6 RELOCATION

 

This chapter examines whether relocation should be compulsory and whether, given that late relocation is extremely dangerous, departure from an area under direct threat by bushfire should ever be recommended. These two issues are often confused: arguments around compulsory evacuation can slide into arguments around any form of planned or advised relocation. To avoid confusion the Commission has addressed these two issues separately. This chapter also considers who should be responsible for recommending and carrying out relocation, and where people should go.

 

6.1       Timely departure from an area threatened by bushfire is an integral part of the Prepare, Stay and Defend or Leave Early policy (‘stay or go’). Leaving early is one of the two key choices that the Country Fire Authority (CFA) advises people to make. Leaving early is also one of the most effective means of preserving life. As Community Fireguard facilitator Ms Serafina Munns attested: ‘The safest place to be during a bushfire is somewhere else’.¹

6.2       Experience has shown that late departure can be deadly. Until 7 February 2009 most civilian deaths in bushfires in Australia occurred during late relocation.2 This fact underpins an extreme reluctance on the part of the CFA to recommend evacuation of an area threatened by fire. On 7 February, 22 people died in or near vehicles, on roadways or reserves, in locations that suggest they were trying to flee a fire.3 However, the great majority of those who died as a result of the fires died in houses.4 A fresh look at relocation as a life-saving measure is required.

 

6.3       ‘Evacuation’ is a word used in Victoria’s emergency management arrangements: in the Emergency Management Act 1986 and the Emergency Management Manual Victoria (the Manual).5 Evacuation is defined in the Manual as:

6.4       The law in Victoria does not support the compulsory evacuation of everyone in an area threatened in an emergency. The existing arrangements in Victoria contemplate that a decision to evacuate a dangerous area will be made voluntarily.7 This is consistent with the ‘stay or go’ position, under which residents are encouraged to decide for themselves whether they will stay and defend their home from a fire, or leave early.

6.5       Although evacuation is not mandatory in Victoria, the word has connotations of compulsion, of people being forced to leave their homes against their will. As the Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council (AFAC) noted in its submission:

6.6       In a similar vein, the State urged caution about using the word ‘evacuation’ in warnings because it may involve a perception of a more organised exercise than simply leaving early.9

6.7       These points are well made. AFAC suggested using the word ‘relocation’ rather than ‘evacuation’.10 As the title of this chapter indicates, the Commission has adopted that suggestion. The words ‘relocation’ and ‘relocate’ — or, more simply, ‘leave’ and ‘go’ — have been used in framing recommendations, and where it was the commonly understood terminology on 7 February. Further, it is recommended that the State Emergency Response Plan (SERP) use the word ‘relocation’ in preference to the word ‘evacuation’, to remove possible confusion resulting from the compulsory or mandatory connotations of ‘evacuation’.

 

The State amend the State Emergency Response Plan so that the word relocation is used in preference to the word evacuation (except in cases where evacuation is clearly more appropriate).

 

 

6.8       The law in Victoria enables the evacuation of people threatened by fire, but does not support the compulsory evacuation of those with a pecuniary interest in any property under threat. Section 31(3) of the Country Fire Authority Act 1958 (the CFA Act) provides:

(a) close any road in the vicinity of the scene of any fire;

6.9       This section would appear to provide for forced relocation of anyone on land that is threatened by fire. It is, however, subject to what has become known as the ‘pecuniary interest exception’ in section 31(4):

6.10     Evacuation is dealt with in a similar way in the Emergency Management Act.11 If a State of Disaster is declared, the powers of the Coordinator in Chief include a power to ‘compel the evacuation of any or all persons from the disaster area or any part of it’.12 Under the Emergency Management Act, this power may not be exercised ‘so as to compel the evacuation of a person from any land or building if the person has a pecuniary interest in the land or building or in any goods or valuables on the land or in the building’.13

6.11     In addition, section 36A of the Emergency Management Act enables a senior police officer to declare an area to be an ‘emergency area’ if the size, nature or location of an emergency makes it necessary to ensure public safety. Once an emergency area has been declared, police may direct people on roads, footpaths or in open spaces to leave the area by the safest and shortest route.14 This power does not extend to directing a person to leave their own property.15

6.12     Strictly speaking, the relevant legislation does allow for a limited form of compulsory evacuation of areas threatened by fire, subject to the pecuniary interest exception. However, the pecuniary interest exception is so broad that it would be impractical for police or the CFA to enforce the compulsory evacuation of an area threatened by fire. There can be no question that the pecuniary interest exception encompasses a person who wishes to stay and defend their home against a bushfire.

6.13     Evacuation under section 31(3) of the CFA Act may be initiated by a member of Victoria Police, or by the Chief Officer of the CFA, any officer exercising the Chief Officer’s powers, or an officer in charge of a brigade, and is physically carried out by police.

6.14     The SERP provides that the decision to recommend that people evacuate rests with the control agency, in conjunction with police and other expert advice.16 Once a decision to recommend evacuation is made, police are responsible for carrying out the evacuation process.17 Under the SERP, it is the responsibility of Victoria Police emergency response coordinators to ensure that consideration is given to whether evacuation is necessary.18

6.15     The SERP notes that there are instances when evacuation may not be the best strategy. In the Manual, Appendix 5 in Part 8 contains advice on evacuation in wildfire emergencies.19 It summarises the fire agencies’ ‘stay or go’ position: that a decision to evacuate or to stay and fight must be made by the individual concerned, must be made well in advance and on the understanding that there should be no last-minute change of plan or attempt to evacuate in the face of a fire. Police are advised to declare an emergency area under section 36A of the Emergency Management Act only at the request or with the approval of the Incident Controller.

6.16     The provisions of the CFA Act and the Manual that cover evacuation during bushfires were synthesised in a letter from Assistant Commissioner Stephen Fontana of the Victoria Police, outlining emergency response arrangements for the 2008–09 bushfire season:

If and when a decision is made to evacuate, police have the responsibility to carry out that process.

The rights of people to stay and protect their homes must be recognised, as this in itself can be a sound strategy for surviving the passage of wildfire. Indeed, the presence of people prepared to fight for their homes may be all that is required in many cases to save those homes. This right of choice is preserved in the Country Fire Authority Act 1958, and also in the Country Fire Authority’s policy on evacuation during wildfire (see Appendix 5, Part 8 of the EMMV [Emergency Management Manual Victoria]). This policy has also been adopted by the DSE, which is responsible for fires on public land.

6.17     There are two current policies that govern the CFA’s approach to relocation or evacuation in bushfire emergencies, Evacuation During Wildfire and Advice to the Community Before and During Wildfire.²¹

6.18     The CFA’s policy Evacuation During Wildfire was first approved in its current form in 1995 and sets out the CFA’s position on evacuation.22

Box 6.1: Current CFA position on relocation during wildfire

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6.19     This current policy placed a greater emphasis on the role of households and individuals in understanding the bushfire risk and deciding whether to stay and defend their home or leave early than did the CFA’s earlier policy.24 The ‘paradigm shift’ represented by the adoption of this policy, away from an agency-centred approach towards the current community safety model, is discussed in Chapter 7.

6.20     The CFA’s companion policy Advice to the Community Before and During Wildfire provides direction for CFA personnel who in turn provide advice to the community before and during bushfires.25 This policy states:

CFA messages in relation to evacuation during wildfire are:

^•             The decision to leave the area or stay with their property during a wildfire is the responsibility of the individuals concerned and should be made well before the expected arrival of the fire front. The available research suggests that late evacuation by residents is a dangerous option.

^•             If a resident is away from home at the time of the fire they can legally be prevented from entering the fire area and can be prevented from returning to their residence.

^•             Victoria Police manages road access in and out of the fire area. While safety is the overriding concern every effort should be made to allow residents and landholders to reach their properties before the fire impacts and as soon as possible after the fire has passed.

6.21     CFA policy does not permit CFA personnel to advise residents as to whether they should choose to leave or, having made that choice, when they should do so. A guide for CFA personnel based on the policy Advice to the Community Before and During Wildfire states:

It is therefore very important that personnel do not make statements about whether a house could or should be defended by residents during a wildfire.

6.22     In relation to evacuation, the guide states:

 

6.23     Numerous arguments against compulsory evacuation were canvassed during the first block of hearings. Indeed, no party or witness seriously advanced the position that a policy of mass compulsory evacuation should be adopted in Victoria. Even so it is worthwhile setting out briefly the arguments against compulsory evacuation.

6.24     Mr Bruce Esplin, Emergency Services Commissioner, Mr Alan Rhodes, Manager Community Safety Research and Evacuation for the CFA, and Dr Sarah McCaffrey, Research Forester/Social Scientist with the US Department of Agriculture Forest Service, spoke of the possibility that, if people are evacuated and no fire or other emergency eventuates, they may not respond to future directions to evacuate: the ‘boy who cried wolf scenario’.29 It is accepted that repetitive false alarms may decrease response to warnings and directions to evacuate, although this is less likely if the basis of any false alarm is explained and understood.30

6.25     There is a concern that it may promote complacency rather than self-reliance, and residents would have less incentive to prepare their property for the risk of bushfire, in the same way that the ‘stay or go’ policy does.31 The Commission was not directed to any research bearing out this concern, although it was alluded to by Dr McCaffrey during her evidence.32

6.26     Another argument against compulsory evacuation is that people have a civil right to stay and defend their homes, and to risk their lives in doing so is their choice.33 The lay witnesses Dr John Ferguson of Buxton, Mr Peter Olorenshaw of Callignee, Mr John O’Neill of Steels Creek and Mr Peter Brown of St Andrews, each of whom had invested a great deal in their homes and property, were strong advocates of this position.34 Mr Olorenshaw’s evidence was typical:

6.27     The corollary of the civil rights argument is the likelihood of civil disobedience with an order to evacuate.36 For example, the lay witnesses Dr Ferguson and Mr O’Neill said in no uncertain terms that they would not have left their properties even if ordered to do so by police.37 The resources required to remove unwilling evacuees could be used to better effect in other ways, such as assisting others who do wish to leave.

6.28     On a more pragmatic level, it is said that if people are unable to stay and defend their homes the demands on the fire services would increase, and more houses would be lost.38 Mr O’Neill’s experience bore this out:

6.29     A further practical concern is that large-scale evacuations may create traffic congestion, endangering the lives of those travelling on the roads and hindering firefighting efforts.40

6.30     The Commission is satisfied that the pecuniary interest exception should be retained, and that compulsory evacuation should not be the policy of Victoria’s fire agencies. Despite this exception fire agencies maintain a responsibility to provide appropriate information to individuals to assist them with making the decision of when it is time to relocate. This responsibility exists regardless of whether or not those agencies have the authority to compel people to leave their homes. As the CFA’s policy Evacuation During Wildfire states:

 

6.31     Consistent with its policies the CFA did not recommend evacuation on 7 February. Warnings issued by the CFA that day contained generic advice for people to enact their bushfire survival plan, and about the dangers of leaving late. The CFA’s warnings did not contain specific advice to those who were planning to leave as to whether they should leave, within what time frame, or by what route.

6.32     Awareness messages posted to the CFA’s website on 7 February contained the following advice:

6.33     Some but not all awareness messages asked residents to ‘enact their Bushfire Survival Plans’.43

6.34     Alert messages posted to the CFA website advised:

6.35     The awareness and alert messages might have been interpreted as advice to those planning to leave that it was time to go. However, it was implicit in the urgent threat messages issued by the CFA on 7 February that safe departure was no longer possible:

6.36     Announcements advising people to ‘leave early’ were read repeatedly on 774 ABC Radio during the morning on 7 February:

6.37     This ‘leave early’ message was reinforced during interviews given by Mr Stuart Ord of the Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE) and Mr Esplin. Interviewed shortly before 11:00am, Mr Ord was asked whether it was too late for people in areas threatened by the Bunyip fire to leave. He responded:

6.38     Mr Esplin was also asked to explain what ‘leave early’ means:

6.39     There were isolated instances of specific advice to listeners in particular areas that, if they had decided to leave, they should leave immediately. At about 2:15pm, Mr Peter Lockwood, the Incident Controller for the Delburn fire, was interviewed about an urgent threat message issued for the Churchill fire.49 He advised those communities that might be affected by the fire ‘if they are to leave, they should leave now’.50 Mr Ord was quoted on the 4:00pm news, on the urgent threat messages issued for Wandong and Hidden Valley.51 He said:

6.40     Unfortunately, his advice given on 774 ABC Radio was not reflected in the warnings posted to the CFA website.53

6.41     The Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre (Bushfire CRC) Victorian 2009 Bushfire Research Response Interim Report explored the questions of whether people left, and if so when and why, in its Chapter 2 — Human Behaviour and Community Safety.54 The interim report noted:

6.42     Residents who left early enough to avoid encountering the dangers associated with a bushfire were triggered to leave by factors including extreme weather conditions, learning that fires had started, hearing radio announcements to activate fire plans, smelling or seeing distant smoke, being told to leave, and judging that the fires were too extreme to stay and defend.56 Residents who evacuated late did so for reasons including seeing others leave, losing confidence in their ability to stay and defend, and failure of attempts to defend.57 The Bushfire CRC’s interim report noted that many of those who attempted late relocations were aware of the dangers of doing so, but that people do not always react in a rational manner in high pressure situations: the flight instinct can be very powerful.58

6.43     The Commission heard evidence from a number of lay witnesses who left their homes, as to when and why they left when they did. The range of responses among lay witnesses was consistent with those recorded in the Bushfire CRC’s interim report. The evidence from lay witnesses was particularly informative as to how the ‘leave early’ message was received and understood by them.

6.44     One witness, Ms Jesse Odgers of Kinglake, explained that, as a sole parent, her plan was to leave early on a day of high fire danger.59 Having heard the weather forecast and the warning for 7 February, she took her daughters out of school at lunchtime on the Friday, and left Kinglake for Balnarring. Her house was destroyed in the fire. She testified that she would make the same decision again:

6.45     She was uncertain, however, how she would be able to continue to take time off work to implement her plan to leave early.61

6.46     The Spooner family of Strathewen, the Ananiev family of St Andrews, Ms Anastasia Scott of Marysville, Ms Alice Barber of Pheasant Creek, Mr David O’Halloran’s partner and children from Flowerdale and the Hainsworth family of Kinglake West all planned to leave rather than stay.62 They left when they learned of the fire, in some cases very late and, in the case of the Spooner family, tragically late. Others, such as Ms Hainsworth’s and Mr D O’Halloran’s families, received sufficient warning to be able to leave safely. Ms Karen Ward and her husband had planned to stay and defend their home at Mudgegonga, but left when they saw the fire and saw what they were facing.63

6.47     Mr D O’Halloran explained that it would take a genuine, credible threat of an actual fire to trigger their fire plan for his partner and children to leave.64 On the idea of leaving early on a day of high fire danger, he said, ‘It’s not quite practical to live life like that’ and ‘you can’t live life in that sort of mode of thought’.65 Ms Hainsworth made a similar observation, when explaining why the declaration of a day of Total Fire Ban would not trigger their plan to leave:

6.48     Perhaps this reluctance to leave home on a day of Total Fire Ban, in the absence of an actual fire, is a manifestation of the ‘cry wolf’ syndrome — a case of repeated false alarms decreasing response. In any event, it appears that the community has not wholeheartedly embraced the ‘leave early’ message. Many, if not most, people who plan to leave will not do so unless and until there is a bushfire in their area.

6.49     Mr Kieran Walshe, Deputy Commissioner of Victoria Police, was asked about evacuations carried out by police on 7 February. He said:

6.50     Mr Walshe gave a number of examples of evacuations facilitated by Victoria Police members:

n      The Salvation Army Rehabilitation Centre was located in a pine plantation in the Kilmore area. Sergeant Hesse from Kilmore crossed the Melbourne–Sydney railway line in his four wheel drive to reach the Centre and assisted the six residents to evacuate. He has since learned that the Centre was razed by fire within minutes of their departure.68

n      Senior Constable Caine of Kinglake and his partner, Leading Senior Constable Wood, attended the Pheasant Creek store sometime after 5:30pm, where about 100 people had gathered with approximately 60 vehicles. They were concerned that the store was a dangerous location due to the presence of petrol. The road to Kinglake had already been cut by fire. Leading Senior Constable Wood drove towards Kinglake West to ensure that the road was passable, while Senior Constable Caine stayed to marshal those present into their vehicles and directed them to Kinglake West. Senior Constable Caine requested a ride with the final vehicle to leave, and saw the fire crossing the road towards the store as they departed. Those at the store were evacuated to the Kinglake West CFA, which was being protected by the CFA.69 

n      Senior Constable Kemezys of Hurstbridge assisted a man to evacuate from a burning property on Jacksons Road, Strathewen at about 4:30pm. Their passage was blocked by fallen and burning trees. At another property in Jacksons Road Senior Constable Kemezys assisted a 12-year-old girl suffering severe burns, lifting her into the police vehicle and driving out to meet an ambulance.70

6.51     Mr Peter Olorenshaw, a serving member of Victoria Police, was on duty with the Latrobe Traffic Management Unit before he was released to return home to defend his property at Callignee. He gave evidence of a warning patrol conducted by him and his partner along Red Hill Road, west of the Mount Tassie ridge.71 He and his partner drove into about 30 properties along Red Hill Road, warning those still present of the approaching fire and asking whether they planned to stay or leave. If they were planning to leave, he advised them to leave straight away. If they were planning to stay, he took their details. Some older couples asked for advice as to whether they should stay or go, and Mr Olorenshaw gave them his subjective opinion that ‘if they were infirm or not capable of actively defending their property then they should leave’. The warning patrol ended when the emergency services were ordered to evacuate from the mountain.

6.52     Mr Walshe also told the Commission what he knew about the evacuation of Gallipoli Oval in Marysville. He said that Leading Senior Constable Hamill and two other police members evacuated approximately 200 people who had gathered at the oval, with about 60 cars, caravans and trailers. He advised the crowd that the fire was only minutes away and that it was necessary for them to evacuate. He directed everyone present to get into their cars and proceed to Alexandra Secondary College. An orderly convoy formed and the cars drove from the oval and out of Marysville, through Buxton and on to Alexandra.72 The Commission also heard evidence from Leading Senior Constable Ken Dwight, who is stationed at Woods Point and was one of the other police members who assisted with the evacuation of Gallipoli Oval.73 He and Senior Constable Peter Collyer were in one of the last vehicles to leave. Mr Dwight explained the decision to evacuate the oval:

6.53     Mr Daryl Hull watched the convoy leave Gallipoli Oval. Mr Hull chose not to join the convoy as he was not prepared to take the risk of driving out along the Buxton Road, because of concerns about driving into the fire, trees falling over the road and cars crashing in the general panic.75 However, he commented that ‘The convoy left in an orderly fashion, the police did a good job there’.76

6.54     Mr Dwight acknowledged the danger of a tree falling across the road, but was confident that he and the others in the convoy would have been able to move it.77 He said that the decision to evacuate the oval was the best option available:

6.55     These evacuations initiated by members of Victoria Police displayed initiative in the face of the approaching fire, notwithstanding that it was against all the advice about not leaving by car when fires approach. However, they knew the road to Buxton was open and that mitigated the risk otherwise involved.

6.56     The relocations about which the Commission has heard evidence were not examples of the system working to achieve timely and safe relocation of those who wished to leave. The police members concerned found themselves in situations where they were called on to make snap judgements on apparently limited information. While rendering assistance to others they were themselves at great risk.79

6.57     The unsystematic nature of the evacuation of Marysville has led one lay witness to question why some residents were evacuated while others were not.80 The same issue arises in relation to Long Gully in Bendigo, where police advised some but not all residents to evacuate the area.81

6.58     It is instructive to compare these late relocations in the face of looming danger with the timely relocation of Boolarra that took place on 30 January 2009. As described by Mr Lou Sigmund, the Group Officer of the CFA Morwell Group, fires had been burning near Boolarra since 28 January. A community meeting was held in Boolarra on the morning of 30 January 2009. People at the meeting asked when they should leave and the response from other CFA representatives was that they should ‘leave early’.

6.59     Mr Sigmund addressed the meeting, and said that ‘the town was in imminent danger of being overrun by the fire if the wind changed to the southwest and that the town would burn if this were to occur’. He said that people would not get a knock on the door telling them to evacuate. He told people wanting to leave that the preferred option was for them to leave town along the road to Churchill, which is a 20-minute drive from Boolarra. Mr Sigmund told the meeting that the Boolarra CFA would sound the siren when ember attacks began, and that would be the signal to leave town. The siren was sounded at around 1:15pm. A large number of people relocated from Boolarra. An orderly procession of cars, many towing caravans, boats and horse floats, drove out of Boolarra to Churchill. While 29 houses were destroyed in Boolarra that afternoon, no human lives were lost.82

 

6.60     In the Commission’s view, there must be recognition that the very general advice given by the CFA and others to ‘leave early’ has not achieved the desired result of people relocating. Evidence indicates many people whose fire plan is to leave will not do so unless there is a fire in their area. It is unrealistic to expect that people will leave their homes every time a day of Total Fire Ban is declared, when their experience is that this is rarely if ever necessary. Some more specific triggers to leave are required that will prompt people to leave when it is still safe to do so. The question of how to achieve this is answered in several ways.

6.61     As discussed in Chapter 5, part of the answer is to revise the fire danger index and the fire danger ratings. Another part of the answer is to provide people with clear advice, when warranted, that their fire plan should be to leave. There must be recognition that some houses are simply not defendable. Equally, there must be recognition that some people are not able to defend their houses, for reasons of age, disability or some other vulnerability. The CFA policy Advice to the Community Before and During Wildfire should be amended so that CFA personnel can recommend that particular households, communities or locations should plan to leave early, based on their assessment of the defendability of the household, community or location in question and the vulnerabilities of the people there.

6.62     The next part of the answer is that warnings issued by the fire agencies should include advice about leaving — a recommendation to relocate — whenever that is appropriate. The Commission recognises that late relocation is extremely dangerous. It is also clear that departure may be possible in certain circumstances when a fire is already burning, and be a safer option than remaining in extreme circumstances. For example, the time available may be adequate for safe departure providing exit roads are known to still be unaffected by the fires.

6.63     To illustrate, on 7 February the fire agencies knew that a south-westerly wind change was forecast for later in the day and that, once the wind changed, the eastern flank of the fire would become the firefront.83 Communities to the east of the path of fires would be under threat after the wind change. These communities included Kinglake and Flowerdale, to the east of the Kilmore East fire; Marysville, to the east of the Murrindindi fire; and Callignee, to the east of the Churchill fire. However, before the wind changed people could have left those communities safely to the north and east — indeed, many people did so. The threat to Kinglake and Flowerdale was recognised in the Kangaroo Ground Incident Control Centre as early as 2:40pm.84 Mr Andy Willans, the DSE fire observer on the Mount Gordon fire tower, had realised the threat to Marysville by 3:30pm.85 The threat to Loy Yang, to the north-east of Callignee, was known in the Integrated Emergency Coordination Centre by 3:00pm.86 The wind change impacted on those fires between 5:30pm and 7:30pm.87 Even on a day as deadly as 7 February, there was time enough to advise people in those communities that, if they were planning to leave, they should do so.

6.64     The Incident Management Team (IMT) — and specifically the Incident Controller for the fire — will have information required to assess whether people in particular locations should leave, if that is their choice. This information includes their existing knowledge of the area: its communities, its topography, locations of particular risk, its road infrastructure and any places of refuge. The IMT will also have information specific to the fire: its severity, its location, its spread, its predicted impact zone, and the weather conditions including any predicted wind change. This is all information that is necessary for the Incident Controller and the IMT to have in order to respond to the fire.88 With that information, the Incident Controller can identify the communities within the fire’s potential impact zone and the time at which the fire may impact on them.89 He or she can then assess whether it is safe for people in those communities to leave, in what time frame, and by what routes. The Incident Controller can also assess whether road blocks should be established to restrict access to areas that may be affected by fire. Having made these assessments, the Incident Controller, assisted by the IMT, can issue warnings that include advice that it is time to leave.

6.65     The protocols of the fire agencies and the relevant CFA policies should be amended to require the Incident Controller to assess whether relocation should be recommended and, if so, to include advice of that recommendation in warnings issued about the fire. Of course, the assessment made by the Incident Controller may be that it is unsafe to leave an area, or that it is unsafe to leave by a particular route. If such an assessment is made, the Incident Controller should include advice to that effect in warnings that are subsequently issued.

6.66     AFAC submitted that it was ‘impractical, unrealistic and unworkable’ to impose such an ‘onerous’ requirement on a single person in a response organisation.90 The Commission disagrees and puts the alternate view that there is no-one better placed to make these assessments than the Incident Controller, properly supported by a competent and well-trained IMT. Incident Controllers are already required to decide what warnings should be issued, and whether and where road blocks should be established. These decisions are based on the same information that is required to assess whether relocation should be recommended, information that is available to the Incident Controller, and which is not readily available to the public.

6.67     In making these recommendations the Commission recognises that it will not always be possible for fire agencies to give timely advice to those who plan to leave. Education of the community to ‘stay or go’ should continue to emphasise the importance of preparation, in case leaving is not possible, along with the dangers of late departure. Fire agencies should continue to educate those living in areas at risk of bushfire that they may not always receive a warning of an approaching fire. Where possible, advice on relocation should be given.

 

The CFA amend its policy Advice to the Community Before and During Wildfire to enable trained CFA personnel to recommend to particular households, communities or locations that they plan to leave early, based on an assessment of defendability, the vulnerabilities of the people there, and the degree of ease with which people are able to leave the area in relative safety.

 

The CFA and DSE amend operational policies to require the Incident Controller to assess whether relocation should occur and to recommend relocation when warranted.

 

proposed Responsibility for carrying out RELOCation

6.68     As discussed in setting out the legal and policy framework for relocation, Victoria Police is responsible for carrying out any recommended evacuation under both section 31 of the CFA Act and under the SERP.

6.69     Warnings should be delivered by the various modes for dissemination of bushfire warnings discussed in Chapter 4, including radio broadcasts, the single agency bushfire information website, the Victorian Bushfire Information Line and, when it commences operation, the national telephone emergency warning system. It is anticipated that in most cases people affected will leave using their own vehicles.

6.70     The police should continue to have responsibility for carrying out relocations recommended by an Incident Controller. There are likely to be instances in the future where it may be appropriate to deliver relocation advice to specific locations, as occurred in some instances on 7 February. There is a particular role for police in facilitating the relocation of people in places such as hospitals, aged care facilities, and other institutions, of which the relocation of the residents of the Salvation Army Rehabilitation Centre in Kilmore is a good example.91

Deciding where to RELOCate

6.71     One of the concerns the State raised about mass evacuation was the need for decisions to be made about where people, their possessions and their animals would go, and how they would be accommodated during the period of their evacuation.92 The evidence heard by the Commission from those who left their homes on 7 February is that almost everyone made their own arrangements. Most people stayed with family or friends, some went to hotels, relatively few went to emergency relief centres.93 The same pattern emerged for those people who had to leave after their homes were destroyed by fire.94 This is consistent with the experience in the United States where, according to Dr McCaffrey, the majority of those who evacuate drive out of the area themselves and stay with friends or family or in hotels.95 Dr McCaffrey estimated that only 10–15 per cent of evacuees used designated sites.96

6.72     Further designation of ‘neighbourhood safer places’ as proposed by the State would provide sites of temporary protection from fire.97 In addition, some residents will make private ‘crisis refuge’ plans for temporary relocation to a safer place as discussed in Chapter 8.

6.73     The evidence indicates that implementation of these recommendations will not result in increased numbers of people seeking shelter at emergency relief centres. However, Municipal Emergency Management Plans prepared by councils are required to designate emergency relief centres in the municipality, and these emergency relief centres should have facilities for sheltering, feeding and personal hygiene for emergency-affected people and their pets.98 As a precautionary measure, councils should review their Municipal Emergency Management Plans before the next fire season, to ensure that they make appropriate provision for relocation during bushfires.

 

Municipal councils review their Municipal Emergency Management Plans to ensure there is appropriate provision for relocation during bushfires, in particular, to indicate the location and arrangements associated with designated emergency relief centres.

 

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[1]     Exhibit 44 – Statement of Munns (WIT.3004.001.0065) [13]; Munns T1374:12–T1374:19. See also Exhibit 101 – Statement of Rhodes (WIT.3004.002.0001) [275]; Exhibit 106 – Statement of McCaffrey (WIT.038.001.0001) [34]

[2]     Exhibit 16 – Statement of Haynes (WIT.001.001.0001) [25(ii)]

[3]     Exhibit 49 – Statement of P O’Halloran, Attachment 1 (WIT.3010.001.0007) at 0007. The circumstances in which each person died will be the subject of more detailed investigation in future hearings.

[4]     Exhibit 49 – Statement of P O’Halloran, Attachment 1 (WIT.3010.001.0007) at 0007. Of the 173 people whose deaths were attributed to the fires on 7 February 2009, 113 were found in houses.

[5]     Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 2 (WIT.005.001.0123)

[6]     Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 2 (WIT.005.001.0123) at 0184

[7]     Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 2 (WIT.005.001.0123) at 0184

[8]     AFAC (SUBM.100.002.0001) [28]

[9]     State of Victoria (SUBM.100.005.0001) [69]

[10]   AFAC (SUBM.100.002.0001) [28]

[11]   Emergency Management Act 1986, s. 24

[12]   A State of Disaster can be declared under s. 23 of the Emergency Management Act 1986. A State of Disaster was not declared on 7 February. Power to compel evacuation can be found under s. 24(2)(e) of the Emergency Management Act 1986.

[13]   Emergency Management Act 1986, s. 24(7)

[14]   Emergency Management Act 1986, s. 36B(1)(c)

[15]   Emergency Management Act 1986, s. 36B(2). There is no evidence that police made any declaration of an emergency area on 7 February.

[16]   The SERP is Part 3 of the Manual; see Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 2 (WIT.005.001.0123) at 0184. The provisions of the SERP that relate to evacuation are discussed in Chapter 10.

[17]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 2 (WIT.005.001.0123) at 0184

[18]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 2 (WIT.005.001.0123) at 0176

[19]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 2 (WIT.005.001.0123) at 0442–0443

[20]   Exhibit 66 – Statement of Collins, Attachment 1 (WIT.3010.001.0025) at 0036

[21]   Exhibit 101 – Statement of Rhodes, Attachments (WIT.3004.003.0049); Attachment (WIT.3004.002.0864)

[22]   Exhibit 101 – Statement of Rhodes (WIT.3004.002.0001) [85]; Attachment (WIT.3004.003.0049) at 0049

[23]   Exhibit 101 – Statement of Rhodes, Attachment (WIT.3004.003.0049)

[24]   Exhibit 101 – Statement of Rhodes (WIT.3004.002.0001) [87]–[88]

[25]   Exhibit 101 – Statement of Rhodes, Attachment (WIT.3004.002.0864)

[26]   Exhibit 101 – Statement of Rhodes, Attachment (WIT.3004.002.0864) at 0867

[27]   Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees, Annexure 6 (WIT.004.001.0238) at 0241

[28]   Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees, Annexure 6 (WIT.004.001.0238) at 0240

[29]   State of Victoria (SUBM.100.005.0001) [71(f)]; Esplin T377:12–T377:24; Exhibit 101 – Statement of Rhodes (WIT.3004.002.0001) [292(c)]; Rhodes T3326:1–T3326:4; Exhibit 106 – Statement of McCaffrey (WIT.038.001.0001) [38]; McCaffrey T3455:16–T3455:29

[30]   Exhibit 102 – Rhodes Tender, Hazard Warning Systems: Review of 20 Years of Progress (TEN.036.001.0001) at 0003

[31]   Esplin T381:30–T383:4; Exhibit 106 – Statement of McCaffrey (WIT.038.001.0001) [36]–[37]; McCaffrey T3453:14–T3453:28; Exhibit 101 – Statement of Rhodes (WIT.3004.002.0001) [290]; Rhodes T3363:18–T3364:9; Nicholson T4492:14–T4492:27; State of Victoria (SUBM.100.005.0001) [71(e)–(f)]

[32]   McCaffrey T3453:14–T3453:21

[33]   Exhibit 120 – Evacuation in Wildfires: The Australian Experience (TEN.038.001.0010) at 0011; Volunteer Fire Brigades Inc (SUBM.100.004.0001) [104]

[34]   Ferguson T955:17–T955:21; Olorenshaw T1901:20–T1901:27; Exhibit 97 – Statement of O’Neill (WIT.047.001.0001_R) [36]; O’Neill T3211:26–T3212:16; P Brown T3547:31–T3548:3

[35]   Olorenshaw T1901:20–T1901:27

[36]   Exhibit 101 – Statement of Rhodes (WIT.3004.002.0001) [292(g)]; Exhibit 106 – Statement of McCaffrey (WIT.038.001.0001) [38]; Exhibit 133 – Statement of Nicholson, Attachment 11 (WIT.056.001.0286) at 0289

[37]   Ferguson T955:17–T955:21; O’Neill T3212:8–T3212:14

[38]   Exhibit 101 – Statement of Rhodes (WIT.3004.002.0001) [290], [292(f)]; Volunteer Fire Brigades Inc (SUBM.100.004.0001) [99]–[102]

[39]   Exhibit 97 – Statement of O’Neill (WIT.047.001.0001_R) [36]

[40]   Esplin T535:1–T535:5; T545:10–T546:6; Exhibit 101 – Statement of Rhodes (WIT.3004.002.0001) [290], [292(a)]; Exhibit 106 – Statement of McCaffrey (WIT.038.001.0001) [35]; State of Victoria (SUBM.100.005.0001) [71(d)]

[41]   Exhibit 101 – Statement of Rhodes (WIT.3004.002.0001) at 0049

[42]   Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees, Attachment 31 (WIT.004.001.0509), for example awareness message for Saunders Rd, Kilmore East Fire at 0515, awareness message for Bunyip Ridge Fire at 0520

[43]   Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees, Attachment 31 (WIT.004.001.0509), for example awareness message for Camperdown–Danedite Road Fire at 0532

[44]   Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees, Attachment 31 (WIT.004.001.0509), for example alert message for Bunyip Ridge Fire at 0544

[45]   Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees, Attachment 31 (WIT.004.001.0509), for example urgent threat message for Murrindindi Mill Fire at 0567–0568

[46]   Exhibit 7 – 774 ABC Radio Transcript (SUMM.001.002.0001) at 0012, 0049, 0072, 0122, 0186

[47]   Exhibit 7 – 774 ABC Radio Transcript (SUMM.001.002.0001) at 0138

[48]   Exhibit 7 – 774 ABC Radio Transcript (SUMM.001.002.0001) at 0155

[49]   See Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees, Attachment 31 (WIT.004.001.0509) at 0528, urgent threat message, Churchill–Glendonald Road Fire for communities of Hazelwood South, Jeeralang, Jeeralang North, Jeeralang Junction

[50]   Exhibit 7 – 774 ABC Radio Transcript (SUMM.001.002.0001) at 0232

[51]   Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees, Attachment 31 (WIT.004.001.0509) at 0546, urgent threat message, Kilmore East Fire, for communities of Hidden Valley, Wandong, Heathcote Junction and Upper Plenty

[52]   Exhibit 7 – 774 ABC Radio Transcript (SUMM.001.002.0001) at 0296

[53]   Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees, Annexure 31 (WIT.004.001.0509)

[54]   Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R)

[55]   Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0104

[56]   Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0104

[57]   Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0105

[58]   Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0105

[59]   Exhibit 10 – Statement of Odgers (WIT.008.001.0001_R) [6]–[7]; Odgers T190:8–T190:12; Odgers T190:26–T190:29

[60]   Exhibit 10 – Statement of Odgers (WIT.008.001.0001_R) [30]

[61]   Exhibit 10 – Statement of Odgers (WIT.008.001.0001_R) [32]

[62]   Exhibit 17 – Statement of Spooner (WIT.011.001.0001_R) [10]; Exhibit 87 – Statement of Ananiev (WIT.040.001.0001_R) [6]; Exhibit 91 – Statement of Scott (WIT.045.001.0001_R) [7]; Exhibit 103 – Statement of Barber (WIT.046.001.0001_R) [12]; Exhibit 114 – Statement of D O’Halloran (WIT.058.001.0001_R) [7]; Exhibit 134 – Statement of Hainsworth (WIT.059.001.0001_R) [9]

[63]   Exhibit 121 – Statement of Ward (WIT.052.001.0001_R) [11]–[12], [24]

[64]   D O’Halloran T3681:22–T3682:25; T3717:15–T3718:25

[65]   D O’Halloran T3682:9–T3682:10; T3717:31–T3718:1

[66]   Hainsworth T4533:19–T4533:22

[67]   Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe (WIT.003.002.0001) [124]

[68]   Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe (WIT.003.002.0001) [131]–[132]; Walshe T657:25–T658:5

[69]   Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe (WIT.003.002.0001) [138]–[139]; Walshe T658:23–T659:9

[70]   Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe (WIT.003.002.0001) [140]–[142]; Walshe T659:10–T660:10

[71]   Exhibit 61 – Statement of Olorenshaw (WIT.034.001.0001_R) [23]–[28]; Olorenshaw T1877:1–T1879:6

[72]   Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe (WIT.003.002.0001) [134]–[137]; Walshe T658:6–T658:22

[73]   Exhibit 64 – Statement of Dwight (WIT.037.001.0001_R) [40]–[50]; Dwight T2067:19–T2072:22

[74]   Dwight T2068:10–T2068:22

[75]   Exhibit 39 – Statement of Hull (WIT.030.001.0001_R) [14]. Mr Hull took shelter in the lake next to the oval during the passage of the firefront.

[76]   Exhibit 39 – Statement of Hull (WIT.030.001.0001_R) [15]

[77]   Dwight T2076:23–T2077:3

[78]   Dwight T2077:6–T2077:11

[79]   Walshe T660:10–T660:31

[80]   Exhibit 91 – Statement of Scott (WIT.045.001.0001_R) [30]; Scott T2927:6–T2927:12

[81]   Compare Exhibit 70 – Statement of Casey (WIT.035.001.0001_R) [7] with Exhibit 34 – Statement of Kane (WIT.017.001.0001_R) [9]–[10], [13(2)]; Kane T1057:2–T1057:8

[82]   Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund (WIT.020.001.0001); Sigmund T893:4–T909:31

[83]   Waller T109:11–T110:11; Rees T2505:13–T2507:2; Exhibit 22 – Statement of M Williams, Annexure 1 (WIT.013.001.0012) at 0073

[84]   Exhibit 107 – Statement of Barca (WIT.3026.001.0001) [35]; Barca T3471:2–T3471:14; Exhibit 44 – Statement of Munns (WIT.3004.001.0065) [32]; Munns T1356:4–T1357:9; Exhibit 115 – Statement of Cowan (WIT.3004.009.0001) [17]

[85]   Willans T3035:15–T3036:8

[86]   Exhibit 66 – Collins Tender (SERO Log) (TEN.020.003.0001) at 0003; Collins T2175:16–T2176:14

[87]   Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) [359]–[360]. For further detail on the impact of the wind change, see Chapter 1.

[88]   See for example Exhibit 42 – Statement of Kreltszheim (WIT.3004.001.0032) [21]–[22]; Exhibit 50 – Statement of Lawrence (WIT.3004.001.0197) [16], [20], [25]; Exhibit 107 – Statement of Barca (WIT.3026.001.0001) [27]–[22], [33]–[36]

[89]   Exhibit 42 – Statement of Kreltszheim (WIT.3004.001.0032) [22], [26], [29]; Exhibit 50 – Statement of Lawrence (WIT.3004.001.0197) [16]–[20]; Exhibit 107 – Statement of Barca (WIT.3026.001.0001) [34]

[90]   AFAC (SUBM.100.002.0001) [26]

[91]   See paragraph 6.50

[92]   State of Victoria (SUBM.100.005.0001) [71(c)]

[93]   Exhibit 10 – Statement of Odgers (WIT.008.001.0001_R) [6]; Odgers T193:24; Exhibit 39 – Statement of Hull (WIT.030.001.0001_R) [24]; Exhibit 70 – Statement of Casey (WIT.035.001.0001_R) [8]; Casey T2358:5–T3259:13; Exhibit 73 – Statement of McCulloch (WIT.043.001.0001_R) [18]; McCulloch T2451:14–T2452:1; Exhibit 87 – Statement of Ananiev (WIT.040.001.0001_R) [22]; Exhibit 91 – Statement of Scott (WIT.045.001.0001_R) [18]; Scott T2925:31–T2926:18; Exhibit 114 – Statement of D O’Halloran (WIT.058.001.0001_R) [22]; D O’Halloran T3690:9–T3690:13; Exhibit 121 – Statement of Ward (WIT.052.001.0001_R) [30]; Exhibit 134 – Statement of Hainsworth (WIT.059.001.0001_R) [32]; Hainsworth T4540:14

[94]   Exhibit 46 – Statement of Gobbett (WIT.026.001.0001_R) [14]; Gobbett T1500:2–T1500:7; Exhibit 61 – Statement of Olorenshaw (WIT.034.001.0001_R) [109]; Olorenshaw T1898:20–T1898:29; Exhibit 108 – Statement of P Brown (WIT.053.001.0001_R) [40]; P Brown T3525:15–T3525:30 (WIT.034.001.0001_R) [109]; Olorenshaw T1898:20–T1898:29; Exhibit 108 – Statement of P Brown (WIT.053.001.0001_R) [40]; P Brown T3525:15–T3525:30

[95]   Exhibit 106 – Statement of McCaffrey (WIT.038.001.0001) [33]; Attachment F (WIT.038.001.0132) at 0135; McCaffrey T3424:3–T3425:5

[96]   Exhibit 106 – Statement of McCaffrey (WIT.038.001.0001) [33]; McCaffrey T3425:8–T3425:15

[97]   Details of the State’s proposal is at State of Victoria (RESP.3000.001.0001) [15]–[20]

[98]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 2 (WIT.005.001.0123) at 0315–0317