8 February the size of the fire was estimated to be 20,000 hectares. Access to parts of the fire was restricted as a major transmission line through the fireground needed to be rebooted. In addition, there was a large number of lightning strikes across the region, and a fire near Bogong Village that also required firefighting resources.438

1.167  The fire was contained after 9 days (16 February), having burnt approximately 31,000 hectares, including 20,000 hectares of forest and park. Areas where fuel had been reduced through burning had a significant effect on the spread and eventual control of this fire.439 It was reported contained at 10:30 on 16 March and Under Control 2 at 11:00 on 25 March.440

 

Warnings

1.168  Due to the power failures distribution of warnings was in the first instance by mobile phone.441 At 19:10 the first urgent threat message for Stanley, Barwidgee Creek and Mudgegonga was issued.442 Subsequent urgent threat messages were sent out through the evening and the following day. On 7 February these were for Stanley, Barwidgee Creek, Mudgegonga, Yackandandah and Bruarong. On 8 February Rosewhite, Murmungee, Ovens and Myrtleford were included in the threat messages.443

1.169  Overnight the location of the fire could not be confirmed. A number of precautionary warnings were issued and these were also issued to towns later found not to be threatened.444

Other Fires

1.170  Numerous other fires occurred on the day but are not being examined by the Commission because, amongst other factors, many were successfully contained. One such fire was the Upper Ferntree Gully fire at Quarry Road, which was reported to ESTA at 15:42. This fire burned 9500 hectares. Twenty-one CFA appliances and 168 personnel attended the fire.445 A heavy helicopter was also redeployed from Bunyip to the fire.446 The fire was reported as contained at 19:10 and was controlled at 21:27.447 This fire, which was relatively small in size, resulted in no fatalities and only one house destroyed.448 However, it was assessed by the CFA as having the ‘most significant potential’ for losses on the day, because of the conditions and its location at the foothills of Mount Dandenong, in a heavily populated area.449

 

1.171  After 7 February the Murrindindi and Bunyip fires continued to burn.450 On 8 February a fire ignited at Wilsons Promontory.451 Many IMTs continued operating on a 24-hour basis.452 The East Tyers–Thomson fire was contained on 16 February but not declared Under Control 2 until 30 March.453 The Beechworth fire continued to burn until 25 March.454

1.172  Weather conditions deteriorated on 23 February posing initial risks to the southern edge of going fires.455 While the CFA recorded 135 grass fires on that day, only 3 developed into significant fires — Upwey (igniting at 14:28), Muskvale near Daylesford (igniting at 14:55), and Won Wron (ignition time not advised).456

1.173  Weather conditions deteriorated again through the weekend of 28 February–1 March.457 On 1 March a joint CFA/DSE/Victorian State Emergency Service media release was issued warning of an extreme weather threat.458 The warning predicted an onset of increasing temperatures and strong northerly winds right across the State.459 Total fire bans were declared on 2 and 3 March.460

1.174  As a result of these concerns comprehensive preparations were undertaken over the weekend and into Monday 2 March. On 2 March, weather for 3 March was predicted to include very strong northerly winds.461 In addition, the police sent out a text message to nearly all Victorian mobile phone customers, warning them of pending and extreme fire and wind changes.462

1.175  On 3 March this prediction was updated. Wind speeds were revised down and humidity was higher than estimated. Ultimately, the weather did not deteriorate as badly as predicted.463 Humidity remained relatively high and this enabled new fires to be more easily controlled. That said, the CFA responded to 195 grass fires over the period 2–3 March.464

1.176  Following these weather patterns, some rainfall fell across the state. Although not significant enough to end the fire season, it assisted ground crews in dampening any fires that remained.465

1.177  Twenty-six days after ignition, the Kilmore East–Murrindindi fire was reported contained on 5 March, under control on 10 March and safe on 27 April. Due to the dry conditions, much of the firefighting was directed at and managed by back burning.466 The Bunyip fire was reported contained on 4 March and under control on 15 March.467

 

1.178  Maps from the Report of the Inquiry into the 2002–2003 Victorian Bushfires, comparing areas burnt across Victoria in 1939, 1983 and 2003, are presented in figures 1.19–1.22.468 The Commission has added a map for the 7 February fires. While the total area burnt in the 2009 fires is less than these earlier fires, the impact on lives and homes lost has been much greater.

Figure 1.19: 1939 Victorian bushfires

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Figure 1.20: 1983 Victorian bushfires

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Figure 1.21: 2003 Victorian bushfires

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Figure 1.22: 2009 Victorian bushfires

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[1]     The DSE fire information management system

[2]     M Williams T720:12–T720:14

[3]     Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams (WIT.013.001.0002) [19], [29]

[4]     M Williams T721:1–T721:8

[5]     Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams (WIT.013.001.0002) [18]

[6]     Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams, Annexure 1 (WIT.013.001.0012) at 0028

[7]     Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams, Annexure 1 (WIT.013.001.0012) at 0032 and 0034

[8]     Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams, Annexure 1 (WIT.013.001.0012) at 0033

[9]     Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0024

[10]   Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams, Annexure 1 (WIT.013.001.0012) at 0030

[11]   Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams, Annexure 1 (WIT.013.001.0012) at 0030

[12]   M Williams T720:17–T720:24

[13]   Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams (WIT.013.001.0002) [21]

[14]   Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams (WIT.013.001.0002) [22]

[15]   M Williams T724:9–T724:11; Dipole activity refers to opposites in weather conditions similar to opposite magnetic or electrical charges.

[16]   Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams (WIT.013.001.0002) [24]–[25]

[17]   M Williams T723:24–T723:26

[18]   Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams (WIT.013.001.0002) [25]

[19]   M Williams T724:22–T724:24

[20]   Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams, Annexure 1 (WIT.013.001.0012) at 0042

[21]   Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams, Annexure 1 (WIT.013.001.0012) at 0042

[22]   Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams (WIT.013.001.0002) [27]

[23]   Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams (WIT.013.001.0002) [28]

[24]   Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams (WIT.013.001.0002) [30]

[25]   Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams (WIT.013.001.0002) [30]

[26]   Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams (WIT.013.001.0002) [29]

[27]   Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams (WIT.013.001.0002) [30]–[31]

[28]   Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams (WIT.013.001.0002) [32]

[29]   Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams (WIT.013.001.0002) [33]

[30]   Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams (WIT.013.001.0002) [33]; M Williams T732:29–T732:30

[31]   Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams, Annexure 1 (WIT.013.001.0012) at 0043

[32]   Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams, Annexure 1 (WIT.013.001.0012) at 0043

[33]   Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001)

[34]   Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) [234.3]

[35]   Exhibit 32 – Tolhurst Report (EXP.003.001.0017) at 0022

[36]   Rees T52:11–T52:23

[37]   Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [68]

[38]   Rees T58:14–T58:28

[39]   Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0053

[40]   Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams (WIT.013.001.0002) [34]

[41]   Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams (WIT.013.001.0002) [35]–[37]

[42]   Tolhurst T1760:28–T1761:8

[43]   Tolhurst T1761:19–T1761:22; Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams (WIT.013.001.0002) [35]–[37]

[44]   Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0067

[45]   Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams, Attachment 2 (WIT.013.002.0001) at 0068

[46]   Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams (WIT.013.001.0002) [13]

[47]   Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams (WIT.013.001.0002) [43]

[48]   Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0067

[49]   Rees T2574:11–T2574:13

[50]   Tolhurst T1762:11–T1762:16

[51]   Tolhurst T1762:17–T1762:28

[52]   McGahy T2239:25–T2239:26; McGahy T2244:2–T2244:12

[53]   Tolhurst T1763:23–T1764:8

[54]   Willans T3030:14–T3030:15; Rees T85:31–T86:6

[55]   Rees T67:11–T67:19

[56]   Williamson T4457:21–T4457:26

[57]   Willans T3030:21–T3030:23; Tolhurst T1026:3–T1026:29; Exhibit 32 – Tolhurst Expert Report (EXP.003.001.0017) at 0027

[58]   Willans T3032:19–T3032:31

[59]   Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0067

[60]   Willans T3030:14–T3030:28

[61]   McCormack T4102:2–T4102:5

[62]   Tolhurst T1765:20–T1765:22

[63]   Esplin T374:25–T374:27; Rees T2402:23–T2402:25

[64]   Exhibit 25 – Hendrie Tender (EXH.025.0001)

[65]   Exhibit 25 – Hendrie Tender (EXH.025.0001)

[66]   Tolhurst T1030:14–T1030:24

[67]   Tolhurst T1030:25–T1031:2

[68]   Tolhurst T1031:2–T1031:9

[69]   Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) at 0017

[70]   Tolhurst T1032:1–T1032:12; Waller T105:1–T105:11

[71]   Rees T81:27–T82:13

[72]   Rees T2626:15–T2626:22; T2627:10

[73]   Rees T2568:29–T2569:6

[74]   Rees T2627:29–T2627:31

[75]   Stayner T1805:1–T1805:6

[76]   Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) [21]

[77]   Rees T2628:5–T2628:28

[78]   Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [298]

[79]   Figure derived from Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) and Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001)

[80]   Griffiths T824:6–T824:11

[81]   See for example Murphy T1281:26–T1281:28; Esplin T205:25–T205:29

[82]   Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [255]

[83]   Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [256]

[84]   Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [257]

[85]   Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [265]

[86]   Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [264]

[87]   Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [266]

[88]   Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0048

[89]   Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [269]

[90]   Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [271]; Mineral earth control lines refers to areas where combustible fuel is removed either by hand or machinery.

[91]   Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [281]

[92]   Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [281]

[93]   To reduce a fire’s rate of spread, aerial bombers lay a retardant mix on vegetation ahead of or adjacent to the fire.

[94]   Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [281]

[95]   Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) [340]

[96]   Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller, Attachment 46 (WIT.002.001.0895) at 0895

[97]   Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) at 0091

[98]   Rees T2666:18–T2666:26; Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0094

[99]   Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0094; Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 1 (WIT.005.001.0049) at 0057

[100]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) at 0091

[101]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) at 0091

[102]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) [385]; Rees T2570:12–T2570:15; Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [321]

[103]  Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0390

[104]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [320]

[105]  Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0010

[106]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [322]

[107]  Willans T3021:24–T3021:28

[108]  Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0010

[109]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [328]

[110]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [330]

[111]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) at 0091

[112]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [326]

[113]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [323]

[114]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [323]; Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees, Attachment 31 (WIT.004.001.0509) at 0525–0526

[115]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 1 (WIT.005.001.0049) at 0093

[116]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 1 (WIT.005.001.0049) at 0056 [see Community Cluster H]

[117]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 1 (WIT.005.001.0049) at 0056 [see Community Cluster H]

[118]  Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund (WIT.020.001.0001) [7]

[119]  Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund (WIT.020.001.0001) [9], [12], [20]

[120]  Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund (WIT.020.001.0001) [10], [14]

[121]  Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund (WIT.020.001.0001) [22]

[122]  Sigmund T898:8–T898:21

[123]  Sigmund T899:10–T899:14

[124]  Sigmund T913:11–T913:22

[125]  Sigmund T900:6–T900:15

[126]  Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund (WIT.020.001.0001) [24]–[25]

[127]  Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund (WIT.020.001.0001) [35]–[36]

[128]  Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund (WIT.020.001.0001) [38]

[129]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [265]

[130]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [76]

[131]  Waller T135:29–T136:2

[132]  Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund (WIT.020.001.0001) [9], [12], [20]

[133]  Rees T68:22; T69:9–T69:10

[134]  Rees T56:4

[135]  Rees T45:27–T46:10

[136]  Rees T63:4–T63:9

[137]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [77]

[138]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) at 0094

[139]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [102]

[140]  Esplin T364:7–T364:8

[141]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [113]

[142]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [359]

[143]  Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0132

[144]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 1 (WIT.005.001.0049) at 0054–0057, 0109, 0113–0122

[145]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0097

[146]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) at 0006

[147]  Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0132

[148]  Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0132

[149]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [27]

[150]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [36]

[151]  Rees T2569:30–T2570:3

[152]  Rees T2570:15–T2570:19

[153]  Murphy T1281:26–T1281:27

[154]  Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0394

[155]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [14]

[156]  Keating T3224:3–T3224:15

[157]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0096; Barca T3465:4–T3465:25

[158]  Rees T89:15–T89.22

[159]  Murphy T1262:20–T1262:24

[160]  Murphy T1267:29–T1267:31; Kreitszheim T1284:25–T1284:31

[161]  Exhibit 107 – Statement of Barca (WIT.3026.001.0001) [51], [71]

[162]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [35]

[163]  Exhibit 132 – Statement of Williamson (WIT.3004.009.0029) [6], [8]; Williamson T4428:8–T4428:10

[164]  Rees T2670:22–T2670:24

[165]  Murphy T1260:14–T1260:23; Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [15]

[166]  Murphy T1261:19–T1261:23

[167]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [15]

[168]  Murphy T1279:9–T1279:11

[169]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [16]

[170]  Murphy T1277:1–T1277:15

[171]  Tolhurst T1736:15–T1736:30; Rees T71:9–T72:16

[172]  Rees T75:1–T75:11; Murphy T1268:8–T1268:12; Kreltszheim T1305:6–T1305:9

[173]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [16]

[174]  Rees T2671:4–T2671:13

[175]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [17]

[176]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [17]

[177]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [17]

[178]  Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0011

[179]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [37]

[180]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [37]

[181]  Keating T3226:14–T3226:17

[182]  Keating T3229:23–T3229:25

[183]  Exhibit 98 – Statement of Keating (VPO.001.002.0237_R) at 0241

[184]  Rees T2674:5–T2674:8

[185]  Rees T2674:14–T2674:15

[186]  Keating T3231:7–T3231:21

[187]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [19]

[188]  Rees T2675:18–T2675:19

[189]  Strike teams may be sent significant distances away from their home locations.

[190]  McGahy T2245:5–T2245:10

[191]  McGahy T2245:10–T2245:11

[192]  McGahy T2246:21–T2246:24

[193]  McGahy T2248:26–T2248:29

[194]  McGahy T2251:19–T2251:26

[195]  McGahy T2253:2

[196]  McGahy T2253:6–T2253:9

[197]  Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0011

[198]  Exhibit 73 – Statement of McCulloch (WIT.043.001.0001_R) [16], [17]

[199]  Exhibit 25 – Statement of Hendrie (WIT.027.001.0007) at 0017

[200]  Exhibit 73 – Statement of McCulloch (WIT.043.001.0001_R) [22]

[201]  Exhibit 73 – Statement of McCulloch (WIT.043.001.0001_R) [50]

[202]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [20]

[203]  Rees T81:10–T81:11; Rees T86:11–T86:12

[204]  Keating T3246:4–T3246:8

[205]  McCormack T4099:6–T4099:8

[206]  Exhibit 97 – Statement of O’Neill (WIT.047.001.0001_R) [22], [24], [26]

[207]  Munns T1369:18–T1369:21

[208]  Keating T3237:23–T3238:15

[209]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [21]

[210]  Cooper T3261:27

[211]  Cooper T3261:19

[212]  Exhibit 73 – Statement of McCulloch (WIT.043.001.0001_R) [20]

[213]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) [354]; Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [21]–[22]; Rees T86:30–T86:31

[214]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [21]–[22]

[215]  Exhibit 114 – Statement of D O’Halloran (WIT.058.001.0001_R) [32]

[216]  Exhibit 43 – Statement of Glassford (WIT.028.001.0001_R) [16]

[217]  Exhibit 121 – Statement of Ward (WIT.052.001.0001_R) [21]

[218]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [24]

[219]  Rees T78:29

[220]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [25]–[26]

[221]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [27]

[222]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [28]

[223]  Rees T92:12–T92:13

[224]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [30]

[225]  Rees T2672:1

[226]  Rees T93:1–T93:8

[227]  Munns T1366:30–T1367:5

[228]  Kreltszheim T1294:1–T1294:6

[229]  Munns T1358:20–T1358:31

[230]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [31]

[231]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [32]

[232]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [33]

[233]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [34]

[234]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0099

[235]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [52]

[236]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0098

[237]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0098

[238]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [49]

[239]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [52]

[240]  Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0401

[241]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [41]; Rees T56:1–T56:3

[242]  Barca T3465:4–T3465:25; Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0098

[243]  Rees T62:13

[244]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [40]

[245]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [42]

[246]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [43]

[247]  Rees T58:3–T58:13

[248]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [45]

[249]  Rees T58:14–T58:19

[250]  Rees T59:12–T59:14

[251]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [47], [48]

[252]  Rees T58:29

[253]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [49]

[254]  Rees T61:22–T61:24

[255]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [50], [51]

[256]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0101

[257]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [64]

[258]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0100

[259]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0120

[260]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [60]

[261]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [64]

[262]  Rees T46:4–T46:12

[263]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0100; Rees T52:24–T52:25; Barca T3465:4–T3465:25

[264]  Rees T52:24–T52:30

[265]  Rees T46:28–T47:4

[266]  Rees T47:1–T47:3

[267]  Rees T47:15–T47:16

[268]  Rees T47:18

[269]  Rees T48:12; Rees T50:8–T50:9

[270]  Rees T52:11–T52:17

[271]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [59]

[272]  Rees T53:12; Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [60]

[273]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [61], [63]

[274]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0103

[275]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [75]

[276]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0102

[277]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [72]

[278]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0102

[279]  Rees T63:4–T63:9

[280]  Barca T3465:4–T3465:25; Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0102

[281]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [75]

[282]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [65], [67]

[283]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [66]

[284]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [69]

[285]  Rees T64:27–T64:29

[286]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [70]

[287]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [72]

[288]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [73]

[289]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [74]

[290]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0105

[291]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) at 0014

[292]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0104

[293]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0104

[294]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0104

[295]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0104

[296]  Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0388

[297]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [77]; Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0011–0012

[298]  Barca T3465:4–T3465:25; Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0104

[299]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0104

[300]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [76]

[301]  Rees T2663:17–T2663:20

[302]  Rees T146:3; Rees – Exhibit 4 (WIT.004.002.0001) [82]

[303]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [80]

[304]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [83]

[305]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [84]

[306]  Rees T2663:27–T2663:29; Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [85]–[88]

[307]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [86]

[308]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [87]

[309]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [88]

[310]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [89]

[311]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [90]

[312]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [99]

[313]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [100]

[314]  Rees T2665:17–T2665:22

[315]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [91]

[316]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [92]

[317]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [93]

[318]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [94]

[319]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [96]

[320]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [97]

[321]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller, Attachment 46 (WIT.002.001.0895) at 0896

[322]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) at 0094

[323]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0096; Exhibit 49 – Statement of P O’Halloran, Attachment 1 (WIT.3010.001.0007)

[324]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [341]; Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) [438]

[325]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0096

[326]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) at 0093

[327]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) at 0094

[328]  Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0397

[329]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [332]; Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [41]

[330]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [332]

[331]  Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [43]; Barca T3465:4–T3465:25

[332]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) at 0094

[333]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [333]

[334]  Waller T127:24–T127:30

[335]  Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [44]

[336]  Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0072) [37]; Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [334]

[337]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [334]; Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [44]

[338]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [334]

[339]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [335]

[340]  Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [51]

[341]  Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [40]

[342]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [335]

[343]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [335], [336]

[344]  Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [50]

[345]  Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [50]

[346]  Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [59]

[347]  Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [59]

[348]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [336]

[349]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [338]

[350]  Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0012

[351]  Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [55]

[352]  Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [56]

[353]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [340]; Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [56]

[354]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [318]

[355]  Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [56]

[356]  Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [53]

[357]  Fraser T3064:26–T3064:30

[358]  Fraser T3054:7

[359]  Fraser T3057:25; T3058:5–T3058:8

[360]  Exhibit 95 – Statement of Fraser (WIT.048.001.0001_R) [23], [31]

[361]  Exhibit 13 – Statement of Newman (WIT.009.001.0001_R) [14]; Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [53]

[362]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [341]

[363]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) at 0093

[364]  Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [60]

[365]  Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [60]

[366]  Hunter T1720:8–T1720:13; T1721:19–T1721:21; Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [61]

[367]  Hunter T1722:7–T1722:8

[368]  Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [61]

[369]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [339]; Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [63]

[370]  Hunter T1723:39–T1724:9

[371]  Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [54]

[372]  Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [64]

[373]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0107

[374]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) at 0015

[375]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0106

[376]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0120

[377]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0106

[378]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0106

[379]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [102]

[380]  Barca T3465:4–T3465:25; Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0106

[381]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0106

[382]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [103]

[383]  Rees T2651:6–T2651:11

[384]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [104]

[385]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [105]

[386]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [106]

[387]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [107]

[388]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [108]

[389]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [109]

[390]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [110]

[391]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [108]

[392]  Esplin T364:7–T364:11

[393]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0107

[394]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0107

[395]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) at 0017

[396]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0108

[397]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0108

[398]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0108

[399]  Rees T2657:27; Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0108

[400]  Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0391

[401]  Rees T2657:22; Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [113]

[402]  Rees T2658:1–T2658:4; Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [120]

[403]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [113]

[404]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0106; Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [112]; Barca T3465:4–T3465:25; Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0108

[405]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [115]

[406]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [116]

[407]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [118]

[408]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [120]

[409]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [119]–[120]

[410]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [122], [125]

[411]  Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0013

[412]  Rees T2659:4–T2659:7

[413]  Rees T2659:18–T2659:26

[414]  Exhibit 4 – Supplementary Statement of Rees (WIT.004.002.0001) [123]

[415]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller, Attachment 46 (WIT.002.001.0895) at 0897

[416]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) at 0101

[417]  Walsh T669:7–T669:8

[418]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 1(WIT.005.001.0049) at 0082

[419]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) at 0100

[420]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) at 0101

[421]  Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [85]

[422]  Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0399

[423]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [359]

[424]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [359]

[425]  Barca T3465:4–T3465:25

[426]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [365], [371]

[427]  Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [72], [73], [86]

[428]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [363]

[429]  Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [77]

[430]  Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [80]

[431]  Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [81]

[432]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [368]

[433]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [364]

[434]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [368]

[435]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [370]

[436]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [366]

[437]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [371]

[438]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [372]

[439]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [373]

[440]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) at 0100

[441]  Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [89]

[442]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [367]

[443]  Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [89]

[444]  Exhibit 130 – Statement of Waller (WIT.3024.001.0073) [90]

[445]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0112

[446]  Rees T2662:23–T2662:27

[447]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0112

[448]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0112

[449]  Rees T2660:24–T2660:27

[450]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) [414]

[451]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) [408]

[452]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [389]

[453]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) at 0099

[454]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) at 0100

[455]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) [409]

[456]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) [410]

[457]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) [415], [418]

[458]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) [432]

[459]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees, Attachment 33 (WIT.004.001.0730) at 0730

[460]  Cook T4751:15–T4751:21; Exhibit 148 – Statement of Cook (WIT.3029.001.0001) [65]

[461]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) [418]

[462]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) [435]

[463]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) [419]

[464]  Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) [419]

[465]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [391]

[466]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [389], [391]

[467]  Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [391]

[468]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 11 (WIT.005.001.0951) at 0999–1001

[469]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 11 (WIT.005.001.0951) at 0999

[470]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 11 (WIT.005.001.0951) at 1000

[471]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 11 (WIT.005.001.0951) at 1001

[472]  Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 1, (WIT.005.001.0049) at 0111