10 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

 

In this chapter we examine Victoria’s emergency management arrangements and, in particular, the State Emergency Response Plan. In addition to those aspects of the emergency management arrangements dealing with warnings and evacuation, the evidence has highlighted some issues to be considered in reviewing the State Emergency Response Plan. This chapter also looks at issues arising from the guidelines for establishing police roadblocks during bushfires.

 

10.1     Victoria’s Emergency Management Act 1986 was enacted following the Ash Wednesday bushfires in 1983, to provide a legislative foundation for emergency management involving an all hazards, all agencies approach, and appropriate coordination of all agencies involved in the response to, or recovery from, an emergency.1 As explained by Mr Bruce Esplin, the Emergency Services Commissioner, the overarching principle underpinning the ‘all hazards, all agencies’ approach is that emergency management entails a whole-of-government approach.2

10.2     The ‘all hazards’ approach to emergency management involves a recognition that all emergencies cause similar problems and that many of the measures required to deal with emergencies are generic. There is also a recognition that one emergency may cause others.3 At the same time, the approach recognises that many risks require specific prevention, response and recovery measures.4 The range of hazards that Victoria’s emergency management arrangements are designed to meet is apparent from the definition of ‘emergency’ in the Emergency Management Act:

(a)        an earthquake, flood, wind-storm or other natural event; and

(b)        a fire; and

(c)        an explosion; and

(d)        a road accident or any other accident; and

(e)        a plague or an epidemic; and

(f)        a warlike act …; and

(g)        a hi-jack, siege or riot; and

10.3     The ‘all agencies’ aspect of Victoria’s emergency management arrangements recognises that all agencies have a role in emergency management and protecting the community from identified risks.6

10.4     Victoria’s emergency management arrangements are founded on the key components of prevention, response and recovery. The objectives of the Emergency Management Act refer to the role of each component of emergency management, as follows:

(a)        prevention—the elimination or reduction of the incidence or severity of emergencies and the mitigation of their effects;

(b)        response—the combating of emergencies and the provision of rescue and immediate relief services;

10.5     At the highest level, the Emergency Management Act vests responsibility for emergency management in the Coordinator in Chief of Emergency Management, who is the Minister for Police and Emergency Services.8 The Coordinator in Chief is responsible for ensuring that adequate emergency management measures are taken by government agencies, and for coordination of the activities of government agencies undertaking those measures.9 The Deputy Coordinator in Chief of Emergency Management is the Chief Commissioner of Police.10 The Coordinator in Chief may delegate powers or functions under the Emergency Management Act to the Deputy Coordinator.11

10.6     Section 8 of the Emergency Management Act establishes the Victorian Emergency Management Council (VEMC) to advise the Coordinator in Chief on all matters relating to the prevention of, response to and recovery from emergencies.12 The Council consists of the Coordinator in Chief and representatives of government and non-government agencies involved in response to and recovery from emergencies.13 The agencies currently represented on the VEMC include all the emergency service agencies — the Country Fire Authority (CFA), the Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE), the Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board (MFB), the Victorian State Emergency Services and Ambulance Victoria — as well as Victoria Police, the Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority, the Bureau of Meteorology, the Department of Defence, the Department of Human Services, the Department of Transport,the Department of Primary Industries, the Department of Premier and Cabinet and the Department of Treasury and Finance.14 The Emergency Services Commissioner is the executive officer to the Council.15

10.7     Section 9 of the Emergency Management Act enables the Coordinator in Chief to establish ‘such committees as are necessary to ensure comprehensive and integrated emergency management’.16 One such committee is the VEMC Coordinating Group, which assists the Coordinator in Chief before or during an emergency to ensure that responsible agencies have taken adequate emergency management measures and to coordinate the activities of those agencies.17 The VEMC Coordinating Group comprises the operational heads of the emergency services, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, and other directors of security and emergency management from relevant government agencies.18

10.8     The emergency management arrangements in place in Victoria are set out in detail in the Emergency Management Manual Victoria (the Manual).19 The Manual was developed and is maintained by the Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner, in consultation with agencies involved in emergency management.20 It contains policy and planning documents for emergency management, and sets out the roles played by the agencies involved in emergency management in Victoria.21 The contents of the Manual are structured as follows:

Part 1 — Introduction to the Emergency Management Arrangements

Part 2 — Emergency Risk Management and Mitigation in Victoria

Part 3 — State Emergency Response Plan

Part 4 — State Emergency Recovery Arrangements

Part 5 — State and Regional Emergency Management Planning

Part 6 — Guidelines for Municipal Emergency Management Planning

Part 7 — Emergency Management Agency Roles

Part 8 — Appendixes and Glossary

Part 9 — Emergency Management Act

Part 10 — Emergency Management Contact Directory

Part 11 — Index.22

10.9     Part 3 of the Emergency Management Act requires the preparation and review of a State Emergency Response Plan (SERP), for the coordinated response of all agencies with roles or responsibilities in responding to emergencies.23 The SERP is called DISPLAN in the Emergency Management Act, although that term is now little used.24 The SERP is set out in Part 3 of the Manual.25 It is discussed in detail below.

10.10  Part 5 of the Emergency Management Act makes provision for the declaration of a State of Disaster by the Premier, in respect of an emergency that ‘constitutes or is likely to constitute a significant and widespread danger to life or property in Victoria’. A State of Disaster may be declared for the whole of Victoria, or for any part of it. Before declaring a State of Disaster, the Premier must consider the advice of the Coordinator in Chief and the State Coordinator — that is, the Minister for Police and Emergency Services and the Chief Commissioner of Police.26

10.11  The effect of the declaration of a State of Disaster is to vest operational control of all agencies in the Coordinator in Chief, thereby streamlining the command structure.27 It also enlivens the powers in section 24(2) of the Emergency Management Act, which include the power to take possession and make use of any property considered necessary for responding to the disaster, the power to control movement in the disaster area and the power to compel evacuation of the disaster area.28

10.12  No serious consideration was given by any witness to advising that a State of Disaster be declared on 7 February 2009, and no witness was aware that this had been considered by anyone else.29 Indeed, Deputy Commissioner Kieran Walshe did not believe that a State of Disaster had ever been declared under the Emergency Management Act, and attributed this to the significant improvements made to Victoria’s emergency management arrangements since the Ash Wednesday fires in 1983.30 This matter will be considered further by the Commission.

 

Roles and structures

10.13  The Coordinator in Chief is responsible for arranging for the preparation and review of the SERP, after consultation with the VEMC.31 This preparation and review of the SERP has been carried out by the Chief Commissioner of Police, on the basis of a delegation under section 7 of the Emergency Management Act.32

10.14  The Chief Commissioner of Police is also the State Coordinator of Emergency Response and has responsibility under the SERP for coordinating emergency response agencies.33 The State Coordinator must appoint a member of the police force to be a Deputy State Coordinator of Emergency Response. Mr Walshe has been the Deputy State Coordinator since 2006.34 During his evidence to the Commission he explained the structure and operation of the SERP.

10.15  The SERP identifies the organisational arrangements for managing the response to emergencies in Victoria. Emergency response management is based on assigning three key management tasks of command, control and coordination. These roles and responsibilities are defined in the SERP as follows:

Command involves the direction of members and resources of an agency in the performance of that organisation’s role and tasks. Authority to command is established in legislation or by agreement within an agency. Command relates to agencies and operates vertically within an agency.

Control

Control involves the overall direction of response activities in an emergency situation. Authority for control is established in legislation or in an emergency response plan, and carries with it the responsibility for tasking other agencies in accordance with the needs of the situation. Control relates to situations and operates horizontally across agencies.

Coordination

10.16  Figure 10.1 demonstrates the SERP’s command, control and coordination functions in emergency response management arrangements.

 

Figure 10.1: Emergency response management arrangements

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10.17  Emergency response agencies are designated as control or support agencies, depending on the kind of emergency.37 The roles and responsibilities of the various agencies with regard to emergency response are set out in Part 7 of the Manual. A control agency is the agency nominated to control the response.38 A support agency, either government or non-government, supports or assists the control agency or another support agency.39

10.18  In relation to fire, the relevant control agencies are the CFA, DSE or the MFB, depending on the location of the fire.40 Section 16 of the Emergency Management Act provides that the chief officers of these agencies may, by agreement, appoint an officer of one of the agencies to have the overall control of the response to the fire.41 The officer appointed becomes the Incident Controller.42 The control agencies on 7 February were the CFA and DSE, and Incident Controllers for each of the fires were appointed by agreement between those agencies.43

10.19  Responsibility for the coordination of emergency response is allocated under the Emergency Management Act to Victoria Police. This is a role performed by Victoria Police for all emergencies, regardless of whether it is the control agency. The coordination function of Victoria Police is discrete from its command and, where applicable, control functions. An independent management structure therefore exists within Victoria Police for the performance of its emergency response coordination function.44

10.20  In addition to the roles of the State Coordinator and the Deputy Coordinator of Emergency Response, held by the Chief Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner of Police respectively, section 13 of the Emergency Management Act requires the appointment by the State Coordinator of a member of the police force to be a coordinator of emergency response for each region and municipal district. Mr Walshe explained that there are currently 23 Divisional Emergency Response Coordinators (DERCs) and 56 Municipal Emergency Response Coordinators (MERCs). A DERC is appointed for each of the 23 Victoria Police Divisions, and a MERC is appointed for each of the 56 Police Service Areas, which cover Victoria’s 79 municipalities.45 The Divisional Superintendent is usually appointed as the DERC for that Division, and the role of MERC is usually allocated to a sergeant or senior sergeant in the municipality concerned.46

10.21  Emergency response coordinators have statutory responsibility for directing emergency response agencies on the allocation of resources in responding to an emergency.47 The responsibilities of emergency response coordinators are set out in more detail in the SERP. The principal role of emergency response coordinators specified in the SERP is to:

^•             Ensure that effective control has been established in responding to an emergency;

^•             Ensure the effective coordination of resources and services having regard to the provisions of s. 13(2) of the Emergency Management Act 1986 (refer also Reserve Powers of Emergency Response Coordinators);

^•             In the event of uncertainty, determine which agency is to perform its statutory response role within a region or other specified area, where more than one agency is empowered to perform that role;

^•             Arrange for the provision of resources requested by control and support agencies;

^•             Review and dispatch situation reports;

^•             Ensure that consideration has been given to:

     –  Alerting the public to existing and potential dangers arising from a serious emergency direct or through the media; and

     –  Any need for evacuation.

^•             Advise recovery agencies of the emergency;

10.22  The SERP sets out particular responsibilities of DERCs and MERCs, and the responsibilities of a field emergency response coordinator, usually the senior member of the police force in attendance at the scene of an emergency.49

10.23  There is a corresponding structure of emergency response coordination centres at state, divisional and municipal level.50 Emergency response coordination centres are described in the SERP as:

10.24  A diagram of Victoria’s emergency response coordination structure was attached to Mr Walshe’s statement and is reproduced here.

 

Figure 10.2: Emergency response coordination structure

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10.25  A municipal emergency coordination centre (MECC) is typically located in a municipal office or public hall.53 One of the responsibilities of a MERC is to attend at the MECC if activated. The Municipal Emergency Response Officer, a council employee, also attends the MECC, together with liaison officers from relevant agencies.54 Divisional Emergency Response Coordination Centres (known as DERCCs or DECCs) are generally located in a police complex.55

10.26  The State Emergency Response Coordination Centre (SERCC) is located at Victoria Police Centre, and is attended by Victoria Police personnel engaged in emergency response coordination and liaison officers from control and support agencies. The SERCC’s functions are described in the SERP as follows:

^•             Information collection, analysis of, and dissemination of intelligence to emergency response agencies;

^•             Coordination of the provision of resources required by Divisional emergency response coordinators;

^•             Allocation of resources on a priority basis;

^•             Requesting Commonwealth physical resources;

^•             Briefing the Coordinator in Chief via the State Emergency Response Coordinator;

10.27  The level of emergency response coordination depends on the scope of the emergency. In the first instance, the response to an emergency takes place at the municipal level. The MERC will be notified and the MECC may be activated. If the emergency calls for resources beyond those available at municipal level, the emergency response coordination is stepped up to the divisional level. The DERC becomes involved and the DECC may be activated. An emergency that extends beyond the division will be stepped up to the State level, to the State Coordinator and the SERCC.57

responsibility for issuing warnings

10.28  The SERP does not state clearly which agency is responsible for alerting the public to danger. The SERP states that:

…

10.29  In contrast, Appendix 5 of Part 8 of the Manual, which deals specifically with bushfires, states simply that under ‘Victoria’s response arrangements, provision of warnings to the community is the responsibility of Victoria Police’.59 These apparently contradictory statements as to which agency has responsibility for issuing warnings sit side by side with the responsibility of emergency response coordinators to ensure that consideration has been given to alerting the public to dangers arising from an emergency. The warning arrangements under the SERP are understood by Victoria Police to require that warnings are initiated by the control agency and delivered by police.60

10.30  The provisions of the SERP on evacuation are described in Chapter 6. Subject to some specific exceptions, evacuation under the SERP is voluntary and response agencies are limited to recommending evacuation and assisting people to evacuate safely and efficiently. The SERP states that the decision to recommend evacuation rests with the control agency, in conjunction with Victoria Police and other expert advisers, time permitting. Once the decision to recommend evacuation is made, police are responsible for carrying out the evacuation process.61

10.31  Appendix 5 of Part 8 of the Manual deals with evacuation during bushfires and encapsulates the ‘stay or go’ position.62 The appendix notes that, unless people choose to leave well in advance of a bushfire, sheltering in a house will generally be safer than being caught in the open in a car. It outlines the fire agencies’ position that a decision to evacuate or to stay and fight must be made by the individual concerned, well in advance and on the understanding that there should be no last minute change of plan or attempt to evacuate in the face of a fire. Police are counselled against such ‘ad hoc actions’ as advising or directing people inappropriately to leave their homes in the path of a fire. There is no attempt in the SERP, or elsewhere in the Manual, to reconcile this advice with the responsibility of emergency response coordinators to ensure that consideration is given to any necessary evacuation.

10.32  A review of the SERP was commissioned by the Minister for Police and Emergency Services following the 2009 bushfires. This review is being led by Victoria Police and is to be completed by the end of September 2009.63 The Commission looks forward to receiving the findings of that review.

WARNINGS AND relocation

10.33  As discussed above, the SERP does not clearly designate the agency responsible for issuing warnings and recommending evacuations. While the SERP currently only uses the term ‘evacuation’, the Commission has recommended in Chapter 6 that the word relocation be used in preference to the word evacuation (except in cases where evacuation is clearly more appropriate). In addition, the means by which warnings were issued and relocations were carried out on 7 February bore little resemblance to the arrangements in the SERP.

10.34  The considerable body of evidence received by the Commission on warnings issued on 7 February indicated that warnings were issued by the fire agencies directly to the public, without reference to the warning arrangements set out in the SERP. There is no evidence that the fire agencies requested Victoria Police to communicate any warning to the public.64 The fire agencies did not request Victoria Police to authorise the use of the Standard Emergency Warning Signal in connection with any warning.65 Mr Walshe explained that, under the Memorandum of Understanding with the ABC, fire agencies would issue warnings directly to the ABC and would not seek Victoria Police’s assistance in disseminating warnings.66

10.35  Similarly, there is no evidence that the fire agencies requested Victoria Police to carry out any relocations on 7 February. As discussed in Chapter 6, current CFA policy is not to recommend the evacuation of people threatened by bushfire. The relocations that were carried out by individual members of Victoria Police were initiated by them, and not by the fire agencies.67 The evidence of Superintendent Rodney Collins, the State Emergency Response Officer, was that the provisions of the SERP requiring emergency response coordinators to give consideration to the need for evacuation is not appropriate in relation to fires, because it is inconsistent with the ‘stay or go’ policy.68

10.36  Moreover, there is no evidence that Victoria Police emergency response coordinators at any level actively ensured that consideration was given to issuing warnings or to recommending relocation on 7 February. These judgements were left entirely to the fire agencies, and to members of Victoria Police exercising their own initiative.69 The evidence to date supports a conclusion that the responsibility of emergency response coordinators to ensure that consideration is given to warnings and evacuations was not actively discharged on 7 February.

10.37  Victoria Police regards its emergency response coordination role as being concerned primarily with the acquisition and application of resources.70 The responsibility to ensure that consideration is given to warnings and evacuations is apparently not regarded by Victoria Police as central to the role of emergency response coordinators. The lack of emphasis given to this responsibility by Victoria Police is illustrated by its omission from the otherwise detailed outline of emergency response arrangements for the 2008–09 bushfire season circulated by Assistant Commissioner Stephen Fontana in October 2008.71 However, the inclusion of this responsibility in the SERP creates an expectation that emergency response coordinators will take active steps in relation to warnings and evacuations or relocations, an expectation that was not met on 7 February.

10.38  Diffuse or unclear responsibility for warnings and relocation is at best unhelpful and at worst life threatening in an emergency. It is unsatisfactory that the SERP does not designate clearly the responsibilities of agencies and emergency response coordinators to issue warnings and to advise people to evacuate or relocate during an emergency. The SERP should be amended to give clear responsibility to the control agency to issue warnings. So there is no confusion as to which agency is responsible for these matters, emergency response coordinators should no longer be responsible for ensuring that consideration has been given to warnings and relocation.

 

The State amend the State Emergency Response Plan:

•      so the control agency for a fire is responsible for issuing and communicating warnings; and

•      to remove from emergency response coordinators the responsibility of ensuring the control agency gives consideration to alerting the public to dangers and potential dangers arising from an emergency.

 

The State revise the Emergency Management Manual Victoria consistent with the interim report recommendations in relation to the ‘stay or go’ policy, warnings and relocations.

 

10.39  Other recommendations to amend the SERP and sections of the Manual on warnings and evacuation are made in:

•    Chapter 4, in which the Commission recommends that the Manual be amended to reflect the changes to the use of Standard Emergency Warning Signal recommended in that chapter

•    Chapter 6, in which the Commission recommends that in the SERP, the word relocation be used in preference to the word evacuation (except in cases where evacuation is clearly more appropriate), to remove possible confusion resulting from the compulsory or mandatory connotations of ‘evacuation’.

REVIEW OF THE serp

10.40  The evidence heard by the Commission, so far, has raised issues that should be considered in the current review of the SERP, namely:

•    the feasibility of establishing an ‘all hazards’ operations centre for Victoria and co-locating the SERCC with this operations centre

•    how the emergency response on 7 February varied from the ‘all hazards, all agencies’ emergency response management arrangements set out in the SERP

•    clarifying the responsibilities of emergency response coordinators and the SERCC under the SERP

•    simplifying the emergency response coordination structures.

These matters are discussed in turn below.

10.41  One of the issues considered in the Report of the Inquiry into the 2002–2003 Victorian Bushfires was whether Victoria’s emergency management arrangements provided an effective management framework during the 2002–03 fires.72 Chapter 18 of that report assessed the State’s emergency management arrangements. The Commission remains mindful of the recommendations of this review.

10.42  However, the Commission has heard sufficient evidence to highlight the ongoing relevance of the recommendations in Chapter 18 of the Report of the Inquiry into the 2002–2003 Victorian Bushfires concerning state level coordination of emergency response. Those recommendations were:

18.43    That the options of co-locating the State Emergency Response Coordination Centre with the new State Emergency Operations Centre be explored.

10.43  Following these recommendations a feasibility study was conducted by the Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner.74 In 2006 Victoria Police declined to participate in the State Emergency Operations Centre (SEOC) or to relocate the SERCC.75 One reason for declining to participate in the SEOC was the security concerns of other agencies that may be involved in responding to a terrorist attack, such as ASIO and the Australian Defence Force. The primary reason, however, was that emergency management is not the day-to-day business of Victoria Police.76

10.44  In 2008 the CFA, DSE, the MFB and Victorian State Emergency Services established the integrated Emergency Coordination Centre (iECC) in East Melbourne as a joint facility for the coordination of emergencies.77 Any emergency for which Victoria Police is the control agency is coordinated from the SERCC at Victoria Police Centre.78

10.45  The establishment of the iECC by some but not all of the emergency response agencies, and the consequent realignment of roles and responsibilities, may represent a departure from Victoria’s ‘all hazards, all agencies’ emergency management arrangements. The feasibility of a SEOC and its co-location with the SERCC, as recommended in the Report of the Inquiry into the 2002–2003 Victorian Bushfires, both warrant reconsideration.

10.46  Despite the establishment of the iECC, the SERCC is retained as a separate centre and operated separately on 7 February.79 At least in the case of emergencies that are coordinated from the iECC, it is unclear why SERCC functions should not be located within the iECC. The evidence demonstrated that, in practice, some of the functions of the SERCC were performed at the iECC on 7 February.

10.47  For example, the SERCC is responsible under the SERP for information collection, the analysis of and dissemination of information to emergency response agencies, and for dissemination of information to the media and the general public.80 On 6 February 2009 a ‘guideline’ was prepared on the roles of the SERCC and the iECC for 7 February. The guideline provided that the iECC rather than the SERCC was to ‘support information sharing, enable intelligence gathering and joint situation analysis between agencies’ — effectively to collect, analyse and disseminate information.81 Superintendent Collins agreed that this involved the transfer of a coordination function from the SERCC to the iECC, where it was performed by the fire agencies rather than Victoria Police.82

10.48  A further example is the emerging role of the State Emergency Strategy Team (SEST) at the iECC. The SEST is not established under the SERP or the Manual, and has evolved from existing arrangements over recent years.83 The SEST is a group comprising senior representatives of the control and support agencies represented at the iECC. It meets regularly during an emergency to: consider how the emergency may impact in the coming days, develop strategies, identify and address deficiencies in coordination and identify stakeholders that should be involved.84 It looks to be an effective vehicle for coordinating emergency response at the State level, particularly for information sharing between agencies. While Mr Walshe and Mr Collins attempted to distinguish between the functions of the SERCC and the iECC, evidence indicates that the role actually performed by the SEST was a true coordination function.85

10.49  The lack of clarity in the SERP on issuing warnings and recommending evacuation or relocation is discussed earlier in this chapter. In addition, the effect of the guideline of 6 February and the, as yet, undefined role of the SEST meant there was no clarity on which agency was responsible for the function of collecting, analysing and disseminating information among agencies and to the public. It is obvious that the timely flow of accurate information is critical to effective emergency response. The current lack of clarity about responsibility for information flow should be addressed in the review of the SERP.

10.50  It is understood that other (internal to Government) reviews are underway that may have a bearing on the design of Victoria’s future emergency management arrangements.86 The Commission has not had the opportunity to be appraised of these. However, for the 2009–10 bushfire season, it is essential that the State clarify arrangements that should apply before the season starts.

10.51  In this context the Commission notes that it would have been necessary for the arrangements in place within the iECC during February 2009 to have departed from those set out in the Manual. This reflects an evolutionary development of a co-located, moving to integrated, operational approach to bushfire management. This approach brought the most senior managers of the CFA and DSE together in a joint facility, that had both a strategic operational role and a whole-of-government coordination role.87

10.52  Unfortunately, because the changed arrangements were under trial, the Manual does not reflect what was occurring in practice, and this led to some ambiguity. There were other protocols and understandings in place but there remained uncertainties, particularly in the responsibilities of Victoria Police vis-a-vis those of the fire agencies.88

10.53  Whichever arrangements the State chooses to follow during the forthcoming bushfire season — and the Commission encourages simplifying existing structures where possible — the Commission intends to examine in detail the emergency management arrangements for bushfires in future hearings. This is necessary to ensure that the lessons from the February 2009 bushfires can be taken into account in confirming the strategic emergency management structure that will best serve Victoria for the future.

 

The State settle the higher level emergency management and coordination arrangements that will apply during the bushfire season, noting that the Commission intends to take evidence on longer-term arrangements during its 2010 public hearings.

 

The State report to the Commission on the outcome of the current review by Victoria Police of the State Emergency Response Plan.

 

Victoria Police, in consultation with CFA and DSE, review the guidelines for the operation of roadblocks during bushfires, including how to:

•      formulate the terms of a discretion to police on roadblocks to allow entry to:

⁻      residents returning to their homes;

⁻      people delivering relief and aid to residents and to animals;

⁻      essential services crews; and

•      expedite the exercise of the discretion in favour of persons able to establish their bona fides.

10.54  As identified in Chapter 3, roadblocks represented one of the most frequently mentioned grievances at the community consultations conducted by the Commission in March and April 2009. While the Commission is yet to examine in any detail the roadblocks that were put in place on and after 7 February, it has been able to gain a good understanding of the guidelines under which those roadblocks were established, and some of the issues caused by the application of those guidelines.

10.55  Victoria Police is responsible for establishing roadblocks, or ‘traffic management points’, during and after bushfires, either at its own initiative or at the request of the Incident Controller. In consultation with the CFA and DSE, Victoria Police has developed guidelines for the operation of these roadblocks.89 These guidelines were developed in the context of a Coronial Inquest into the deaths of two people in the Grampians fires in 2006, who had been allowed to pass through a police roadblock to return to their property.90

10.56  The guidelines advise Victoria Police officers on roadblocks ‘If in doubt, keep them out’, and give police no discretion to allow anyone other than responding fire agency personnel to pass. Under the guidelines, the discretion to establish a partial road closure rests with the Incident Controller. Victoria Police may institute a total road closure, or may upgrade a partial road closure to a total road closure. Only the Incident Controller may downgrade a total road closure to a partial road closure.91

10.57  Many witnesses commented about the inflexibility of police roadblocks. Witnesses such as Mr Peter Newman of Buxton and Mr Doug Walter of Taggerty, who had stayed to defend their homes, found that if they left to communicate with family and friends, or to get supplies, they would not be permitted to return through the roadblock.92 Mr Walter said that every time he went through a roadblock he was at the mercy of the police officers stationed there:

10.58  In a similar vein, Mr John O’Neill of Steels Creek experienced a ‘small but frustrating amount of difficulty’ the day after the fire in getting his children past roadblocks to stay with family.94

10.59  Mr David McGahy, the Captain of the Arthurs Creek/Strathewen CFA, reported that a lot of residents had been troubled by the hard line taken by police officers at roadblocks that ‘If you go out, you are not going to get back’.95 Mr McGahy pointed out that residents had been traumatised by the ‘horrendous experience’ they had been through. He said:

10.60  Witnesses who had left their homes found that roadblocks prevented their return in the days after the fire. Both Dr Chris Harvey of Kinglake and Mr Illiya Ananiev of St Andrews were stopped at roadblocks from returning to their homes, and both returned via a back route.97 Their experience was consistent with findings of the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre’s Victorian 2009 Research Response Interim Report, which notes that many people attempted to return to their properties in the days after the fire, but in many cases were turned away by roadblocks. The majority of interviewees reported circumventing roadblocks by either talking their way through or finding an alternative — often more dangerous — route back to their properties.98

10.61  A number of witnesses reported that police roadblocks prevented the passage of people assisting in the response to the fires, providing medical assistance and restoring essential services.99 Mr Lou Sigmund of Boolarra, Group Officer in the CFA Morwell Group, said that the debrief process had highlighted that an ambulance, water carriers, bulldozers and firefighters without identification had been stopped at roadblocks.100 Mr John Williams, who was in Yarra Glen on 7 February, was angered that it took five hours before his badly burned friend reached hospital, because the ambulance could not pass through a roadblock.101 He pointed out that the emergency services were trained to be imaginative and resourceful in an emergency, and said:

10.62  The inflexibility of police roadblocks also caused difficulties for police on the roadblocks. Mr Walshe spoke of members being assaulted, almost run over, and subject to civil litigation. He acknowledged that the guidelines need refinement.103

10.63  One measure that does appear to have worked well in the days after the fires was a system of providing local residents with wristbands and stickers for their cars, so that they could pass freely through the roadblocks.104 This was used to good effect in the Kinglake area, but does not appear to have been universally employed.105

10.64  A report prepared for the Victoria Police Critical Incident Management Review Committee, arising from the Victoria Police bushfire internal debriefing process, identified a need to increase clarity for members and the public around legislative powers and current policy relating to traffic management points prior to, during and after an emergency.106 The Police Association has also sought clarification of roadblock protocols, including clear identification of people who are permitted to pass. While the current guidelines appear clear enough, what they lack is sufficient flexibility for police officers on roadblocks to exercise common sense and good judgement as to who should be permitted to pass, and helpful guidance to assist the exercise of some discretion.107

10.65  Victoria Police should review its roadblock guidelines, in consultation with the CFA and DSE, before the start of the next fire season. In reviewing the guidelines, Victoria Police should consider the matters raised here.

 

The CFA and DSE amend operating protocols to ensure that when an Incident Controller requests Victoria Police establish a roadblock to an area threatened by a bushfire, the Incident Controller simultaneously issues a bushfire warning to residents of that area.

 

10.66  In addition to issues arising from the inflexibility of the guidelines on roadblocks, some lay witnesses queried why police had established a roadblock restricting access to their area, but had neither warned residents of the area of the approaching bushfires nor advised them to evacuate.

10.67  Ms Jill Kane of Bendigo drove around a police roadblock to reach her brother Mr Mick Kane’s house in Long Gully. Having encountered the roadblock, she assumed that the police had warned residents about the fire danger and advised them to leave, and could not understand why that did not occur.¹⁰⁸

10.68  Mr Illiya Ananiev and his family passed a police roadblock at Mittons Bridge as they fled the fire along the Heidelberg-Kinglake Road. He commented:

10.69  Mr David Brown of Strathewen noted that a roadblock had been set up on the main approach road to Strathewen, as early as 3.30pm. Police on the roadblock were allowing only local residents through. Mr Brown queried what information had prompted the establishment of the roadblock, and why no warning had been issued to the Strathewen community.¹¹⁰

10.70  These are legitimate questions. A decision made by an Incident Controller to establish a roadblock to an area threatened by fire should be based on the same information that should also prompt the Incident Controller to issue a warning to communities in the path of a fire. In some circumstances, this information should also be used to advise people to leave the area, as recommended in Chapter 6. The fire agencies’ protocols should integrate consideration of whether roadblocks are necessary with consideration of warnings and advice to relocate.

 

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[1]     Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin (WIT.005.001.0001) [10]

[2]     Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin (WIT.005.001.0001) [15]

[3]     Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin (WIT.005.001.0001) [23]

[4]     Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin (WIT.005.001.0001) [13]

[5]     Emergency Management Act 1986, s. 4

[6]     Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin (WIT.005.001.0001) [14]

[7]     Emergency Management Act 1986, s. 4A

[8]     Emergency Management Act 1986, s. 5(1)

[9]     Emergency Management Act 1986, s. 6

[10]   Emergency Management Act 1986, s. 5(2)

[11]   Emergency Management Act 1986, s. 7

[12]   Emergency Management Act 1986, s. 8(1); Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin (WIT.005.001.0001) [25]

[13]   Emergency Management Act 1986, s. 8(2)

[14]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 57 (WIT.005.001.2350); Esplin T203:24–T203:31

[15]   Emergency Management Act 1986, s. 8(3); Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin (WIT.005.001.0001) [25]; Esplin T203:21–T203:23

[16]   Emergency Management Act 1986, s. 9

[17]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin (WIT.005.001.0001) [26]; Esplin T204:13–T204:23

[18]   Esplin T204:13–T204:23. See also Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 57 (WIT.005.001.2350)

[19]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 2 (WIT.005.001.0123)

[20]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin (WIT.005.001.0001) [32]; Esplin T201:8–T201:14

[21]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin (WIT.005.001.0001) [31]

[22]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 2 (WIT.005.001.0123) at 0127–0128

[23]   Emergency Management Act 1986, s. 10

[24]   Walshe T599:8–T599:15

[25]   Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe (WIT.003.002.0001) [19]; Walshe T599:16–T599:17

[26]   Emergency Management Act 1986, s. 23(1)

[27]   Emergency Management Act 1986, s. 24(1); Esplin T213:9–T213:19; Walshe T1247:2–T1247:13

[28]   Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe (WIT.003.002.0001) [125]–[127]; Emergency Management Act 1986, s. 24(2)(c), (d) and (e). The power to compel evacuation in s. 24(2)(e) is subject to the pecuniary interest exception in s. 24(7).

[29]   Esplin T212:14–T213:25; Walshe T1210:11–T1210:24; T1245:19–T1245:23; Rees T2407:22–T2407:24; T2408:14–T2408:17; Collins T2182:13–T2183:15

[30]   Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe (WIT.003.002.0001) [128]

[31]   Emergency Management Act 1986, s. 10

[32]   Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe (WIT.003.002.0001) [20]

[33]   Emergency Management Act 1986, s. 11(1); Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe (WIT.003.002.0001) [33]

[34]   Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe (WIT.003.002.0001) [12], [13], [33]; Walshe T597:3–T597:10

[35]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 2 (WIT.005.001.0123) at 0173

[36]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 2 (WIT.005.001.0123) at 0174

[37]   Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe (WIT.003.002.0001) [26]; Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 2 (WIT.005.001.0123) at 0174

[38]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 2 (WIT.005.001.0123) at 0174–0175

[39]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 2 (WIT.005.001.0123) at 0175

[40]   Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe (WIT.003.002.0001) [27]; Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 2 (WIT.005.001.0123) at 0361, 0374, 0392

[41]   Section 16 also provides that in the absence of agreement the relevant emergency response coordinator may direct a chief officer to appoint an incident controller. This was not necessary on 7 February 2009. Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe (WIT.003.002.0001) [29]–[30]

[42]   Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe (WIT.003.002.0001) [29]

[43]   Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe (WIT.003.002.0001) [28], [30]

[44]   Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe (WIT.003.002.0001) [15]

[45]   Walshe T600:4–T600:24

[46]   Walshe T600:9–T600:17

[47]   Emergency Management Act 1986, s. 13(2)

[48]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 2 (WIT.005.001.0123) at 0176

[49]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 2 (WIT.005.001.0123) at 0176–0178

[50]   Walshe T624:20–T624:27

[51]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 2 (WIT.005.001.0123) at 0179

[52]   Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe, Annexure 3 (WIT.003.002.0044)

[53]   Walshe T625:11–T625:17

[54]   Walshe T623:1–T623:5; T624:30–T625:9

[55]   Walshe T625:20–T626:4

[56]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 2 (WIT.005.001.0123) at 0180

[57]   Emergency Management Act 1986, s. 13(2); Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 2 (WIT.005.001.0123) at 0181–0182; Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe (WIT.003.002.0001) [35]; Walshe T623:19–T624:2

[58]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 2 (WIT.005.001.0123) at 0181

[59]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 2 (WIT.005.001.0123) at 0443

[60]   Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe (WIT.003.002.0001) [24]–[25]; Statement of Walshe, Attachment 1 (WIT.3010.001.0025) at 0038; Walshe T631:4–T632:21; Exhibit 66 – Statement of Collins (WIT.3010.001.0013) [42]

[61]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 2 (WIT.005.001.0123) at 0184

[62]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 2 (WIT.005.001.0123) at 0442–0443

[63]   Walshe T696:4–T696:13; Exhibit 40 (INF.005.001.0001)

[64]   Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe (WIT.003.002.0001) [98]; Walshe T657:7–T657:11

[65]   Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe (WIT.003.002.0001) [98]; Walshe T656:29–T657:3

[66]   Walshe T632:16–T632:21. See also Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 23 (WIT.005.001.1856)

[67]   Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe (WIT.003.002.0001) [124]; [129]–[142]; Walshe T657:4–T660:31

[68]   Exhibit 66 – Statement of Collins (WIT.3010.001.0013) [48]

[69]   Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe (WIT.003.002.0001) [98], [129]–[142]; Walshe T657:12–T660:31; Exhibit 66 – Statement of Collins (WIT.3010.001.0013) [42]–[47]; Collins T2166:23–T2169:19

[70]   Collins T2108:3–T2108:24

[71]   Exhibit 66 – Statement of Collins, Attachment 1 (WIT.3010.001.0025); Collins T2125:5–T2125:10

[72]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 11 (WIT.005.001.0951)

[73]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 11 (WIT.005.001.0951) at 1240

[74]   Collins T2126:7–T2126:17

[75]   Exhibit 66 – Collins Tender (TEN.020.001.0001)

[76]   Collins T2126:18–T2126:30

[77]   Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) [93]–[96]; Exhibit 6 – Statement of Waller (WIT.002.002.0001) [158]–[160]; Exhibit 66 – Statement of Collins (WIT.3010.001.0013) [12]

[78]   Collins T2125:17–T2126:6

[79]   Exhibit 66 – Statement of Collins (WIT.3010.001.0013) [28]

[80]   Exhibit 11 – Statement of Esplin, Attachment 2 (WIT.005.001.0123) at 0180

[81]   Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe (WIT.003.002.0001) [65]; Annexure 7 (WIT.003.002.0061); Exhibit 66 – Statement of Collins, Attachment 3 (WIT.3010.001.0041); Collins T2132:10–T2134:17; T2186:24–T2188:14

[82]   Collins T2133:5–T2134:8

[83]   Walshe T651:23–T651:27; Collins T2129:17–T2129:26

[84]   Exhibit 66 – Statement of Collins (WIT.3010.001.0013) [30]–[33]

[85]   Walshe T650:28–T651:22; Collins T2131:27–T2132:9

[86]   Walsh T696:4–T696:12

[87]   Exhibit 66 – Statement of Collins (WIT.3010.001.0013) at 0015–0018

[88]   Exhibit 82 (OESC.001.001.0031)

[89]   Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees, Annexure 5 (WIT.004.001.0231); Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe (WIT.003.002.0001) [146]–[147]; Walshe T682:12–T685:17; Exhibit 66 – Statement of Collins, Attachment 1 (WIT.3010.001.0025) at 0029–0036

[90]   Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe (WIT.003.002.0001) [144]–[146]

[91]   Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees, Annexure 5 (WIT.004.001.0231); Exhibit 19 – Statement of Walshe (WIT.003.002.0001) [147]–[151]; Annexure 10 (WIT.003.002.0064) at 0071; Walshe T682:12–T685:17; Exhibit 66 – Statement of Collins, Attachment 1 (WIT.3010.001.0025) at 0029–0036

[92]   Exhibit 13 – Statement of Newman (WIT.009.001.0001_R) [19]–[20]; Newman T345:29–T346:9; Exhibit 77 – Statement of Walter (WIT.041.001.0001_R) [74]–[79];

[93]   Exhibit 77 – Statement of Walter (WIT.041.001.0001_R) [77]

[94]   Exhibit 97 – Statement of O’Neill (WIT.047.001.0001_R) [31]; O’Neill T3210:28–T3211:6

[95]   McGahy T2260:25–T2261:4

[96]   McGahy T2261:10–T2261:14

[97]   Exhibit 67 – Statement of Harvey (WIT.036.001.0001_R) [34]–[36]; Harvey T2200:27–T2201:1; Exhibit 87 – Statement of Ananiev (WIT.040.001.0001_R) [27]; Ananiev T2781:30–T2782:3

[98]   Exhibit 126 – Bushfire CRC Interim Report (CRC.300.001.0001_R) at 0107–0108

[99]   Exhibit 13 – Statement of Newman (WIT.009.001.0001_R) [21]; Newman T346:30–T347:18; Sigmund T913:11–T913:22; Exhibit 125 – Statement of J Williams (WIT.055.001.0001_R) [70]–[72]; J Williams T4231:11–T4231:24; T4233:26–T4234:5

[100]  Sigmund T913:11–T913:22; Exhibit 28 – Statement of Sigmund, Attachment 3 (WIT.020.001.0015) at 0024–0026

[101]  Exhibit 125 – Statement of J Williams (WIT.055.001.0001_R) [70]–[72]; J Williams T4231:11–T4231:24

[102]  J Williams T4233:26–T4234:1

[103]  Walshe T685:18–T686:13; see also Rees T2495:2–T2498:14 and Exhibit 74 – Rees Tender (SUMM.022.069.0086) at 0149–0150

[104]  Walshe T687:10–T687:21; T690:3–T690:31

[105]  Exhibit 10 – Statement of Odgers (WIT.008.001.0001_R) [24]; Exhibit 134 – Statement of Hainsworth (WIT.059.001.0001_R) [44]; Exhibit 77 – Statement of Walter (WIT.041.001.0001_R) [79]

[106]  Exhibit 140 (VPO.001.026.0153) at 0155

[107]  Police Association Victoria (SUBM.100.009.0002) [6(9)]

[108]  Exhibit 34 – Statement of Kane (WIT.017.001.0001_R) [9], [13]; Kane T1057:2–T1057:8

[109]  Exhibit 87 – Statement of Ananiev (WIT.040.001.0001_R) [21]

[110]  Exhibit 48 – Statement of D Brown (WIT.029.001.0001_R) [18], [19(f)–(g)]; D Brown T1649:16–T1649:26