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2 ENGAGING COMMUNITIES

From the outset the Commission saw its interaction with all Victorians, and in particular those affected by the fires, as a vital cornerstone of its investigation into the fires. This chapter begins with a brief overview of the full range of initiatives implemented by the Commission to engage with the community. It then moves to the primary focus of this chapter — a detailed account of the community consultations held in March and April 2009 and a summary of the issues raised. The chapter concludes with a brief account of the involvement of lay witnesses in the first round of public hearings.

Communicating with the Commission

2.1 Initial interaction with the community began through avenues such as the offices of the Premier, the Governor-General, the Victorian Attorney-General, the Prime Minister, the Department of Premier and Cabinet, the Department of Justice, Members of Parliament (federal and state), the Supreme Court of Victoria and local municipalities. A broad array of material was received by the Commission either directly or through referral, including:

• offers for services (pro bono and paid)

• personal accounts of the fires

• complaints about how the emergency services responded to the fire

• submissions to the Commission

• copies of academic publications, books, research papers and previous reports

• enquiries about how the Commission could provide support to individuals affected by the fires.

2.2 Processes to manage the initial contacts were put in place by the Commission Secretariat. A toll free 1800 number was provided as an enquiry line, an email enquiry address commenced operation on 24 February 2009, and the Commission website was launched on 16 March.1

2.3 Commission staff responded to initial contacts by phone, email or post, and, where appropriate, provided contact details for other agencies providing bushfire assistance. These agencies included the Victorian Bushfire Reconstruction and Recovery Authority, the Victorian Bushfire Case Management Service and Bushfire Legal Help.2 In addition, a process for the lodgement of formal submissions to the Commission
was advertised and commenced operation in March (Chapter 3).

Consultations in Fire-affected Communities

2.4 The Commission’s first priority was to meet with and listen to people from those communities directly affected by the fires. Between 18 March and 9 April the Commission held community consultations in fire-affected locations. The community consultations were an important foundation for the work of the Commission. Beginning its work in bushfire-affected communities enabled the Commission to hear first-hand about people’s experiences, and gain valuable insights into how individuals and communities responded to current bushfire-related policies and programs. The community consultation process is outlined in paragraphs 2.14–2.31.

Communication Facilitated by the Commission

2.5 The Commission website, launched in March, provided information about the Commission and its processes, including the community consultations, the submissions process and how to view submissions, the role of the public hearings and their dates and times, and a media centre. During the hearings interested people were able to view the transcripts on the Commission website from the following day.

2.6 Also, to maximise immediate access to its work, the Commission provided live web-streaming of the hearings. This proved to be extremely popular. During the first block of hearings, more than 5700 people logged in to watch, including approximately 100 ‘unique browsers’ watching from outside Australia. A lower-bandwidth audio-only option was also provided early in the hearings, which increased in popularity. Approximately 80 per cent of those listening to or watching the hearings were from Melbourne and about 10 per cent were from Sydney. The overseas viewers resided in countries such as the United States, New Zealand, China, Thailand, Singapore, Canada and the United Kingdom.

2.7 Libraries throughout Victoria (including the State Library of Victoria) made facilities available for people to view or listen to the live streaming and to access and download transcripts from the hearings. This assisted the Commission in its commitment to providing an open and accessible process for fire-affected communities and the wider Victorian community. The Commission thanks the State Library and all the other libraries for helping to make the hearings accessible to a wider audience.

Lay Witnesses to the commission

2.8 Following the community consultations, the Commission interviewed a substantial number of people
directly affected by the fires. Many of these people agreed to appear as lay witnesses in the hearings.
These witnesses provided an invaluable and unique perspective on what took place during the January
and February fires and the impact of those fires. Many provided harrowing details of their experiences.
The Commissioners commend these witnesses for being willing to provide their testimony to assist with
the Commission’s deliberations. More information on lay witnesses is provided at paragraphs 2.77–2.90.

Written Submissions

2.9 From 18 March, submissions were invited from any person or organisation with information relevant to at least one of the Commission’s terms of reference. Over 1260 submissions were received by 18 May, the cut-off date for submissions to be considered for the interim report. Submissions continue to be received and will be considered as part of the Commission’s further work.

2.10 The Commission received submissions from across Victoria, the rest of Australia and overseas. The content of these submissions is discussed in Chapter 3.

2.11 These submissions have assisted the Commission in a range of ways, by:

• providing a pool of valuable resources from which to scope topics to be considered by the inquiry

• drawing attention to individuals or organisations with expertise relevant to the inquiry

• providing insights into complex technical issues

• identifying people who may wish to give evidence before the Commission as lay witnesses

• illustrating the wide range of opinion on some matters

• alerting the Commission to research that has been undertaken or technology that is already available.

2.12 Chapter 3 of this report provides more detailed information about the important role the submissions have played, and will continue to play, in the Commission’s investigations.

2.13 The Commission extends its appreciation to all who have contributed written submissions.

Fire-Affected Community Consultations

Box 2.1: Standard greeting at community consultations

Why are we here? Why are you here? What do we hope to achieve?

We are here to listen to what you choose to tell us about the fires and their impact. We would like to hear your stories and your views on what we can learn from them and what you think matters most.

We are not taking evidence. This is not that sort of process. That will happen later when the formal hearings begin.

The Royal Commission has extremely wide terms of reference. You have a copy of them on the tables.
There are many issues we could investigate. We seek your views on the critical issues and the priority
we should attribute to them.

Purpose of these consultations

2.14 These were the introductory words spoken by the Commission Chairperson, Bernard Teague, at each
of the community consultations conducted by the Commission over 22 days in March and April (Box 2.1). Twenty-six separate consultation sessions occurred in 14 fire-affected communities across Victoria.
Over 1250 people attended the sessions (Table 2.1).

2.15 As indicated by the Chairperson, the purpose of the consultations was to gather early and immediate information about the impact of the bushfires and to hear directly from the individuals affected.

2.16 It was explained that the forums were not formal Commission hearings and the information obtained would not be viewed as evidence. Rather, the participants’ experiences represented important qualitative insights into what happened and why. The Commissioners were seeking assistance to identify key issues for further research and investigation, before any formal hearings began. Participants’ experiences would also influence the priority issues for attention in the Commission’s interim and final reports.

2.17 Over the four weeks of consultations it became apparent that they also provided other benefits. In a number of cases the consultations represented one of the first opportunities for some people to come together and discuss what might be the future of their communities in the aftermath of the fires. In many instances participants met others for the first time, exchanged contact details and discussed how they could remain connected and continue working together on recovery. This process also helped some to articulate their feelings about the fire and, therefore, assisted in the healing process. The impact upon individual recovery and the drawing together of communities were important outcomes of the discussions.

2.18 The Commissioners gratefully thank the people who participated in the community consultations. It was a privilege to be allowed into these communities to hear first-hand accounts of their difficult experiences and losses. Amongst feelings of utter devastation, each community demonstrated generosity and dignity in sharing their experiences with the Commission. This personal reference point underscored the importance of the Commission’s work as it entered into the more formal processes.

Method of Consultations

2.19 It was not possible for the Commission to hold consultations in all communities affected by the fires. Accordingly the consultations were held in the 14 most affected communities (Table 2.1). Potential participants were informed of the consultations by state-wide media advertisements and other local posters and publicity. Local government personnel also advised community members of the forthcoming sessions. Only members of the affected communities were invited to register and participate. In most communities, participants had a choice between two forums held at different times on the same day.

2.20 Each consultation was chaired by a professional facilitator, and all followed a common agenda and process. The intention was to create a safe atmosphere and a simple, straightforward format that would enable participants to speak frankly among themselves, in the presence of the Commissioners. The sessions were not open to anyone outside the community, including the media. Many media representatives chose to attend the opening of each session and to speak with participants during breaks. This arrangement retained the integrity of the process but enabled media representatives to gather personal stories from those willing to share them publicly.

Table 2.1: Schedule of community consultations, March–April 2009

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2.21 In table-based discussions people were invited to respond to three specific questions:

• What was the impact of the bushfires on your community?

• What worked well to prepare your community?

• What didn’t work well in your community, and what should be done differently?

2.22 The facilitator requested that the small groups at each table be self-managing, and that they appoint a person to report back on their conversation to the whole group. There were three suggested ground rules: respect each other’s views; say if you disagree; and, outside of the forum, do not attribute comments or views to those who expressed them. People were asked to contribute as individuals, not as representatives of any particular body or organisation.

2.23 During the table-based discussions the Commissioners moved from table to table, listening to the different conversations. A Commission staff member was assigned to each table to take notes of the conversations.

2.24 At the conclusion of each session there was a plenary discussion, with table spokespersons reporting their responses back to the full forum, followed by an opportunity for general discussion. This plenary discussion was video recorded, for later reference by the Commission, and the facilitator or a scribe also recorded a summary of the major points made during the plenary discussion.

2.25 In some consultations, in which the numbers were small enough, the entire process was conducted
in plenary, without table-based discussions. On these occasions the same three questions were used.

2.26 The sessions typically ran for one and a half hours. They each concluded with the Commissioners thanking people and indicating other ways in which they could engage with the work of the Commission if they wished. Each consultation included a morning tea, light lunch or afternoon tea as a further opportunity for Commissioners to speak with the community members in an informal manner.

2.27 Following the visit to each community, a brief summary of the major themes emerging from the consultation(s) was forwarded to participants and posted on the Commission website.

Recording the narratives

2.28 The record of each consultation was a summary of notes taken by Commission staff, the facilitator/scribe and the Commissioners, and the video of the plenary comments. The informal records did not attribute comments to particular people. The video-recording was for the Commission’s internal use only.

2.29 While common themes emerged across the fire-affected communities, each had distinctive features. The details of emphasis and perspective, even dissent, were sometimes quite marked. Further, within communities, many opposing views were expressed, often with equal emphasis. For example, there were as many people who spoke positively about the protective nature of brick homes over weatherboard constructions as those who were critical of the number of brick homes that seemingly exploded or imploded. While this chapter focuses primarily on the commonality of issues and views, it does so noting the diverse perspectives held to varying degrees within and across communities.

2.30 The first question that people were asked to address concerned the impact of the fires on their own lives and that of their communities. Here the Commission heard stories of people, families and whole communities torn apart by the random and unpredictable nature of the fires and the devastation they caused. People spoke of loss of lives, livelihoods, property, stock, houses, community infrastructure and the community itself, along with experiences of dislocation and population depletion, disruption to schooling and childcare, and upheaval at every level.

2.31 This chapter does not attempt to capture or record the grief, devastation and trauma of the people, as commitments were given that unfiltered emotion could be expressed without fear of attribution. Their experiences were nonetheless powerfully expressed and compassionately received by the Commission.

The key issues raised in consultations

2.32 The Commission analysed the key themes emerging from the discussions. The plenary notes from the consultations, and the notes taken by the facilitator/scribe, Commissioners and Commission staff were collated and summarised. Some 60 issues were discussed in response to the following questions:

• What worked well to prepare your community?

• What didn’t work well in your community, and what should be done differently?

2.33 The responses from these questions were categorised and then grouped into these themes:

• communications and warnings

• community preparedness

• fuel reduction

• emergency management and coordination

• recovery efforts

• buildings and infrastructure.

The balance of this chapter is organised around these headings.

2.34 As described in paragraph 2.28, the Commission sought to capture the reactions and opinions of participants using scribes and a video-recording of the plenary session. The subsequent exercise of writing reports of each consultation, for posting on the Commission website, enabled summary and analysis to occur close to the event. What is represented in the graphs below is illustrative of issues raised across the 14 communities. The graphs do not purport to be based on a technical analysis of issues.

2.35 A number of quotations are included in this chapter to illustrate the general themes and issues raised. These are not quotations from the community consultations themselves, as the Commissioners made a commitment to listen to the stories of fire-affected individuals in a safe, local environment where they could speak frankly and without attribution. Rather, the quotations are drawn from the testimony of lay witnesses who spoke publicly before the Commission in the first round of formal hearings. The quotations illustrate the key issues raised at the consultations.

Communication and warnings

Figure 2.1: Communication and warnings

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2.36 All but one community (Horsham) reported severe communication difficulties and frustration about the failure of essential systems. People spoke of clogged mobile systems and of uneven coverage, the long delays or lack of success in getting through to Triple Zero, and of internet and landline phone outages. In some communities, such as Flowerdale, participants said that unreliable and inadequate power supply and phone coverage (mobile and landline) had been a longstanding grievance.

Lay witnesses Mrs Carol Matthews of St Andrews and Ms Karen Ward of Mudgegonga described similar experiences:

It was just ringing, ringing, ringing. Just couldn’t get through.3

The phone lines in Mudgegonga are old copper … when we had dial up it could take a week to download anything, so we went to satellite which was practically no better, and on a hot day like that, and with so many people accessing it, we would never have been able to get onto the computer and have a look at the CFA websites.4

2.37 There were varied views on the effectiveness of 774 ABC Radio. Some community members spoke of
the ABC’s exceptional service while others, particularly in Strathewen, St Andrews, Dixons Creek and
Chum Creek, were aggrieved that information about their area was not aired until well after the firefront
had passed. At several consultations, the naming of the fires by 774 ABC Radio was reported as exacerbating misinformation and confusion. Examples included the St Andrews fires being referred to as Kilmore East; Steels Creek referred to as Murrindindi; and Boolarra referred to as Delburn (Murrindindi and Delburn being districts, not specific locations). However, it is important to note that fires are not named by the ABC and they only report the information as provided by the fire authorities.

2.38 Common to most assessments were expressions of frustration that the ABC did not provide ‘real-time’ information about the location or direction of the fires, with the time lag for some communities being up to three hours. Nonetheless, these criticisms were often accompanied by statements about the ABC information being only as reliable and current as that which was provided to it.

Mr Denis Spooner of Strathewen, Mr David O’Halloran of Flowerdale and Mr Peter Brown of St Andrews spoke of the time lag problems as follows:

No mention was made of Strathewen, St Andrews, until an hour after the places had been burnt out.5

Flowerdale apparently got one warning, which I didn’t hear, but they got one warning and one warning only, and by the time there was a second warning, I’m told, which was around 9 o’clock, it was all over.6

On reflection, I regret relying on the ABC to the extent that I did. It gave me the impression that we had more time before the fire front arrived than we had in reality.7

2.39 Most people with access to Country Fire Authority (CFA) scanners found them to be an invaluable mechanism for staying informed. Conversely, the CFA website was criticised. Those who retained internet access reported significant inaccuracies and time lags in the website information.

Mr David Brown of Strathewen confirmed this:

People who had access to the CFA scanner knew pretty much by sort of 3:30[pm] that Strathewen and
St Andrews were in the firing line, as opposed to sort of a lot of us who were relying on [ABC Radio] 774.8

2.40 Most communities reported that the only warnings of any force were those delivered by the government and the media in the week prior to 7 February, though many conceded that these warnings did not awaken them to the extent of the risk. Many communities suggested that the Fire Danger Index used by the CFA, and other authorities, ought to be adopted and communicated to the public as a standard measure for all communities.

Mr Illiya Ananiev of St Andrews supported this:

All we are looking for is a category 1, 2, 3 or 5, and maybe a colour, red, yellow, green, to mix in with it.9

2.41 A final issue pertains to warning sirens. A recurring suggestion was that the sirens used by the CFA in
some communities to gather its members ought to be upgraded with stronger and varying warning tones for the benefit of the whole community. Some people suggested that such a system could be similar to the hurricane/cyclone warning systems used in Australia’s north.

The evidence of Dr Lachlan Fraser of Marysville illustrates similar concerns raised about warning tones:

It [the siren] certainly wasn’t the wail that we are accustomed to when there’s a fire at other times of the year, so to me that didn’t indicate that there was a fire in our local area that the siren was sounding about.10

Community preparedness

Figure 2.2: Factors affecting community preparedness: individual and local preparations

Figure 2-2 Factors affecting community preparedness-individual and local preparations.jpg

2.42 Many discussions about preparedness were prefaced by expressions of futility. The ferocity and speed of the fires left many feeling helpless and many of those who believed they were ‘fire ready’ were overwhelmed by what transpired.

Mr Bevan Gobbett of Clonbinane reflected similar views in his evidence:

You could have put a hundred fire tankers and Elvis in front of my house that day and you would have killed a hundred fire tankers and Elvis.11

2.43 There was general consensus that individuals have primary responsibility for preparing their own properties for bushfire threats. Many people stated that this involved minimising fuel levels around homes, preparing fire plans, testing and maintaining pumps and ensuring that hoses and hose fittings were fire resistant.

2.44 Frustration was expressed in some communities about too few green waste and hard rubbish collections; restrictive council regulations about burn-offs and tree clearance; and neighbours who gave little or no attention to reducing fuel loads on their properties.

As supported by Mr Ananiev:

The CFA is trying to do the right thing, saying yes, make it safe, but the council won’t let you.12

2.45 Local CFA information sessions focusing on fire behaviour, fire plans and basic firefighting strategies were praised. Of concern, however, was the poor attendance at these sessions. Many people suggested that
the programs could be strengthened by:

• more regular scheduling

• stronger promotion, targeted at new people moving into fire-prone areas

• providing more comprehensive information about different fire behaviours, including information on radiant heat and ember showers

• placing more emphasis on the ‘stay and defend’ or ‘leave early’ options so that people are better equipped to make sound decisions

• annual checking of fire plans and site visits.

Attendance at training sessions was later commented on by Dr John Ferguson of Buxton:

The first thing I learned was that very few people attended them [the CFA information sessions].13

2.46 Roof sprinklers and other sprinkler systems around properties were regarded by many as effective fire suppressants. Some spoke persuasively of the value of diesel pumps or stand-alone solar power units for pumps; private water carts; misters under the eaves; gutter plugs; and back-up generators. Others spoke with conviction about the more fire-resistant capacity of deciduous vegetation compared with native species.

The views of Mr Peter Newman of Buxton, Mr P Brown and Dr Ferguson illustrate various opinions about preparing properties for fires:

The sprinkler and having greenery around the house made all the difference.14

If we rebuild, it will be on the basis that we have electric pumps and diesel backup generator, not just one power source.15

Deciduous trees in previous bushfires have produced good shelter … if I had the chance to start from the beginning, the trees would be planted strategically, specifically for that purpose.16

2.47 There were widely held concerns in some communities about water supplies and failing water pressure. Some communities such as Flowerdale and Kinglake West questioned bore water arrangements.
The Flowerdale community, in particular, suggested that there was inadequate access to water from
King Parrot Creek when it was most needed for firefighting. Other communities spoke of the need for
better planning to ensure sufficient and accessible water supplies for tankers.

Issues of water supply were confirmed in the evidence of Dr Ferguson and Mr O’Halloran:

In quick succession over about one hour, we had lost electricity, then landlines, then mobile and then town water.17

We had a five and a half horsepower petrol motor on like a billycart that had a pump attached that could be put into the creek. We had pumping rights to the creek.18

2.48 People who belonged to community fireguard groups rated them highly and in the lead up to the fires those who had phone-tree arrangements felt confident about having sufficient back-up support. For those not affected by failed phone coverage, the phone trees were a significant support in making decisions and in securing assistance.

Ms Christine Glassford of Reedy Creek and Mr John O’Neill of Steels Creek shared similar views:

It [the community fireguard group] was very good … I felt it was sufficient to enable me to prepare sufficiently, certainly to still be here, but I guess I don’t know what else more you could do anyway.19

The telephone tree was … very good in that it sort of kept the lines of communication clear among the immediate neighbours.20

2.49 Finally, in Horsham, people spoke appreciatively of the council which organised a community practice of its disaster plan in December 2008 and provided its residents with up-to-date phone listings. In addition, the council took heed of the warnings prior to 7 February and ensured that CFA tankers were strategically placed around all high-risk areas, enabling a maximum response time of 11 minutes should fires ignite.

Fuel reduction

Figure 2.3: Factors in fuel reduction

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2.50 As figure 2.3 indicates, fuel reduction discussions fell into three major categories of emphasis, with each receiving considerable attention.21 Across all communities these were prominent issues that were articulated with high levels of conviction and contention.

2.51 Specific concerns were raised about the build up of fuel loads on public lands and along roadsides.
The Commission heard repeated criticism of the decline in fuel reduction and fuel management programs, such as controlled burning and back burning, conducted by government agencies and local councils.
Many argued that the build up of fuel, particularly in state forests and national parks, was the most significant contribution to the fires. Others spoke of roadside fuel acting as ‘wicks’ that drew the fires into townships.

2.52 Added to this concern were widely held views that the buffer zones and fire trail networks on crown land were insufficient and poorly maintained. Some claimed that these impediments compromised the safety
of firefighters and severely limited their fire suppression efforts.

Similar comments to these of Dr Chris Harvey of Kinglake and Mrs Joan Davey, whose family lived in Kinglake, were often made:

The idea is if you reduce fuel, there is no fire. Bald Spur Road has never, or the mountain either side of it, has never had a fuel reduction burn … The DSE has never been up there to do any burning off … It was metres deep in some places with leaves and debris from 47 years worth of – do we call it negligence? I would call it negligence, but I don’t know whether I’m being fair.22

Roadsides shouldn’t have trees that have the ability to block them. I believe that trees are fine so long as they have not got the ability to fall and block a road.23

2.53 In addition, some participants maintained that tree preservation orders were too prohibitive, as were council regulations about the retention of native vegetation. These issues were contentious, with some favouring radical change, others advocating a hands-off approach, and some arguing for a ‘common sense’ balanced approach to maintaining bushland settings and making homes safe.

Views expressed by Mr Ananiev and Ms Glassford illustrate the frustrations that were frequently raised
in the consultations:

Fallen trees are not allowed to be touched. Trees on the outside of my property are not allowed
to be touched.24

My issue has been that in some instances we have had these dangerous trees or roads reviewed
three or four times and each time more trees have been taken.25

2.54 A final concern to some community members was the issue of absentee landholders and ‘weekenders’ who in some communities showed little or no commitment to fuel reduction programs or standards. Insurance discounts for compliant landowners and tighter monitoring of compliance by councils were suggestions put forward by several communities.

As also stated by Mr Newman:

We have got a lot of suburban people in the area that are retired there and they don’t have the same learned knowledge and reactions.26

Emergency management and coordination

Figure 2.4: Issues in emergency management and coordination

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2.55 Matters associated with resources available to fight the fires were raised but did not feature prominently, with the exception being assistance from the CFA and fire-bombing aircraft — the latter were viewed to be effective in those communities where they were used. There appeared to be tacit agreement that there would rarely be sufficient resources to deal with the multiplicity of fire outbreaks on days like 7 February.

2.56 Any criticism raised in sessions about the CFA was quickly countered by other community members in the same sessions. Across all communities there was widespread praise and appreciation expressed for the CFA and other workers supporting them.

The views of Mr Doug Walter of Taggerty, Mr Peter Olorenshaw of Callignee and Mrs Davey reflect widely held opinions:

I would like to be able to get in touch with the fire captains and tell them how very grateful we were.27

[The CFA] are a very selfless organisation and have assisted in clearing debris off the roads, but also
the local farming community.28

The families are all very grateful to CFA volunteers and all volunteers.29

2.57 Roadblocks represented the most frequently mentioned grievance for the majority of communities. People expressed anger and frustration about emergency service personnel denied access to fire-affected areas. Family and friends who were separated from loved ones experienced severe distress. Residents who fled their homes spoke of the stress of being unable to return to care for livestock and protect their homes from spot fires and ember attacks. Others who had stayed spoke of being ‘cut off’ and reluctant to leave their properties for fear of being denied return access.

The comment of Mr John Williams of Yarra Glen is representative of one raised many times at the consultations:

I think there certainly needs to be a measure of common sense, a measure of compassion in these roadblocks. 30

2.58 Many people felt that roadblock protocols and regulations were too prohibitive and lacked understanding of some of the fundamental needs of locals to access fresh food, medical assistance, and feed and veterinary care for their livestock. Others argued that roadblocks should be staffed by people with local, up-to-date information, who had discretionary powers to vary regulations and protocols, as the emergency required.

Mr D Brown made similar comments:

Neither of the policemen [on a roadblock] were prepared to say what they were doing this for, why they were doing this, what they had been instructed.31

2.59 Community participants in Kinglake, Bendigo, Marysville, Yarra Glen, Flowerdale and Strathewen spoke of the perils of evacuating and of not knowing the location of evacuation centres or fire refuges. These comments were often accompanied by requests for coordinated evacuation plans for people who cannot self-evacuate — in particular elderly people, those without cars and people with a disability. The early evacuation of elderly residents from a Marysville aged care facility was viewed as a good example of a
well-executed plan.

Uncertainty about the location of fire refuges is reflected in the comment of Mr O’Halloran:

I think it [the Yarra Valley Recreation Reserve] would probably be just one [a fire refuge] that locals know about. I have never been aware of it being an official place.32

2.60 Some people questioned the existence of local council emergency management plans and argued that more was needed to educate residents about such plans. They argued that central fire refuges should be well known and well signposted, both for locals and for tourists visiting the area, and that a coordinated ‘notification’ approach was needed for residents who had chosen to evacuate. It was suggested that
fire-resistant signs such as ‘we have left’, posted in a prominent area close to the entrance of properties, would assist emergency workers in checking the safety of residents and properties.

2.61 A number of the communities spoke of roads that changed names multiple times and of the lack of accurate, up-to-date maps that indicated the types of road. Added to this was the failure of many maps to indicate access areas, trails and firebreaks in parks and forests. This was perceived as a significant impediment for fire units and emergency service personnel deployed from outside the local area. A recurring suggestion was that volunteers with sound local knowledge should accompany outside units deployed to the area; alternatively, they should play a greater role in local operational communications.

Mr Walter similarly stated:

Through the smoke up Knafl Road we saw the red and blue flashing lights of what was obviously a CFA unit. I ran up to the front gate. They stopped and I was ever so glad to see them. It turned out, on talking to the fire captain, that they were a New South Wales unit that was lost.

… [the fire captain’s] exact words to me were the first casualty in this crisis has been communication, that they had no map and that they had no briefing, and they didn’t know what to expect. So I actually climbed into the command vehicle with him at that point knowing that my wife and Josh were still at the home and showed them where they were trying to go ... 33

Recovery efforts

Figure 2.5: Issues with recovery efforts

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2.62 Issues raised about recovery efforts were essentially directed at the immediate post-fire experiences of participants. The timing of the consultations meant that medium- and longer-term recovery issues, such as access to donated funds and government grants, the clearance of blocks and case management arrangements, were only just beginning to surface.

2.63 Most communities acknowledged the generous and sometimes ‘overwhelming’ support from volunteers. They spoke of strengthened community cohesion and resilience and of the many kindnesses extended to them by a host of individuals, businesses, government and community-based agencies. Specific examples of commendation were from Kinglake residents who felt well supported by the people and services available at Whittlesea, and from Marysville residents who were profoundly appreciative of the range of support services provided at Alexandra.

Mr Ken Rogers of St Andrews supported this view:

It turned me over. People at one stage just gave us a hundred dollars. Shops were giving us things, or not charging ... They couldn’t do enough. It was hard at times to find things for people to do who wanted to help you.34

2.64 Countering these commendations were grievances about poor coordination of recovery services. Many people observed that there was a lack of clarity about the role of different agencies and the way they should work together. Multiple registration procedures, along with having little or no information about the whereabouts and wellbeing of family, friends or neighbours, exacerbated the stress and trauma for many people.

The experience later described by Mr Olorenshaw was not unique:

My herd was inspected twice by veterinarians who had no knowledge or contact with one another and they were doing the same job and the same role.35

2.65 Some people spoke of the need for a single, up-to-date, electronic and centralised database of residents’ details that could be shared among service providers to track locals, synchronise lists of missing persons and monitor access to services and grants. Others spoke of the need for better identification systems such as a bracelet system or an on-the-spot photo identification procedure that enabled photos to be exchanged between evacuation centres and service providers.

Mrs Matthews suggested the following in her evidence:

One lady had been told that in fact we had all died. So, I just think in the future, streamlining and training people who are in the process of doing the registrations would be a simple but effective things to do.36

2.66 Residents of Flowerdale and Hazeldene reported that four days transpired before emergency service personnel arrived. This time lag well exceeded responses in other areas. Nonetheless some communities spoke of there being several days or more before they had access to medical services, fuel, fresh food, power and phone coverage.

Delays like those described by Mr Newman illustrate the difficulties:

Water we got back on Tuesday … Thursday we got power back and then we got two bars on the mobile and I have only got a normal mobile, got two bars on Saturday, four bars on Monday so really brilliant.37

2.67 Many people spoke of the need for urgent assistance to repair fences, and of inequities of fencing policies, particularly for people whose properties bordered crown lands. The responsibilities and liabilities of private and public landowners with regard to fencing was a highly contentious issue, causing substantial stress and anxiety for those affected.

2.68 Also touched upon in a number of the consultations were issues of insurance and grants from public relief funds. The issues focused primarily on the equity of eligibility criteria. While acknowledging that it was ‘early days’, some people were concerned about criteria pertaining to insured, under-insured or un-insured property owners. Property owners who did not draw their primary income from the land, and those whose properties were not their principal place of residence, also expressed concern about perceived disparities and inequities. Another recurring concern was about the processes for making claims and applying for grants; many people were fearful that excessive ‘red tape’ would delay respite from the severe financial strain they were experiencing.

Ms Sharon McCulloch of Kinglake described the same frustrations:

We needed to comply with certain things to even be open again for insurance purposes, so we needed to have all our fire extinguishers checked, we needed to have our septic tank pumped … we needed to do quite a few things to satisfy them that we were publicly not liable once we re-opened again.38

Buildings and infrastructure

Figure 2.6: Concerns with buildings and infrastructure

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2.69 Across the 14 communities, issues raised about building codes and community infrastructure were less predominant than those issues reported under previous themes.

2.70 People described various building features and infrastructure that they believed would provide them with protection. But many were stunned by the non-discriminatory impact of the fires — some of the most fire-ready homes did not withstand the ferocity of the fires, while others that were less fire-protected were left standing.

As suggested by Ms McCulloch in her evidence:

I don’t like saying luck, but it was a bit of luck … if the wind had blown directly at us I don’t think we would have been as fortunate.39

2.71 Few people disputed that building standards for fire protection would need serious review and upgrading.
A repeated caveat, however, was that one size does not fit all; fire-prone areas can vary greatly in topography, as can the bushfire risk. The standards need to accommodate these variations.

2.72 Some people spoke of the urban-rural interface of their respective communities and of their ‘lifestyle’ choice to live in bushland settings. They argued that any new developments and reconstruction regulations ought to reflect a sensible balance of competing values — environmental conservation, human safety and property protection.

Mrs Matthews reflected on life in the bush as follows:

We love the bush and every time we go back there is a feeling of it being our home.40

2.73 Questions about the merits of bunkers were repeatedly raised. In many instances people expressed an openness to installing bunkers, not just on their own properties but at community centres such as schools. People suggested that an expert engineering investigation was needed so that an Australian standard could be developed.

Mr Gobbett later said of bunkers:

It [the bunker] saved our life in this fire. If we didn’t have it, I don’t doubt that we would be dead.41

2.74 As figure 2.6 indicates, another concern raised in some communities was that of power poles. Many argued that power poles should be built from concrete or other fireproof materials. Others argued that powerlines should be relocated underground. Most posited that clearing of fuel loads and vegetation around powerlines had been inadequate.

Mr P Brown’s view on powerlines as expressed during the hearings was illustrative of those held by others in some communities:

I believe it is about time we bit the bullet and started undergrounding our power in bushfire areas.42

Community consultations — concluding comments

2.75 As stated at the outset of the consultations, the Commission sought assistance in identifying key issues for further research and investigation, in advance of any formal hearings. This objective was certainly achieved.

2.76 The Commission is extremely grateful to all community participants who provided first-hand accounts of their experiences and views on a wide range of issues. The task of confronting, examining and discussing experiences was at times difficult for people. As emphasised in paragraph 2.35, the commitment to confidentiality has been maintained and the quotes used in this chapter to illustrate the issues raised have come from witnesses at the public hearings, not from attendees at the community consultations. The Commission thanks the attendees and other local community members and organisations who assisted in hosting and supporting the sessions.

EVIDENCE OF LAY WITNESSES

2.77 An important part of the evidence heard by the Commission during the first block of hearings came from 29 ‘lay witnesses’ — people from all walks of life who were affected in some way by the 2009 bushfires. Having experienced the devastating impact of the bushfires first hand, they were able to provide an account of that impact on them personally, on their families, their neighbours and the communities to which they belong.

2.78 Lay witnesses who appeared before the Commission all lived or worked in areas affected by the 2009 bushfires, or else had loved ones who lived in these areas. A small number of lay witnesses experienced
the fires in a professional capacity, though all lay witnesses gave evidence in their personal capacity.
Their names and associated transcript references are outlined in Table 2.2.

2.79 The contribution of lay witnesses was extremely valuable, as will be apparent from the frequent references to their evidence in the chapters that follow.

Identification of lay witnesses

2.80 The Commission identified lay witnesses in different ways, including through:

• attendance at the community consultations

• applications for leave to appear received in March and April

• submissions made by members of the public to the Commission

• witness statements taken by Victoria Police following the bushfires

• referrals from witnesses interviewed

• media reports

• individuals who contacted the Commission’s enquiry line.

2.81 During the first hearing block, the Commission investigated a number of issues, including warnings, communications, and the ‘stay or go’ policy. Lay witnesses provided information to the Commissioners about these issues by reference to their personal circumstances, their individual fire planning and preparation, and their own experiences on 7 February and immediately following.

2.82 For some, giving evidence before the Commission enabled them to speak for family members who perished in the fires. A number of lay witnesses gave evidence about how the fires affected vulnerable people, such as the elderly, young children and people with disabilities.

2.83 Many lay witnesses told the Commission about their efforts to defend their homes against the fires.
Some stayed and defended their homes successfully; others saw their homes burn despite their best efforts; all were able to share their experience to the benefit of the Commission.

2.84 Some witnesses told how they abandoned their plan to stay and defend when they realised the severity of the firestorm. The Commission also heard from lay witnesses about their attempts to find shelter during the fires.

2.85 Other lay witnesses chose to leave rather than stay to defend their homes. Their accounts of how and
when they made their decisions to leave their homes have informed the Commission’s understanding of
the practical application of the ‘stay or go’ policy.

2.86 Some lay witnesses informed the Commission of their involvement with the CFA, either through being a volunteer, attending community information sessions or becoming involved in a community fireguard group. Several recounted their previous experience of fires in their area, which informed their response
to the 2009 bushfires.

2.87 The evidence of almost all of the lay witnesses included vivid descriptions of the fires. Many witnesses also provided photographs and video footage they took during and after the bushfires. Combined with their oral testimony, these photographs and video footage have greatly assisted the Commission in better understanding the spread and severity of the bushfires.

2.88 Lay witnesses were also given the opportunity to give evidence in relation to other matters of concern
to them, including:

• their experience with police roadblocks in the aftermath of the bushfires

• restrictions on their ability to manage the vegetation around their homes

• the adequacy of fuel management in their area

• bushfire bunkers

• the process of identifying those who perished in the fires

• the need for a more coordinated response to the fires.

These issues are to be examined in greater detail by the Commission in future hearing blocks.

Evidence of lay witnesses — concluding comments

2.89 The evidence presented by lay witnesses was detailed and varied. It demonstrated the profound effect that living through the 2009 bushfires had on them, their families and their communities. From the evidence of lay witnesses, both the Commission and members of the broader community have been able to gain a better understanding of the devastating effect that the bushfires had on so many people. Lay witnesses also drew on their experiences to offer suggestions as to how things could be done differently in future, all of which have been given careful attention by the Commission.

2.90 The process of identifying, interviewing and calling lay witnesses to give evidence is continuing. In future hearing blocks, the Commission will continue to ask lay witnesses to provide an account of their experience of the fires, while addressing specific topics under investigation. These topics will include building issues, the causes and circumstances of each of the fires, emergency response and recovery, land-use planning and fuel management — all matters within the Commission’s terms of reference.

Table 2.2: Lay witnesses in the first hearing block, May–July 2009

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